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Until recently, the avian brain has remained relatively unexplored by neuroscientists. 
However, as reports of evidence of high-order behaviour in birds has increased, the avian 
brain is increasingly becoming a model of interest to the field. Despite the evolutionary 
trajectory diverging millions of years ago, some structural similarities have been 
highlighted that have prompted further research into the brain and behaviour of pigeons. 
One such area is the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) which is the structural homologue 
of the mammalian prefrontal cortex (PFC). The aim of the current thesis was to explore 
the similarities in the activity of NCL cells compared to those reported in the mammalian 
PFC. In particular, we explored the extent to which NCL cells exhibit value coding when 
different factors were manipulated. 
Pigeons were trained to associate stimuli with different outcomes, where the value of a 
reward was discounted by a preceding cost. The value manipulations used in the 
experiments conducted were increasing the delay to the reward, increasing the physical, 
and the cognitive effort required to attain a reward, and the probability of receiving a 
reward. We recorded from cells in the NCL and found evidence of value coding in relation 
to delay discounting, and physical effort discounting, suggesting similar properties to 
cells found in the mammalian orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. Our 
pursuit of an appropriate cognitive effort task fell short, and as such, no conclusions could 
be drawn as to whether NCL encodes cognitive effort discounting. In the final experiment, 
where probability discounting was manipulated, NCL cells showed no differences in 
firing to suggest that the area is involved in encoding probabilistic discounting. In 
summary, the studies in the current thesis add to the literature comparing the functional 
characteristics of the pigeon NCL to the mammalian PFC, and identify areas for further 
research around the question of cognitive effort discounting in animals, and how the avian 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Decision Making and the Importance of “Value” 
Every day, humans and other animals’ brains are constantly making subconscious 
value judgements that guide quick decision-making. Some behaviours are simple and 
automatic, and do not require the engagement of higher order brain areas. Such quick 
evaluations and actions are advantageous, as they mean that behaviours that may be 
required for a human or animal’s survival can be carried out efficiently and with little 
conscious attention. However, in situations where behaviour may need to be adjusted or 
withheld in order to achieve a different result, a “top down” processing approach is 
necessary. It’s thought that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is important for top down 
processing (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Before describing the studies of the current thesis, 
the following section will provide an introduction to how the brain makes a decision, and 
in particular, the areas that are involved in integrating different facets of value discounting 
in order to make the best decision.  
To understand the importance of value judgements, we must first understand the 
steps required to make a decision. Rangel, Camerer & Montague (2008) describe the steps 
involved in decision-making. First, a person or animal must have knowledge of the 
available choices, and of their own internal and external state. Factors affecting external 
state include the presence of external dangers to the animal’s safety, for example, 
predators, and the terrain that they may be required to traverse in order to attain an 
outcome. Factors affecting internal state may include the animal’s hunger levels, thirst 
levels, energy availability and physical health.  
Next, they must establish the value of each available choice given the internal and 
external state. Rangel et al. (2008) describe three different valuation systems involved in 
assigning value to different options. The first is the Pavlovian behaviour system. The 
Pavlovian system drives behaviours that are associated with a predefined cue. They might 
be referred to as “automatic” or “instinctual” behaviours, but can also be trained in 
experimental animals. The second type of valuation system is the habit system. Habit 
systems work by learning the value of actions that are carried out repeatedly. These are 
learnt through trial and error – when repeated enough, an animal will learn that a certain 
set of actions leads to a particular outcome, and eventually build up an action-reward 




The third system guiding decision making is a goal-directed system. The goal-
directed system establishes ‘goal values’ that result from a certain action. The goal-
directed system is sensitive to contextual changes and to fluctuations in internal and 
external states. For example, a goal directed system might direct a mouse to travel a short 
risky route to obtain food when they are very hungry, because the goal value (the food) 
is highly rewarding. However, when satiation is reached, the value of the food is lessened, 
and the same route that was selected previously might not be taken. Once value has been 
assigned to each option, the animal must select and carry out an action. What follows is 
a reflective analysis of the course of action that they have just taken, evaluating how 
successful and rewarding the outcome was. Finally, they learn from the experience, and 
update the representations of the different possible actions, as well as their internal and 
external state. As a result, the relative value that is placed on future outcomes is adjusted 
(Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Given the importance of the factors that affect 
complex decisions, the concept of value with respect to goal directed decision-making 
has become a topic of interest in psychology and neuroeconomics.  
Before describing the literature around value encoding, it is important to delineate 
the concept of value as opposed to reward. Reward can be defined as the objective amount 
of reinforcement that one receives for carrying out a course of action. When reward is 
contiguous with a defined behaviour, the likelihood of that behaviour being repeated is 
increased. For example, a reward for a hungry pigeon is three seconds of access to grain. 
Value, on the other hand, is subjective and less tangible, and different approaches have 
been taken to define it (O’Doherty, 2014). For the purposes of the current studies, value 
can be defined as the subjective usefulness or importance that an outcome is judged to be 
worth, based on an individual’s current external and internal state. Value is fluid and can 
change over time. Importantly, the value placed on an outcome of an action at one point 
in time will affect the decision making process, and therefore, value can be inferred by an 
animal’s behaviour (O’Doherty, 2014). Factors that manipulate the value of an outcome 
mean that decision-making is a lot more complex, and so the neural representation of such 
factors is the subject of a large body of research.  
An important aspect of value that affects decision-making is discounting. 
Discounting refers to the extent to which a ‘costly’ factor required to attain a reward, for 
example a delay, or effort exertion, detracts from the value of the reward (Critchfield & 




underlie certain psychological and neurodevelopmental disorders, such as impulsivity 
associated with ADHD and substance abuse, disordered eating and perseverating 
behaviours in OCD are, in essence, disorders of value-discounting (Critchfield & Kollins, 
2001; McClelland et al., 2016; Pinto, Steinglass, Greene, Weber, & Simpson, 2014). Over 
the years, researchers have begun to ask the question: what area of the brain is computing 
these discounting factors and assigning value to outcome accordingly? Answering this 
question can help to understand the neurobiology behind disorders of decision-making, 
and importantly, how they may be treated. 
The experiments in the present thesis explore four variations of discounting; delay 
discounting, physical effort discounting, cognitive effort discounting and probabilistic 
discounting. Delay discounting refers to the extent to which a time delay preceding a 
reward affects the overall perceived value of an outcome. Effort discounting refers to the 
extent to which effort requirements to obtain a reward affects the overall perceived value 
of an outcome. Effort discounting may be in the form of physical effort, or cognitive 
effort. Probabilistic discounting describes the extent to which the manipulation of the 
likelihood of a reward being delivered affects the overall perceived value of an outcome. 
In all these cases, different facets of value are being manipulated. In the present thesis, 
we explore the neural basis of discounting in the pigeon brain. To our knowledge, studies 
looking into value representation and discounting in the avian brain are limited. 
Therefore, before describing the experiments that were carried out, the current body of 
literature exploring delay, effort (physical and cognitive) and probabilistic discounting in 
the mammalian brain will be outlined. Furthermore, I will introduce the area in the pigeon 
brain that presents a viable candidate as the area involved in representing value and 
discounting, based on the current studies into its function and neuroanatomy.  
1.2 Delay Discounting 
How does delay discounting influence behaviour? 
If a group of people is offered the choice between receiving $100 immediately, or 
$200 in two months’ time, some people will choose the smaller, immediate option, while 
others will choose the larger, delayed option. Even though $200 is twice the amount of 
money, the two-month delay that the person has to endure detracts from the allure of it. 
Such devaluation is referred to as delay discounting. Delay discounting can be defined as 




Kollins, 2001). Ainslie (1975) published an early review in which he put forward a model 
of delay discounting to explain the nature of the effect of delay on choices. Ainslie noted 
that as delays to reward increase, the extent of reinforcement is quickly reduced when 
training animals on a task.  He explained that impulsiveness, that is, the tendency to 
choose a smaller, more immediate reward instead of waiting through a delay for a larger 
reward, can be accounted for by a hyperbolic function where rewards are discounted as a 
function of time, thereby reducing the subjective value of the delayed rewards (Ainslie, 
1975).  
Because of delay discounting, humans sometimes find it difficult to act in a way 
that will gain them rewards in the distant future. Delay discounting is therefore a clinically 
relevant concept, because it often drives people to choose a sooner reward, often less 
advantageous reward, over a delayed, but objectively better reward. A number of 
disorders are defined by evidence of impulsivity, a behaviour pattern driven by delay 
discounting, where people act in a way that gains them immediate reward (Kalenscher, 
Ohmann, & Gunturkun, 2006). For example, a person suffering an alcohol addiction will 
act impulsively, deciding to drink for the immediate feeling of intoxication. The 
consequences that follow do not seem as salient to them when they decide to consume 
alcohol, presenting a clear example of delay discounting. Interestingly, pathological 
gamblers, individuals with addictive disorders, and heroin and cocaine users, discount 
monetary rewards more than controls who do not use drugs (Kirby & Petry, 2004; 
Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997; Miedl, 2012; Owens et al., 2019).  
Studies into the neural basis of delay discounting  
To better understand disorders involving impulsive decisions, neuroscientists have 
begun to explore the neural basis of delay discounting. In order to do so, however, it is 
first important to explore the neural networks involved in receiving reward. The process 
of selecting, expecting and receiving reward has been studied using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans. A range of structures found in the prefrontal cortex, 
in particular the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), as 
well as the ventral striatum and the amygdala appear to be activated in response to 
receiving reward (Ernst et al., 2004; McClure, York, & Montague, 2004). These 
structures are anatomically connected and their integrated input appears to be an 




More specifically, to understand the neural basis of delay discounting, we must look 
at the encoding of the value of a reward, rather than simply receiving a reward. When 
considering the neurobiology of value processing, it seems plausible that the same areas 
that code for reward, or at least areas closely connected, would encode value. Through 
observations of behaviour in humans with frontal lobe damage, neuroimaging techniques 
and a series of lesion studies and single cell recordings in rats and primates, key areas of 
the brain involved in encoding value have been identified.  
In the first instance, we can turn to the neurobiology of disorders of delay 
discounting in humans. Adult patients with ADHD typically behave more impulsively in 
gambling tasks, leading to large losses (Malloy-Diniz, Fuentes, Leite, Correa, & Bechara, 
2007). Furthermore, ADHD patients also show dysfunctional activation in the OFC that 
correlates with making more risky decisions (Wilbertz et al., 2012). In fact, dysfunction 
in the OFC is often identified in disorders of impulsivity. Another clinical population that 
displays impaired delay discounting is those with substance use disorders; numerous 
studies have reported impulsive delay discounting behaviour in individuals with 
substance use disorders (Reynolds, 2006). Consistent with ADHD patients, there seems 
to be dysfunction in the frontal areas of the brain of drug addicts, particularly the OFC 
(Owens et al., 2019; Volkow & Fowler, 2000). When drug users experience cravings, the 
OFC is hyper-metabolic in proportion to the intensity of their craving (Volkow & Fowler, 
2000).  Furthermore, drugs such as cocaine impair the function of areas in the prefrontal 
cortex, including the OFC and disrupt the user’s ability to make adaptive and long-term 
beneficial decisions (Lucantonio, Stalnaker, Shaham, Niv, & Schoenbaum, 2012).  
Another way of gaining insight into the structures involved in value discounting is 
to observe behavioural changes when specific areas are lesioned, or temporarily de-
activated. In both primates and rats, disabling areas equivalent to the OFC has led to a 
deeper understanding of the role of OFC in processing reward and value, especially in 
relation to delay discounting. Two common impairments that have been noted in animal 
models is that OFC lesions appear to prevent reversal learning and interfere with 
Pavlovian conditioning. For example, damage to the OFC in rats impairs their acquisition 
of a Pavlovian auto-shaping response; that is the ability to approach a stimulus predicting 
reward. Interestingly, these animals are not impaired in learning what stimulus predicts 




2003). The behaviours exhibited by animals with OFC lesions suggest that the area is 
important for processing reward contingencies and adjusting behaviour in response. 
OFC lesions in rats have been associated with changes in behaviour in response to 
delay discounting. For example, a number of studies have examined the effects of lesions 
to the OFC in a task where animals are presented with the choice between an immediate, 
small reward and a delayed, large reward.  Rats with OFC lesions tend to exhibit a 
preference for immediate, small reward in contrast to non-lesioned animals who prefer 
the larger, delayed rewards (Jo, Kim, Lee, & Jung, 2013; Rudebeck, Walton, Smyth, 
Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2006). Similarly, when the cannabinoid receptors in the rat 
OFC are activated rats prefer immediate, small rewards (Khani et al., 2014).  
Interestingly, Winstanley (2004) found the opposite effect in that lesions to the OFC 
increased rats’ preference for larger, delayed rewards (Winstanley, 2004). Irrespective of 
the direction in which OFC lesioned rats change their behaviour, it is evident that animals 
with OFC lesions process reward differently to non-lesioned animals. 
Single unit recording in animals 
As well as observing the behavioural effects of lesions to the OFC, a number of 
electrophysiology studies have explored the role of the OFC in reward processing. For 
example, Ramus and Eichenbaum (2000) found that cells in the rat OFC show preferential 
firing for odours that cue reward over odours that cue non-reward. Furthermore, when the 
pairing of the odours with reward were extinguished, the OFC neurons also extinguished 
their cue preferences (Ramus & Eichenbaum, 2000). Similar findings have been 
demonstrated in monkey OFC (Hikosaka & Watanabe, 2000; Thorpe, Rolls, & Maddison, 
1983).  
OFC cells not only encode reward and non-reward, but also appear to encode the 
value of different rewards. Schoenbaum, Chiba, and Gallagher (1998) trained rats to 
distinguish between an appetitive cue signalling sucrose syrup release and an aversive 
cue signalling quinine release. Firing in the rat OFC was selective for appetitive outcomes 
over aversive outcomes (Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gallagher, 1998). Interestingly OFC 
cells not only respond differentially to positive and negative rewards, but they also 
respond differentially to two different types of positive rewards. For example, cells in 
OFC respond more strongly during a period prior to receiving a highly appetitive reward 




reward (less favoured juice; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). 
The OFC therefore appears to encode some aspect of differentiating between different 
values of reward. 
As well as distinguishing between reward and non-reward, between positive and 
negative outcomes, and between rewards that differ in value, cells in the OFC also appear 
to be modulated by the magnitude of reward. Both Cromwell and Schulz (2003) and 
Wallis and Miller (2003) found that cells in the monkey OFC were modulated by the 
amount of reward they were about to receive. Specifically, the firing rate of the cells 
increased just before the monkeys were to be delivered a large amount of fruit juice 
compared to a small amount of fruit juice (Cromwell & Schultz, 2003; Wallis & Miller, 
2003). Roesch and Olsen (2007) took these studies one step further and examined whether 
the neural activity was in response to the amount of reward or the motivation induced by 
that reward. By pitting motivation to obtain a reward against motivation to avoid an 
aversive stimulus, the authors concluded that it was the actual reward amount rather than 
the motivation levels that was being modulated by the neural activity (Roesch & Olson, 
2007). 
Finally, OFC cells also seem to be modulated by delay discounting. Both Roesch 
and Olsen (2005) and Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006) varied the duration of the delay 
to a reward in order to modulate the value of that reward. By undertaking such a 
manipulation, the authors were able to modulate the subjects’ reward preferences, and in 
doing so also modulated the neural activity of neurons in the primate OFC (Padoa-
Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Roesch & Olson, 2005). Roesch, Taylor and Schoenbaum 
(2008) took these studies further and found that some OFC cells fired in relation to reward 
magnitude and others independently encoded the delay length, while some cells only fired 
in increasing anticipation of the reward delivery (Roesch, Taylor, & Schoenbaum, 2008). 
The OFC therefore appears to play some role in the trade-off between time and reward 
magnitude, that is, in delay discounting.  
Overall, the studies of delay discounting in the mammalian brain indicate that OFC 
cells play an important role in modulating impulsive behaviour, and in encoding value 
when delays are manipulated. OFC’s involvement in delay discounting is relatively 




mammalian area when it comes to making decisions that are impacted by delay 
discounting.  
1.3 Physical Effort Discounting 
How does effort discounting influence behaviour 
If a group of people are offered $100 dollars for no effort exertion, or $200 dollars 
if they run 5km, just like in the delay discounting example, you would likely see that 
some would select the smaller reward requiring no effort, while others would exert more 
effort for double the reward.  In the same way that increasing delay affects the perceived 
value of a reward, the effort costs that are required to obtain the reward can also discount 
value. Effort discounting can therefore be defined as the extent to which effort 
requirements decrease the perceived value of a reward (Botvinick, Huffstetler & 
McGuire, 2009). Like delay discounting, it is an important aspect of decision making 
affecting clinical populations, as well as every day decision makers.  
Typically, if a person is able to exert effort, and continue to do so in pursuit of a 
greater outcome, we consider them to be highly motivated or tenacious. However, we can 
also see disorders of effort discounting; for example, perseverative behaviour is an 
example of effort discounting gone awry, where a person continues to do an action in 
order to gain some perceived ‘outcome’, despite the action not being adaptive, and on the 
contrary, often problematic. In contrast, some lack motivation to the point of apathy, and 
find it difficult to exert any effort in order to gain an outcome (Bonnelle et al., 2015; 
Treadway & Zald, 2013). Apathy is often a negative symptom of mood disorders and 
schizophrenia. It is therefore important to understand the neurobiology behind effort 
discounting and in turn, begin to understand how they can be treated. 
Clinical research has explored differences in effort discounting, finding that when 
given a choice between a high effort-high reward and low effort-low reward, patients with 
depression, and with negative schizophrenia symptoms are much less likely than controls 
to choose the high effort high reward (Barch, Treadway, & Schoen, 2014; Gold et al., 
2013; Treadway, Bossaller, Shelton, & Zald, 2012). Interestingly, individuals with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are more likely to choose to expend high effort than 
controls are, perhaps relating to repetitive actions and heightened investment in non-
social interests, both common traits of individuals with ASD (Damiano, Aloi, Treadway, 




A number of animal studies have addressed the effects of effort discounting in 
decision-making paradigms by manipulating the effort required to achieve a reward. For 
example, rats placed in a T-shaped maze with the decision between receiving a large 
reward, but at a high effort cost (HCHR (high-cost, high-reward) or a low reward arm but 
with minimal effort required (LCLR (low-cost, low-reward); chose the HCHR arm on the 
majority of trials. The authors also found that when the barrier was increased in size, the 
preference shifted to favour the LCLR arm, indicating a change in the perception of the 
reward value as effort requirements were manipulated (Walton, Croxson, Rushworth, & 
Bannerman, 2005). Similar behaviour has been shown in an operant task where the effort 
required was in the form of lever presses on a fixed ratio (Walton, Kennerley, Bannerman, 
Phillips, & Rushworth, 2006). Initially rats would press the HCHR lever more to attain a 
larger food reward, but as the number of presses required to attain reward was increased, 
the rats switched preference to LCLR (Walton et al., 2006). The basic design of these 
experiments demonstrates how manipulating effort requirements creates changes in the 
behaviour of animals.  
A behavioural study using macaque monkeys indicated that primates display 
similar behaviour changes in response to effort discounting. The study involved 
manipulating the number of presses required to receive a reward and manipulating the 
reward amount. The monkeys were presented with two options. On some occasions the 
reward amount remained constant, while the effort required was manipulated, with 
different stimuli representing “high” or “low” effort. On other occasions the effort 
requirement was kept constant while the reward amount differed and again, different 
stimuli represented large food reward or small food reward.  As expected, the monkeys 
chose the option that required the least effort, or the option that obtained higher reward. 
In pairs where the monkeys had to choose a between a larger reward but with a higher 
effort cost (HCHR) and a smaller reward but with little effort cost (LCLR), most chose 
the higher cost and larger reward. Furthermore, in forced choice trials, where the monkey 
was only presented with one stimulus, the latency to respond was much quicker when the 
HCHR cost stimulus was presented, indicating a preference for exerting more effort for 
larger reward (Walton et al., 2006). Once again we see that manipulation of effort 




Studies into the neural basis of effort discounting  
Imaging studies of the human brain during decisions where effort costs are 
manipulated have implicated different areas of the brain in such decisions. A common 
theme that has emerged is that different effort costs elicit differential activation of the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Massar, Libedinsky, Weiyan, Huettel, & Chee, 2015; 
Prevost, Pessiglione, Metereau, Clery-Melin, & Dreher, 2010). The ACC is part of the 
medial frontal cortex (MFC) and connected to a number of sites in the brain including the 
PFC, ventral midbrain, amygdala and motor areas, and is thought to play a vital role in 
learning and updating information to guide decision making (Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, 
Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001; Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006). 
It therefore makes sense that ACC would be involved in decisions regarding physical 
effort cost. Others however have reported conflicting findings, reporting OFC to be the 
area reflecting value, while ACC simply encodes different effort requirements (Aridan, 
Malecek, Poldrack, & Schonberg, 2019; Hogan, Galaro, & Chib, 2018). The authors 
suggest that a core network involving OFC and ventral striatum code a general ‘value’ 
signal, when reward is discounting by different demands, in this case, effort requirements 
(Aridan et al., 2019; Westbrook, Lamichhane, & Braver, 2019).  
Many of the studies into the neural basis of effort discounting in humans are 
restricted to cognitive effort discounting, due to the constraints of current imaging 
techniques, where participants are required to refrain from moving to avoid movement 
artefact affecting the scan. Studies of cognitive effort discounting in humans are outlined 
in the next section. The extent to which cognitive effort discounting can be generalised 
to physical effort discounting in terms of the underlying neural structures involved is up 
for debate. An fMRI study in humans assessing the activation when people are 
anticipating a cognitive or a physical effort requirement highlighted the ventral striatum 
as representing a ‘common motivational code’ that indicates the net value of the 
anticipated action whether it requires physical or cognitive effort (Schmidt, Lebreton, 
Cléry-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012). However, the authors hypothesize that in 
a choice task it is likely that separate prefrontal areas would encode the different values 
associated with different requirements.  
A recent study by Hogan and colleagues (2019) aimed to explore Schmidt et al’s 
assumption (Schmidt et al., 2012) about the involvement of the PFC in decisions when 




made choices between different levels of effort requirements (in the form of grip force) 
to attain a monetary reward. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was identified 
as being involved in assessing the value of the prospective effort choices, while the ACC 
was involved in making the decision, and its activity was modulated by choice difficulty 
(Hogan, Galaro, & Chib, 2019). While further studies in human subjects specifically 
looking at physical effort are lacking, the involvement of the PFC and in particular, ACC 
is consistent with the existing imaging studies involving cognitive effort (Botvinick, 
Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009; Massar et al., 2015; Skudlarski et al., 2003). 
Perhaps one of the most compelling human studies into the role of ACC in relation 
to effort based decisions is a study by Parvizi et al (2013). The study reported on the 
experience of two epilepsy patients with intracranial electrodes, allowing the stimulation 
of the anterior midcingulate cortex. When the area was stimulated, both patients 
individually reported what they felt. In sham trials, and in trials where areas adjacent to 
ACC were stimulated, they did not report any changes. However, in both patients, when 
the ACC area was stimulated, they reported similar feelings. Patient One reported feeling 
like they were “trying to figure out [how to] get through something… not like a negative 
thing… more of a positive thing like… push harder to try and get through this”. Patient 
Two reported a similar feeling that “If I don’t fight, I give up. I can’t give up” (Parvizi, 
Rangarajan, Shirer, Desai, & Greicius, 2013). While the findings cannot be quantified, 
the authors surmised that when ACC is activated, it results in a sense of a “will to 
persevere”, a concept closely linked to effort.  
Lesion studies in animal models have largely focussed on ACC and medial frontal 
cortex (MFC) in relation to effort discounting. Walton, Bannerman & Rushworth (2002) 
trained rats in a T-maze where they chose between a high effort option of climbing a 
barrier for larger reward (HR) or no barrier for small reward (LR). Before surgery, all the 
rats chose the HR arm almost every time. After lesions of medial frontal cortex, including 
prelimbic, infra limbic and cingulate cortices, rats would chose the LR arm. The authors 
concluded that MFC is important for making animals exert more effort in order to obtain 
larger rewards (Walton, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2002). In a follow up study, Walton, 
Bannerman, Alterescu & Rushworth (2003) found that a more localised lesion to ACC 
saw the same behavioural changes, and concluded that it was the impairment of ACC 
function that affects the willingness of the animal to put in effort to obtain reward 




findings, consistently showing a decrease in high effort choices associated with ACC 
lesions (Holec, Pirot, & Euston, 2014; Peter H. Rudebeck, Walton, Smyth, Bannerman, 
& Rushworth, 2006).  
Single unit recording in animals 
As previously discussed, one problem with the study of effort in the human brain 
is that the constraints of an fMRI machine mean that studies focus on cognitive effort 
discounting as opposed to physical effort discounting.  In other words, the tasks that 
induce effort do not tend to require physical effort but rather a more complicated cognitive 
task. Single cell recording in animals allows the recording of cells in different areas of 
the brain during a decision making task with varied physical effort requirements. A 
number of animal studies have explored the role of the areas equivalent to those that have 
been implicated in effort discounting in humans. 
Hillman & Bilkey (2010) recorded from neurons in the ACC of freely moving rats 
during a choice paradigm where they could select to turn down one arm of a maze to gain 
low reward for low effort cost (LCLR; no barrier, two food pellets) or high reward for 
high cost (HCHR; climbing a larger barrier for six food pellets). 63% of cells in ACC 
increased firing prior to moving towards a specific reward outcome, and 94% of these 
cells fired more before moving towards the HCHR arm. The authors went on to record 
from a group of cells that were HCHR responsive when the barrier was removed, but the 
different reward outcomes remained (2:6; two pellets and six pellets). They found that the 
difference in firing disappeared for all but one of the cells, indicating that the increased 
firing during HCHR trials was a response to the effort requirements rather than the reward 
amount. However further manipulations of the experiment suggested that the activity in 
ACC was not so straightforward; when a barrier was presented on both sides (2B:6B) 
firing was more to the side with the most reward, indicating. Furthermore, when rats were 
required to choose between receiving two rewards, with no barrier, or two rewards with 
a barrier (2:2B), the ACC cells showed preferential firing for the most valuable option, 
being the 2 rewards with no barrier. Again, when the task was switched back to a 2:6B 
configurations, these cells changed their firing rate preference to the HCHR side. The 
authors conclude that ACC cells are dynamic in their firing and represent the most 
valuable options taking into account the effort requirements and reward amount (Hillman 




Cowen, Davis and Nitz (2012) carried out a similar study aiming to dissociate 
ACC cell response to effort, reward and action sequences. They developed a maze that 
formed a loop instead of a T-shape. The rats approached a choice area where they selected 
one of two paths that would initiate the corresponding food amount and the presence or 
absence of a barrier.  The rats carried out choice and forced trials. Among the ACC cells 
that they recorded from, the authors found that half responded differentially according to 
the specific route taken, while 21% responded to the effort cost associated with their 
chosen path, and 12% encoded the future reward amount. When the authors compared 
the difference in firing between high and low reward and the differences between high 
and low effort requirements in the period before path selection, they found that firing 
related to the value outcome of the reward. In other words, similar to Hillman & Bilkey 
(2010), ACC firing was found to relate to the value of an outcome when taking into 
account the effort requirement and reward amount. (Cowen, Davis, & Nitz, 2012).  
In a more recent study by Porter, Hillman & Bilkey (2019), the authors recorded 
from ACC cells in rats during a task where, again, effort requirements were manipulated 
but reward amounts remained constant.  The rats ran along a shuttle box, that was tilted 
0, 15 and 25 degrees, therefore creating a series of effort conditions, from the more 
effortful requirement of running uphill at 25 degrees to the less effortful, and more 
preferred (as evidenced by a choice paradigm) option of running downhill or with no tilt. 
A subset of neurons fired selectively to different tilt angles, to uphill vs. downhill and to 
interactions of tilt angle and uphill versus downhill, during both the activity period and 
the reward delivery period. Population activity increased when the rats ran downhill, and 
more cells were selective to downhill compared to uphill when the tilt was greater (i.e. 
25°). There was also preferential encoding at a population level when the rats received 
the reward after running downhill at 25° compared to any other time receiving reward. 
Over all, the ACC activity in Porter et al.’s experiment further demonstrate the dynamic 
response patterns of ACC to the most valuable actions and outcomes accounting for 
different effort states. An interesting finding from the study was that even in the 0 degree 
condition, ACC firing was greater to the “downhill” condition, suggesting that the rats’ 
prior experience may have resulted in a conditioned evaluation of running in the 
“downhill” direction, even when the effort requirement is no different (Porter, Hillman, 




To summarise the literature exploring physical effort discounting in the 
mammalian brain, human imaging studies provide some direction suggesting that 
prefrontal areas and the ACC are implicated in making decisions affected by effort 
discounting. Animal studies provide further evidence that the ACC is indeed a key part 
of making these decisions, demonstrating that lesions of ACC change effort related 
decisions, and that cells in ACC respond in a dynamic nature to reflect the most valuable 
option when effort requirements are manipulated.   
1.4 Cognitive Effort Discounting 
How does cognitive effort influence behaviour 
It’s well documented that the value of an outcome is decreased by increased 
physical effort demands (Kennerley et al., 2006; Walton et al., 2005). The studies outlined 
in the previous section demonstrate that when two options vary in effort exertion, but 
have a constant reward outcome, the subject (human or animal) will choose the option 
requiring the least exertion (Kool et al., 2010). However, more recently, the distinction 
between cognitive effort and physical effort has been highlighted. Cognitive effort can be 
defined as “the degree to which cognitive control is engaged” (Shenhav et al., 2017). 
Therefore, cognitive effort discounting refers to the extent to which the cognitive 
demands required to attain a reward, decreases the perceived value of the reward. For 
example, completing a task may require engagement of working memory, selective 
attention or rule changing, all requiring more cognitive control. Compare those tasks with 
one that is well learned and automatic, where one can easily carry out the task with little 
thought. A real life example is driving a car. Driving around a familiar area where the 
streets are quiet, requires minimal working memory and focussed attention. On the other 
hand, driving in a busy, unfamiliar area requires selective attention to ignore distractors, 
working memory to navigate, and rule switching to attend to traffic signals. The first 
situation requires far less cognitive effort than the second, and to many people, the first 
option would be the preferred one, particularly after a long day of working where 
cognitive resources might already be drained.   
Shenhav and colleagues (2017) compare mental effort to physical effort; “task 
characteristics and information processing are analogous to the weight of an object and 
the physical strength of a person trying to lift it, and that task performance is the swiftness 




together, assuming that they can be interchanged in the study of the broader concept of 
‘effort’. But researchers are now asking if such a generalisation is justified, or whether 
we should instead be treating cognitive and physical effort as separate value predictors 
(Kool & Botvinick, 2018).  
In a study exploring how cognitive effort affects human behaviour, Kool, 
McGuire, Rosen & Botvinick (2010) provided participants with two card decks, one of 
which require more task shifting than the other, and consequently requiring higher 
cognitive effort (HCE) and another with less switching, demanding lower cognitive effort 
(LCE). The participants’ errors and reaction times indicated a preference for the low effort 
deck, and furthermore, their choices favoured the low effort deck. Interestingly, some of 
the participants reported no awareness of a difference in difficulty between the two decks, 
despite showing behavioural preferences for the LCE deck.  Westbrook, Kester & Braver 
(2013) also found that cognitive effort requirements in an n-back task discount the value 
of a reward, and furthermore, that the discounting curve is greater for older adults 
(Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013).  
Cognitive effort discounting is clinically relevant in a similar way to physical 
effort discounting. Anhedonia and avolition, in relation to depression (Hammar et al., 
2011) and also negative symptoms in schizophrenia patients, can relate to both physical 
and cognitive effort. However, some studies have specifically explored the relationship 
between cognitive effort requirements and clinical symptoms. For example, it has been 
shown that schizophrenia patients have an impaired ability to detect differences in 
cognitive demands (Gold et al., 2014), and show a steeper cognitive discounting curve, 
particularly if they exhibit a greater number of negative symptoms (Culbreth, Westbrook, 
& Barch, 2016). In other words, while schizophrenia patients may not detect cognitive 
effort changes as easily as controls, they respond in a way that indicates that a cognitive 
effort increase is more costly to them than it may be to a control.  
Studies into the neural basis of cognitive effort discounting  
Human patients with damage to different brain areas provide some insight into the 
neural mechanisms driving cognitive effort. Cognitive fatigue is often reported in 
individuals who have experienced traumatic brain injuries (TBI), and unsurprisingly, TBI 
patients subjectively rate mental effort on cognitive tasks more highly than controls, and 




Andriessen, Brauer, Vos, & Van Der Werf, 2007). fMRI findings suggest that patients 
with TBIs exhibit increased brain activity across all regions during cognitive tasks when 
compared to controls, which may be the cause of the experience of mental fatigue. 
Interestingly, some of the areas that are significantly less activated in controls compared 
to TBI patients include frontal areas such as the left middle frontal gyrus and the ACC, 
as well as in the basal ganglia and the parietal cortex. The authors suggest that the increase 
in ACC activity in TBI patients may reflect greater effort being engaged in order to carry 
out the task compared to healthy controls (Kohl, Wylie, Genova, Hillary, & DeLuca, 
2009).  
In older adults with depression, who have poorer cognitive control abilities, there 
is some evidence that the ACC is less active during a response inhibition task when 
compared to healthy controls (Katz et al., 2010). Furthermore, a meta-analysis of studies 
of ACC dysfunction found that ACC abnormalities were related to adverse outcomes in 
elderly people with depression, and that the executive dysfunction that is often present in 
geriatric depression patients are similar to those observed in people with damage to ACC 
(Alexopoulos, Gunning-Dixon, Latoussakis, Kanellopoulos, & Murphy, 2008).  
In fMRI studies of healthy subjects, ACC has also been implicated in responding 
to changes in cognitive effort requirements. In a study where task switching was used to 
increase cognitive effort, activity in ACC increased during HCE tasks when compared to 
LCE tasks (Botvinick, Huffstetler & McGuire 2009). Massar and colleagues (2015) found 
that ACC was the only region that was more active in cognitive effort tasks compared to 
delay discounting tasks, and OFC was found to encode the value associated with both 
cognitive effort and delay discounting. In another fMRI of healthy controls and problem 
gamblers completing the Stroop task, both groups showed activation in dorsal ACC and 
dorsolateral frontal cortex while engaging cognitive control to carry out the task, but 
pathological gamblers showed decreased activation in left ventromedial PFC (Potenza et 
al., 2003). Dorsal ACC and dorsolateral PFC, along with the insular and superior parietal 
cortices have also been implicated in cognitive effort in healthy controls carrying out a 
word memory task (Allen, Bigler, Larsen, Goodrich-Hunsaker, & Hopkins, 2007). 
In a more recent imaging study by Westbrook et al. (2018), the value of tasks 
differing in cognitive effort requirements is thought to be coded in a general valuation 




that a distinct frontal network, specifically involving the ventromedial PFC and the 
ventral striatum, encoded the value of cognitive discounting in the same way as it would 
the value of other subjective costs like delay discounting and physical effort (Aridan et 
al., 2019; Hogan et al., 2018; Westbrook et al., 2019). If it is the case that cognitive 
discounting is encoded as part of a more general value encoding network, then we might 
expect studies in animal models to find cells in similar areas to those implicated in delay 
and effort discounting tasks to also represent cognitive discounting.  
Cognitive effort in animals 
The study of cognitive effort in animals is somewhat limited. The nature of 
cognitive effort makes it difficult to manipulate in non-human subjects. While humans 
can report that certain tasks require more cognitive effort, be it concentration or task 
switching, it is difficult to determine whether animals experience the same subjective 
change in task difficulty. One problem faced is the inability to quantify how much 
cognitive effort, if any, is expended. In physical effort tasks, it can be assumed that tasks 
requiring greater energy output, for example a rat jumping over a barrier compared to no 
barrier, objectively requires greater physical effort. When it comes to cognitive effort 
tasks, the only measure of cognitive effort is the accuracy in a task. However, using 
accuracy as a measure poses another problem. If an animal performs worse in a difficult 
matching to sample task than it does in an easy matching to sample task, it is apparent 
that the difficult task was more cognitively demanding. However, the animal is then more 
likely to receive a reward in the easier task than the difficult one. As such, their choices 
may favour the easy task over the more difficult task simply because they are more likely 
to get reward, not because of the differences in effort requirements. This problem is 
especially pertinent in an electrophysiological experiment. Any changes in neural firing 
between high and low cognitive effort conditions cannot be attributed to the effort, but to 
the more simple explanation that the neural difference is a response to reward likelihood. 
At present, the most robust cognitive effort paradigm conducted in animals was 
created in the Winstaley lab at University of British Columbia. Cocker, Hosking, Benoit 
& Winstanley (2012) first developed the rodent Cognitive Effort Task (rCET) to explore 
the effect of psychostimulants on decision making when manipulating cognitive effort. 
The rCET required rats to select one of two levers designated to either high effort, high 




holes was illuminated for either 1 second (LR trials) or 0.2s (HR trials). The rat then had 
to make a nose poke into the hole where the light had occurred. A correct nose poke led 
to a reward of one (LR) or two (HR) pellets. The authors argued that the HR condition 
required more cognitive effort as it demanded greater cognitive attention due to the 
shorter presentation time of the sample stimulus (Cocker, Hosking, Benoit, & Winstanley, 
2012). Cocker et al (2012) used the rCET to define “Workers”, rats that chose the HR 
option more often than the “Slackers”, who preferred the LR option. The set of studies 
that were conducted using the rCET are discussed in depth in Chapter 3. 
In summary, the current literature surrounding cognitive effort is unclear. Many 
of the human studies are simply framed as “effort” studies, confined to cognitive effort 
tasks because of the restraints of imaging technology. However, those studies generally 
support the view that the PFC and in particular the ACC are involved in assessing and 
carrying out cognitive effort requirements. ACC has therefore been assumed involved in 
cognitive effort discounting. In animals, only one research group has successfully created 
a cognitive effort task that allow for the manipulating of cognitive effort, and therefore 
the exploration of cognitive effort discounting. While the task design is innovative, it 
means that as it stands, the literature on cognitive effort in animals is extremely limited.  
1.5 Probabilistic Discounting 
How does probabilistic discounting influence behaviour 
In order to survive and reproduce, animals make decisions based on what will gain 
them maximum reward. In most real life situations, a reward such as food is not 
guaranteed, and a degree of uncertainty can make the “best” option less obvious. For all 
animals, human and non-human, past experiences carrying out a particular action 
contribute to a cognitive representation of how likely it is to lead to reward. For example, 
if a foraging animal finds that travelling to a particular area almost always results in them 
finding food, they are more likely to go to that area again in the future. However if they 
only find food in that area once in every ten visits, they may tend towards travelling to 
other areas where the likelihood of food is higher. Probabilistic discounting is the term 
used to encompass such behaviour changes. It refers to the extent to which the value of a 
particular action changes when the likelihood of receiving reward is adjusted. 
Behaviour based on reward probability extends to normal and abnormal human 




can be advantageous to select less probabilistic rewards, for example, taking an informed 
and calculated risk when investing money. However, if probabilistic discounting is 
impaired, it can result in problematic, risky behaviours. Risk taking behaviours are often 
at the root of delinquency and criminal acts among people of all ages. In fact, by 
definition, risky behaviour is a symptom of a number of behavioural disorders such as 
gambling and substance use disorders, as well as antisocial personality disorder. 
Impulsivity, a feature of ADHD, is also often perceived as a deficit of probabilistic 
discounting, as it can lead to selection of certain behaviour with little regard for outcome 
probabilities that we might otherwise see in healthy controls (Bialaszek, Gaik, McGoun, 
& Zielonka, 2015; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999). 
Studies of human behaviour find that clinical populations may be less sensitive to 
probabilistic discounting. For example, problem gamblers have been found to show a less 
steep probabilistic discounting curve (Madden, Petry & Johnson, 2009; Holt, Green & 
Meyerson, 2003). People with ADHD are more likely to act impulsively in a probabilistic 
discounting decision paradigm, and ADHD children are more likely to choose a large, 
risky reward over a smaller, more certain one compared to controls (Dai, Harrow, Song, 
Rucklidge, & Grace, 2016; Drechsler, Rizzo, & Steinhausen, 2010). Heavy smokers also 
have a less steep probabilistic discounting curve when compared to non-smokers (Yi, 
Chase & Bickle, 2007), and males that meet the criteria for internet gaming disorder show 
a preference for probabilistic outcomes over fixed ones when compared to controls (Lin, 
Zhou, Dong & Du, 2015). Given the relevance of probabilistic discounting in both clinical 
and non-clinical populations, it is important to understand the neural networks driving the 
process, and understanding where disorder may arise.  
Studies into the neural basis of probabilistic discounting  
Imaging studies in human brains have implicated prefrontal areas as being 
involved in probabilistic discounting. Activity in the mPFC has been associated with 
selection of high risk options compared with lower risk options (Ernst et al., 2004) and 
also outcome uncertainty in the delay period prior to reward delivery in a risky decision 
making task (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001). Furthermore, the activity in  mPFC, 
and more specifically, OFC has been implicated in the representation of subjective value 
when reward probabilities are variable (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, Glover, 
2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Peters & Buchel, 2009). OFC 




participants choose from two decks of cards, one associated with high risk and large 
reward, or low risk and small reward, for which the contingencies are switched throughout 
the session. OFC activation levels positively correlate with task performance, suggesting 
the OFC activation is important in assessing probability and driving optimal behaviour 
(Lawrence, Jollant, O’Daly, Zelaya, & Phillips, 2009).  
Other frontal areas involved in probability discounting include posterior 
frontomedian cortex (PFMC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and ACC. In all of these 
areas, activation relates to processing uncertainty, which is an unavoidable aspect of a 
task where probability is manipulated. Unlike probability, which is the quantified 
likelihood of reward delivery based on past experience, uncertainty is exclusive to the 
period just prior to reward delivery, or the absence of reward delivery, where either 
outcome could eventuate. PFMC activation is found to be negatively correlated with 
intolerance of uncertainty in a task where some cues indicated a 50/50 chance of an 
aversive outcome (Schienle et al., 2010). ACC activation has also been linearly correlated 
with certainty of a reward in a HiLo task, where the chances of a participant being correct 
ranged from 50/50 (most uncertain) and 100% certain. Furthermore, the level of 
intolerance to uncertainty predicted the extent to which the degree of uncertainty 
impacted ACC firing in adolescents, but not adults (Krain et al., 2006). In summary, 
mPFC as a whole is consistently reported as being involved in tasks where probability is 
manipulated. OFC in particular is associated with the subjective value of different actions 
in relation to probability, while ACC activity appears to be linked to uncertainty of 
reward.  
Lesion studies in both humans and animals have explored the role of prefrontal 
cortex in probabilistic discounting tasks. While human studies can observe the 
performance of humans with brain damage in tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task (for 
example, Bechara, 1997; Bechara et al., 1999; Malloy-Diniz et al., 2007), the brain 
damage that patients have sustained tends to be non-specific and widespread across brain 
areas. Lesion studies in animal models allow the observation of the effects of more 
specific lesions or deactivations. A number of studies have explored how different lesions 
affect rats’ performance on a rat version of the Iowa Gambling Task (Zeeb, Robbins, & 
Winstanley, 2009). OFC lesions that were made after the animals had learnt the task did 
not change preferences, but lesions made before learning the task, impaired their 




In another study using a similar risky decision-making task, where rats chose 
between  certain small rewards or risky large rewards, lesions to different areas of the 
PFC in rats affected behaviour in different ways. The authors found that lesions to pre 
limbic mPFC reduced the animals’ risk discounting so that they were more likely to 
choose the risky, larger reward. Lesions to OFC affected response time, but not choice, 
and lesions to ACC and insular cortex had no effect of the rats’ activity (St. Onge & 
Floresco, 2010). In another lesion study of rats, lesions to nucleus accumbens core 
resulted in rats choosing large rewards only when they were certain, and opting for 
smaller, certain rewards if large rewards had a smaller probability of being delivered 
(Cardinal & Howes, 2005). Overall, the behaviour reported in PFC lesion studies in rats 
during probabilistic discounting tasks do not clarify the role of prefrontal areas. 
Single unit recording 
Electrophysiology studies of the neural mechanisms of probabilistic discounting 
in the animal brain have allowed more specific insight into the brain areas involved. 
Activity in subcortical brain regions have been implicated in encoding of reward 
probability. Dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia 
nigra of monkeys have been found to fire in preference to signals of a more probable 
reward at a population level (Fiorillo, Christopher, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Tobler, 
Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2014). Furthermore a number of dopaminergic neurons show an 
increasing firing rate between the stimulus presentation period and the expected time of 
reward delivery, in particular during trials higher in uncertainty (Fiorillo, Christopher et 
al., 2003). In another task manipulating the probability of receiving reward, tonically 
active cells in the monkey putamen fired more following the delivery of a reward in a low 
probability trial than a high probability trial (Apicella, Ravel, Deffains, & Legallet, 2011). 
Electrophysiology studies in frontal areas, including those identified as important 
in the previously mentioned human imaging studies, have formed a compelling argument 
for their involvement in probabilistic discounting. Cells have been found in the monkey 
ACC, OFC and lateral prefrontal cortex that modulate firing specifically in relation to 
reward probability, as well as integrating other value variables such as reward magnitude, 
certainty and cost in terms of effort requirements (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2006; 
Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & Wallis, 2009; O’Neill & Schultz, 2018; Yang & Murray, 
2018). Kennerley and colleagues (2009) recorded from all three areas during a decision 




the highest of proportion of cells representing three value variables (probability, reward 
pay off and effort cost) in ACC (Kennerley et al., 2009). ACC has also been shown to fire 
in the period before receiving an optimal reward when probabilities and magnitudes are 
manipulated, even before the monkey’s behaviour changed to indicate that they preferred 
the optimal stimulus. Furthermore, deactivation of ACC impaired the monkey’s search 
for the optimal stimulus (Amiez et al., 2006). In a non-choice task  where monkeys were 
presented with a stimulus indicating the reward magnitude and the probability of reward 
delivery, OFC cells fired in response to magnitude, certainty and volatility of reward 
(Yang & Murray, 2018). Therefore, despite the doubt cast by lesion studies in animal 
PFC, electrophysiological studies support the idea that both OFC and ACC are involved 
in probabilistic discounting in some way. 
A study of mPFC cells in mice recorded firing rates over the course of a choice 
task where the mice were presented with a choice between two options, for which the 
probability of reward changed across the session. Over time, mPFC cells changed firing 
rates in relation to both the overall value of the two choices they were presented, and also 
the relative value for each selected choice, compared to the other option. The changes in 
firing rates were dynamic over the course of the trials as the associated probabilities 
changed (Bari et al., 2019). Another recent study, this time in rats, recorded from both 
OFC and mPFC during a choice task where rats made a decision between a high 
probability, small reward and a lower probability larger reward. OFC neurons encoded 
the overall value of an outcome based on the probability and size of reward, while neurons 
in mPFC reflected updating of information following reward delivery and prediction 
errors on single trials (Hong et al., 2019). Taken together, these two studies of OFC and 
mPFC indicate that mPFC is responsible for updating an overall representation of value 
following each trial, whereas OFC uses that updated information to guide decisions and 
to inform what the “best” option is.  
The findings reflect those from a similar study of the rat OFC by van Duuren et 
al (2009), but in their task, the reward amount was the same and only probability was 
manipulated. After sampling an odour that would indicate the probability of reward 
delivery, the rats moved towards the food delivery area. While moving there, 22% of 
active cells were modulated by the different reward probabilities, while only one cell 
appeared to modulate activity in response to uncertainty. Furthermore, a subpopulation 




these cells responded in rewarded trials, but not in non-rewarded trials. Another subset of 
cells were activated during both rewarded and non-rewarded trials, with 63% of them 
responding more during non-rewarded trials, and 37% responding more during rewarded 
trials. The authors concluded that a subset of OFC cells exhibited a probability predictive 
response during the movement and waiting period following odour sampling, while 
another subset was sensitive during the reward period coding delivery or non-delivery 
(van Duuren et al., 2009). While van Duuren et al did not find convincing evidence of the 
rat OFC encoding reward certainty, a more recent study in monkeys did find certainty 
encoded in OFC. As well as seeing neural responses to the expected reward magnitude, 
and to the task volatility, the authors also saw that OFC neurons adjusted firing rates to 
predict whether a the reward outcome  was certain or uncertain (Yang & Murray, 2018). 
To summarise the current literature focussed on the neural mechanisms of 
probabilistic discounting, it is clear that a number of areas are involved in representing 
different aspects of a decision affected by probabilistic discounting. Two particular stages 
of a decision are highlighted as important in establishing, and representing value. First is 
the value representation that must exist when the bird is selecting a course of action. The 
OFC seems to be the brain area involved in representing value at this point in the decision, 
and drives the selection of the “best” outcome based on the probabilities associated with 
each option. However, the OFC’s value representation must be informed by the other 
important stage of the process, which is immediately following in decision outcome. 
Following reward delivery, or non-delivery as the case may be, the brain must update the 
representation of each action sequence based on what has happened. The updating process 
during probabilistic decisions seems to take place in the mPFC and ACC, according the 
imaging and electrophysiology studies in mammals.  
1.6 The Avian Brain Neuroarchitecture 
The experiments in the current thesis aim to explore the neural basis of value 
discounting in the avian brain, using Columba livia (pigeons) as a model. Two of the most 
notable differences between the avian and mammalian brain is that the avian brain is not 
laminated and that it has not developed an elaborate prefrontal cortex, as have mammals 
(Güntürkün, 2005b; Güntürkün & Bugnyar, 2016). In the past, the avian brain was viewed 
as being composed of only the mammalian basal ganglia, and it was therefore assumed 
that some of the higher order behavioural flexibilities associated with the mammalian 




explored the cognitive capabilities of birds, it has become apparent that lamination and 
the presence of the mammalian neocortex is not the only variable in neuroarchitecture 
that predicts higher order thinking (Güntürkün & Bugnyar, 2016; Kirsch, Güntürkün, & 
Rose, 2008). The avian pallium is now considered to function in a similar way to the 
mammalian neocortex (Güntürkün, 2005b). The area that we focussed on as a candidate 
for the encoding of value discounting is called the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL), 
which is positioned in the dorsolateral section of the pigeon forebrain (see Figure 1.1) 
(Güntürkün, 2005b).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Comparison of the human brain and the pigeon brain, with the PFC and NCL 
highlighted in Green. The brain in the middle lower part of the picture is the pigeon brain 
on the same scale as the human brain. Adapted from Güntürkün (2005). 
NCL: an equivalent of mammalian PFC 
The mammalian PFC occupies one third of the neocortex (Fuster, 2001). It is made 
up of a number of sub regions, including medial prefrontal cortex (anterior cingulate 
infralimbic and prelimbic cortices), orbitofrontal cortex, ventrolateral and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortices and the frontal eye fields (Fuster, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). The 
PFC has long been considered the area involved in higher order thinking and exerting 
‘top-down’ control of behaviour, and vital for adjusting behaviours to achieve a goal 
(Carlen, 2017; Duncan, 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ott & Nieder, 2019). While damage 
to PFC does not impair automatic behaviours, such as reflexes and conditioned responses 
to stimuli, it does impair the ability to control goal directed behaviours that are not so 
well established (Miller & Cohen, 2001), and damage has been linked to major changes 




A number of anatomical similarities exist that position NCL as the equivalent to 
the mammalian PFC, responsible for higher order planning and behaviours. NCL receives 
input from sensory areas and outputs to motor areas, much like PFC (Fuster, 2001; 
Güntürkün, 2005b, 2005a; Güntürkün & Bugnyar, 2016; Kirsch et al., 2008). There are 
also similar connections between NCL and amygdala, and the nucleus accumbens as there 
is in PFC (see Figure 1.2) (Güntürkün, 2005a). Studies of the neural mechanisms of higher 
order functions such as working memory in the avian brain provide further evidence that 
NCL has evolved to be the functional analogue of the mammalian PFC (Güntürkün, 
2005a). 
 
Figure 1.2 A simplified model of the connections to and from NCL. The figure shows 
areas with reciprocal connections to NCL (blue areas), that receive output from NCL 
(orange area) and project to NCL (yellow area) in a similar way to the mammal PFC. 
Based on Figure 2 from Güntürkün (2005). 
When considering the research into the function of the PFC in animals outside of 
humans and primates, it is important to consider how brains have developed over the 
course of the past 300 million years. While on different evolutionary trajectories, 
mammals and birds have evolved to survive in a world that requires problem solving on 




mammals and birds need to adapt and adjust behaviour in order to achieve a goal, which 
coincidentally is a function that has been attributed to the PFC in mammals. It therefore 
follows that the avian brain too is likely to have developed an area responsible for 
initiating and controlling goal directed behaviour. Simply put by Carlen (2017); “It is the 
behaviour, not the cortex that is selected by evolution”. By further exploring the 
functional analogies between NCL and PFC, we can continue to extend theories of the 
function of the human prefrontal cortex, and in particular, how dysfunctions and 
abnormalities may cause problematic behaviour in clinical populations.  
NCL as a candidate for representing value discounting 
Previous studies of the properties of NCL support the area as a candidate for 
carrying out PFC-like functions, and more specifically value representation. For example, 
lesion studies find comparable behaviour changes in birds to the behaviour changes 
observed from PFC damage in humans. Damage to the NCL appears to impair 
mechanisms underlying executive function in birds, such as their ability to plan, select 
and adapt responses, reflecting those impairments seen when the mammalian PFC is 
damaged (Güntürkün, 2005a). Furthermore, when NCL is lesioned, pigeons no longer 
show a difference in anticipatory behaviours, namely pecking, prior to reward delivery in 
long and short intervals, which indicates that NCL plays a role in anticipation of reward 
(Kalenscher, Diekamp, & Gunturkun, 2003).  
Electrophysiological studies using pigeons have implicated the NCL in the 
encoding of reward and reward value (Johnston, Anderson, & Colombo, 2017; Koenen, 
Millar, & Colombo, 2013; Starosta, Güntürkün, & Stüttgen, 2013). For example, NCL 
activity differs in response to stimuli indicating reward over non-reward (Johnston et al., 
2017; Starosta et al., 2013) and to differing reward amounts (Koenen et al., 2013). 
Differentiation in NCL cell firing rates has been found to take place in both the sample 
period, when the bird was presented with a stimulus indicating how much reward they 
would receive, and also in the delay between the presentation of the sample stimulus and 
the delivery of reward (Koenen et al., 2013). Interestingly, NCL cells that fired when a 
stimulus predicted no reward also fired after receiving no reward when a reward had been 
indicated (Starosta et al., 2013). As a result, NCL has been implicated in negative reward 
prediction and updating information about reward expectancy, much like cells in the 




 NCL cells also appear to reflect the relative value of a reward, not just reward 
amount, when value discounting factors are manipulated. For example, Kalenscher and 
colleagues (2005) trained birds to choose between a small, immediate reward and a larger 
reward after a delay that was increased over the session. As the delay increased, the birds’ 
preferences shifted from the larger, delayed reward to the smaller, immediate reward, and 
NCL activity reflected this change in preference (Kalenscher et al., 2005). Based on the 
current NCL studies, it is clear that NCL is not only similar in function to PFC, but also 
largely influenced by reward and value.  
From what is a large body of research into the various aspects of value coding in 
the mammal brain, two areas, the OFC and ACC stand out as common areas involved in 
a range of value discounting computations. OFC is considered an important area for the 
coding of delay discounting, while ACC is generally seen as the key area involved in 
effort discounting. The area responsible for encoding probabilistic discounting is less 
clear, but both OFC and ACC have been implicated. As mentioned earlier, the NCL is the 
avian analogue of the mammal PFC, and OFC is part of the PFC (it is also often referred 
to as ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Therefore, we might expect similar neural 
responses to manipulations of value in NCL as we see in OFC.  
There has not been an equivalent of the ACC identified in the avian brain as of 
yet. When considering the Brodmann’s areas, ACC is mainly made up of areas 24, 25, 32 
and 10, all areas which are often considered to fall under the medial PFC regions in fMRI 
studies of the human brain (Öngür & Price, 2000). When considering how this might 
translate into the avian brain, it seems likely that NCL is likely the best area for 
comparative study, given that it is considered the avian equivalent of PFC. The 
assumption that NCL may reflect properties similar to such a wide range of mammalian 
brain areas may seem to lack nuance, however it is important to consider the evolutionary 
trajectory of the avian brain, and the small size relative to the mammalian brain. Smaller 
brains must evolve to efficiently house structures that carry out the same abilities to thrive 
in a world with similar ecological pressures to larger mammals. Therefore, pigeon brains 
have evolved to represent a much more efficient and compact neural system. It therefore 
stands to reason that NCL may contain subpopulations of cells that respond in similar 
ways to different areas of the mammalian PFC and that as a result, we may see different 
factors of value discounting (delay, effort, and probabilistic) represented within NCL 




1.7 Aim  
The aim of the studies described in the current thesis was to manipulate the value 
of an outcome by creating different discounting costs, and explore whether neurons in 
NCL respond in ways similar to cells in the mammalian PFC. In order to do this, we 
developed a simple task design where the birds were presented with one stimulus that the 
bird had learnt led to a specific outcome, preceded by a specific cost, while we conducted 
electrophysiological recordings from cells in NCL. Birds were trained until they had 
associated each stimulus with the corresponding value, indicated by their stimulus 
preference, inferred from the response times to peck each stimulus they had been trained 
on. It has been demonstrated in the past that pigeons will peck a stimulus signalling a 
highly valued outcome more quickly than they will peck one with a lesser value (Mendl, 
Burman, Parker, & Paul, 2009).  
Using a stimulus association task with no choice component meant that any 
differences in neural activity when the bird looked at a stimulus could be explained only 
by the visual properties of the stimulus, and the associated value that it represented, rather 
than a response to a choice. For example, when two stimuli appear on the screen, any 
modulation in firing could be in response to either of the stimuli, rather than pure 
encoding of the value associated with a single stimulus. We also balanced the stimuli used 
across all the birds, and controlled for colour, to avoid interpreting neural responses to 
differing visual features as value related activity. In each chapter, an experiment using a 
basic stimulus association task design is described, manipulating a different aspect of 
value discounting. We aimed to record the extent to which neurons in NCL encoded each 
discounting variable, and if they fired in a manner that indicated that NCL is responsible 
for representing value within the avian brain. By doing so, we aimed to further understand 
the role of the ‘prefrontal-like’ area NCL, and gain insight into ways that the avian brain 
has evolved in a homologous trajectory to complete similar functions to the mammalian 
brain. 
1.8 General Methods  
Subjects 
The subjects in each studywere experimentally naïve adult homing pigeons 
(Columba livia) acquired from a local breeder. The birds had free access to grit and water 




them at 80-85% of their free feeding body weight.  They were housed in individual wire-
mesh cages and kept on a 12 to 12 light-dark cycle with lights on at 07:00 h. The subjects 
were kept and treated in accordance with the University of Otago Code of Ethical Conduct 
for the Manipulation of Animals, and the University of Otago Animal Ethics Committee 
approved the experiment.  
Apparatus 
The subjects were trained and tested in standard operant chambers measuring 35 
cm (length), 43 cm (width), and 39 cm (height). At the front of the chamber was a 43 cm 
monitor surrounded by an infrared touch frame. In front of the touch frame sat a plexiglass 
panel with six square holes arranged in a 2-row x 3-column format. The size of each 
square was 6 cm by 6 cm and the center-to-center distance of each hole was 6.5 cm. In 
experiment 3, a plexiglass panel with six square holes arranged in a 3-row by 3-column 
format was used. The size of each square hole was 3.8 cm x 3.8 cm and the center-to-
center distance of each hole was 4.5 cm. Situated 20 cm below the center key was a hopper 
that could be illuminated and delivered the wheat reward. The stimuli consisted four black 
and white pictures; one picture of Arnold Schwarzenegger, one picture of a cactus flower, 
one picture of a black crow and one picture of a person on a skateboard at a skate park. 
The stimuli were 6 cm by 6 cm in size, and appeared centered in the square aperture.  
Surgery 
At the completion of behavioural training the birds were implanted with a 
lightweight microdrive to allow single-unit recording. They were first anesthetized with 
a mixture of ketamine (25 mg/kg) and xylazine (5 mg/kg). After pruning the feathers on 
the scalp and overlaying the ears, the head was immobilized using a Revzin stereotaxic 
adapter (Karten & Hodos, 1967). The scalp was first sprayed with a topical anesthetic 
(10% xylocaine) and then cut and retracted to expose the skull. A hole was drilled above 
the NCL at AP +5.5 ML ± 7.5 (Karten & Hodos, 1967). Six stainless steel screws were 
placed into the skull (one serving as a ground screw), the tips of the electrodes of the 
microdrive were lowered to position them above the NCL, and the microdrive was 
secured to the skull with dental acrylic. The incision was sutured and sprayed with 
xylocaine. The bird recovered in a padded and heated cage until fully alert and mobile 
and then returned to its home cage where it was allowed to recover for at least seven days 
before the recording sessions started.  
Neural Recording 




CA, USA) mounted in the microdrive were used for recording the extracellular activity 
of single neurons in the NCL. For each session one electrode was used to record the neural 
activity and a second electrode with minimal activity served as the indifferent. All 
electrodes were impedance–matched to about 0.5-1 MOhm. The signal was passed 
through a FET headstage, then a Grass P511K preamplifier (Grass Instruments, Quincy, 
Massachusetts, United States) where it was amplified and filtered to remove 50 Hz noise. 
An oscilloscope and speaker were used to monitor the signals. A CED micro1401 system 
(Cambridge Electronic Design Limited, Cambridge, United Kingdom) collected the 
electrophysiological data, and CED Spike2 software was used for behavioural time-
tagging of all events and analysis of the spike data. Good isolation of a cell, and a signal-
to-noise ratio of at least 2:1, were the criteria for selecting a cell for a recording session. 
After cell isolation the behavioural program was initiated. A recording session lasted 
approximately one hour. At the end of the session the electrodes were advanced 40 µm. 
The birds were tested once a day.  
Histology 
 When the electrodes reached the end of the target area, an electrolytic lesion was 
created by sending a 9V current through each electrode for 10 s which marked the final 
recording position. The pigeons were then euthanised using carbon dioxide gas and 
perfused with a mixture of physiological saline and 10% formalin. Once the brains were 
removed from the skull, they were kept in 10% formalin for at least 5 days and then 
sucrose formalin (10% formalin, 30% sucrose) until the brains had sunk. Using a cryostat, 
the brains were frozen and sliced into 40 µm sections and then stained with Thionin. The 
position of the electrolytic lesions and depth records were used to reconstruct electrode 












Chapter 2: The Neural Representation of Delay Discounting 
in the Pigeon NCL 
2.1 Rationale for the Study of Delay Discounting in Pigeons 
Studies of pigeon behaviour show that, like humans, a simple hyperbolic function 
best describes the change in behaviour indicating the relationship between reward and 
delay discounting. In other words, pigeons are more likely to choose a smaller, sooner 
reward over a larger, later one, but if both small and large have the same delay time (i.e. 
both are received immediately or both are equally delayed) then they would choose the 
larger reward (Ainslie, 1975; Grossbard & Mazur, 1986). Given the similarity in the 
behaviour of pigeons and mammals, including humans, when it comes to delay 
discounting, pigeons are a viable subject in which to investigate the neural basis of delay 
discounting. Despite the divergence in the evolution of the mammalian and avian brain, 
it is useful to understand how the avian brain has evolved along a different trajectory to 
result in a similar behavioural model as to mammals. Given the functional and anatomical 
similarities between the pigeon NCL and the human PFC, the NCL is a good candidate 
for exploration (Güntürkün, 2005a).  
Recently, a number of studies have begun to examine the reward processing 
characteristics of NCL cells. Koenen, Millar, and Colombo (Koenen et al., 2013) found 
that NCL cell activity was modulated by whether a stimulus predicted a large, small, or 
no reward. Specifically, in the period where the cue was presented, and in the subsequent 
delay period before the delivery of the reward, some NCL cells exhibited a graded change 
in activation as a function of the anticipated reward amount. Cells in the NCL also seem 
to be involved in encoding the delay to a reward. Kalenscher et al. (Kalenscher et al., 
2005) gave pigeons a choice between an immediate small reward and an immediate large 
reward. Naturally, the pigeons chose the immediate large reward, but across the session, 
as the delay to the large reward was increased, pigeons shifted their preference to the 
immediate small reward. The NCL cells integrated reward amount and delay-to-reward, 
thereby coding the subjective reward value of a stimulus (Kalenscher et al., 2005).  
The findings of Koenen et al (2012) and Kalenscher et al (2005) suggest that cells 
in NCL code stimulus value, and that the value may be modulated by the delay to reward 




limitations. First, in both studies, pigeons were trained using a choice paradigm, and as 
such, many factors could be at play in modulating neural activity. When two stimuli 
appear on a screen, for example, any modulation in firing could be in response to either 
of the stimuli. Second, the neural activity was examined during the delay period, and 
again, factors other than pure stimulus value may have come into play in modulating 
neural activity. Neural modulation in the delay period, for example, could be a result of 
the visual components of the stimulus eliciting continued responses that carry over into 
the delay period that are unrelated to the value that the subject assigns to the stimulus.  
Perhaps a better way to examine value coding is to observe neural activity while an 
animal is presented with a single stimulus that indicates the magnitude of the reward to 
be received following a specified delay period. Such an experiment was conducted around 
the same time that the current experiment was. Kasties et al (Kasties, Starosta, Güntürkün, 
& Stüttgen, 2016) measured neural activity in NCL when pigeons were presented with 
one of four stimuli that predicted one of four conditions: small reward after a short delay, 
small reward after a long delay, large reward after a short delay, or large reward after a 
long delay. Although Kasties et al (2016) found cells in the NCL that responded 
differently to the four stimuli, a fact perhaps not too surprising given the known visual 
sensitivity of NCL cells (Scarf, Stuart, Johnston, & Colombo, 2016), they found no 
evidence that the responses to the stimuli were modulated by either the reward amount, 
the delay length, or the interaction of reward amount and delay length. The authors 
concluded that the cells in NCL showed no evidence of value coding (Kasties et al., 2016).  
Given that NCL cells code reward amount, temporal discounting, and the shift in 
preference from a delayed large reward to a small immediate reward (Kalenscher et al., 
2005; Koenen et al., 2013), it is surprising that Kasties et al (Kasties et al., 2016) found 
no evidence that NCL cells were modulated by reward value. There are, however, two 
limitations of the Kasties et al (Kasties et al., 2016) study that may have made it difficult 
to find value coding. The first limitation concerns aspects of the reward itself. In the 
Kasties et al (Kasties et al., 2016) study, the small reward consisted of 1–1.5 s access to 
food and the large reward consisted of 5–6 s access to food. The variable nature of the 
reward duration with the “small” and “large” categories, plus the fact that reward was 
only delivered on 50% of the trials, may have interfered with the mapping of a reward 




A second limitation of the Kasties et al (Kasties et al., 2016) study was that value 
coding was only assessed during the presentation of the stimulus. A number of 
investigators have found that information concerning the value of an item is transmitted 
during the period between stimulus presentation and the appearance of the reward. For 
example, Komura et al (Komura et al., 2001) found that when presented with a cue 
signalling a preferred reward, cell firing in the rat’s thalamus increased across the delay 
period subsequent to stimulus presentation. Furthermore, dopamine cells have been found 
to fire in anticipation of reward in learning tasks in mammals (Schultz, 2002), and given 
NCL’s significant DA innervation (Puig et al., 2014), it seems likely that there would 
exist some anticipatory response in NCL. In fact, Koenen et al (Koenen et al., 2013) 
reported differential firing in NCL cells in response to differing reward amounts during a 
delay period prior to reward. By focusing on just the sample period, Kasties et al (Kasties 
et al., 2016) may have underestimated the capacity of NCL cells to engage in value 
coding. 
Another important issue that Kasties et al (Kasties et al., 2016) did not investigate 
was whether value coding continued into the reward period. In mammals, the OFC has 
been implicated in updating information related to expected outcome important for 
decision making, thereby facilitating flexible behaviour (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; 
Schoenbaum & Roesch, 2005). Past experiments have found that OFC activity is 
modulated by reward value at the time of reward presentation (Roesch & Olson, 2005; 
Thorpe et al., 1983). To date, while NCL activity during the reward period has been 
recorded (Kalt, Diekamp, & Güntürkün, 1999), whether that activity is modulated by the 
perceived value of the stimulus that preceded it has not been explored.  
In the current study, we re-examined the issue of value coding in NCL neurons. We 
trained pigeons to associate four cues with four different conditions; short delay followed 
by small reward (S1), short delay followed by large reward (S3), long delay followed by 
small reward (L1) and a long delay followed by large reward (L3). Instead of the stimuli 
predicting reward on 50% of the trials, the stimuli in the current experiment predicted 
reward on 100% of the trials. Additionally, Epstein’s (Epstein, 1981) finding that the 
amount of food gained is not necessarily proportional to the duration of the food 
presentation, and that long food access durations run the risk of depleting the food hopper 
(Epstein, 1985), has prompted some to manipulate reward amount by using a specified 




& Baum, 2000; Elliffe, Davison, & Landon, 2008; Landon, Davison, & Elliffe, 2003). In 
line with these findings, our small reward consisted of one 2-s period of food delivery 
and our large reward consisted of three 2-s periods of food delivery. Finally, we examined 
value coding in NCL activity in the sample period, the delay period, and the beginning of 
the reward period. 
2.2 Methods 
Behavioural Task 
Four birds were trained on the delay discounting behavioural task. At the end of 
a 5-sec intertrial interval (ITI), one of the four stimuli appeared on the center-top hole 
(Figure 2.1). Three pecks to the stimulus turned it off and initiated a delay period. Every 
peck to the touch screened was accompanied by a 50-ms 1000-Hz feedback tone. At the 
end of the delay period the reward was delivered. Each stimulus was followed by either 
a short (2 sec) delay or a long (8 sec) delay, and either a small reward (one 2-sec period 
of access to wheat) or large reward (three 2-sec periods of access to wheat). For the large 
reward the three 2-sec periods were delivered one after the other with an inter-reward 
pause of 1 sec during which time the hopper was lowered. For ease of exposition, the 
stimuli are referred to as S1, S3, L1 and L3, with the letters signifying a short or long 
delay, and the number signifying one or three reward periods. Each session consisted of 
64 trials, with 16 trials dedicated to each of the four stimuli, randomly intermixed. Which 
stimuli were associated with each of the four delay/reward conditions was balanced across 
animals. The birds were trained until the latency to peck the S3 stimulus was shorter than 






Figure 2.1. Behavioural procedure. The sequence of events for each of the four stimuli. 
S1: short delay, small reward; S3: short delay, large reward; L1: long delay, small reward; 
and L3: long delay, large reward. The small reward consisted of one 2-sec period of wheat 
reward, whereas the large reward consisted of three 2-sec periods of wheat reward. The 
short delay and long delays were 2 sec and 8 sec in duration, respectively.  
Data Analysis 
We analyzed the sample period (Sample), the first second of the delay (Delay-1), 
the second second of the delay (Delay-2) and the first second of the reward period 
(Reward-1)for evidence of value coding in the firing rates of NCL neurons. With respect 
to the sample period, unlike studies with primates where one can monitor the exact 
position of the eyes, it is difficult in pigeons to monitor when they are looking at the visual 
stimulus. Colombo, Frost, and Steedman (2001) adopted a convention that neural activity 
to a viewed stimulus was measured during a period from -400 ms to -100 ms prior to the 
first peck to that stimulus. The reason the period ends 100 ms prior to contact with the 
keys is because pigeons close their eyes approximately 80 ms prior to a key peck 
(Goodale, 1983).  
Cells were selected for population plot analysis in one of two ways. In the first 




to a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) as a factor. 
The dependent variable was the firing rates of cell during the 300 ms sample presentation 
periods or 1000 ms delay periods. In the second selection method we conducted a paired 
t-test comparing the firing rates of the cells during the S3 and L1 trials, again separately 
for the different periods. On the basis of whether the main effect of Stimulus was 
significant the cell’s data entered into a population plot.  
For the population plots, each cell’s data was normalized by dividing all the cell’s 
firing rates by the average firing in the middle three seconds of the ITI period, and 
subjected to two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs with stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and 
bin (6: bins 1-6 for the sample period, or 20: bins 1-20 for the delay and reward periods) 
as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). LSD 




All electrode tracks were within the targeted NCL region as defined by Karten 
and Hodos (1967). The histology results are shown in Figure 2.2. The intended track 
positions for NCL were AP +5.5 and ML +7.5. The track position for the left NCL bird 
(Z9) was AP +6.75 and ML +7.5, differing only from the intended AP position by 1.25 
mm. The track position for the second left NCL bird (B6) was AP +5.5 and ML +7.8, 
differing only from the intended ML position by 0.3mm. The track position for the right 
NCL bird (B4) was AP +6 and ML +7.6, differing from the intended AP position by 
0.5mm and the intended ML position by 0.1mm. The track position for the second right 
NCL bird (B7) was AP +5.75 and ML +7.2, differing from the intended AP position by 





Figure 2.2. Electrode track reconstruction. Electrode track position reconstructions for 
the two right NCL birds (B4 and B7) and two left NCL birds (B6 and Z9). All recordings 
were within the full dorsal-ventral extent of NCL. The following are the brain regions as 
defined by Reiner et al (2004): A, archopallium; DA, tractus dorso-arcopallialis; CDL, 
area corticoidea dorsolateralis; Hp, hippocampus; N, nidopallium; Rt, nucleus rotundus; 
TeO, tectum opticum; TrO, tractus opticus; V, ventricle. 
Behavioural Data 
For each session, the median latency to the first peck was calculated across the 16 
trials dedicated to each of the four stimuli. The latency to the first peck averaged across 
all sessions from which cells were recorded is displayed in Figure 2.3. The latencies were 
subjected a log10 transformation to reduce across subject variability, and the transformed 
latencies were subjected to a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus (4: S1, 
S3, L1, L3) as the factor (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a significant effect 
of stimulus, F(3, 9) = 43.49, p < .01. Planned pairwise comparison confirmed the latencies 
to S1 and S3 differed from the latencies to L1 and L3, but that that the latencies to S1 and 






Figure 2.3. Behavioural performance. Mean latencies of the first peck to each of the four 
stimuli for the four birds averaged across all sessions from which neurons were isolated. 
Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Sample Period 
We recorded from a total of 207 cells (B7 = 24, Z9 = 58, B6 = 59, B4 = 66). There 
were no right-left differences in the response characteristics of the cells and so the data 
were collapsed across this variable. Of the 207 cells, 35 displayed a significant effect of 
Stimulus (one-way ANOVA) during the 300 ms Sample period. The population response 





Figure 2.4. Population plot: Sample filtering. Normalised firing rate for cells that show a 
significant effect of Stimulus across the four trial types during the Sample period. The ITI 
represents the entire 5-sec ITI period, the Sample period (S) represents a 300 ms period, 
and Delay-1 (Del-1) and Delay-2 (Del-2) periods represent the first and second second of 
the 2-sec (for S1 and S3) or 8-sec (for L1 and L3) delay period. Reward-1 (Rew-1) is the 
first second of reward presentation. In S1 and S3, this is the second immediately following 
Delay-2, while in L1 and L3, it is the second following the entire 8-sec delay period.  
The data in Sample, Delay-1, Delay-2 periods and the first second of the reward 
period were subjected to separate two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus (4: 
S1, S3, L1, L3) and bin (6: bins 1-6 for the Sample period, or 20: bins 1-20 for the delay 
and reward periods) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected). In the Sample period there was a significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 102) = 
4.98, p < .01. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that the activity to S3 was greater 
than the activity to all the other stimuli, the activity to S1 was greater than the activity to 
L1 and L3, however there was no difference in the activity between L1 and L3. In the 
Delay-1 and Delay-2 periods, there was no significant effect of stimulus, all Fs(3, 102) < 
1.76, all ps > .17.  
Overall, in the Reward-1 period there was no significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 




a significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 102) = 3.53, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that activity to S3 was greater than the activity to L1, but not S1 or L3. There were no 
difference in activity between S1, L1 and L3. In the second 500 ms of the reward period, 
there was no significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 102) = 1.99, p = .15. 
The distribution of the latency to peck, displayed in Figure 2.3, may indicate that 
the birds identify the stimulus before the first peck, in particular for the long delay 
conditions. To explore this possibility, the period immediately following the onset of the 
stimulus presentation was analysed.  
The 400ms period following stimulus presentation was subjected to separate two-
way repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and bin (6: bins 1-6 
for the Sample period, or 20: bins 1-20 for the delay and reward periods) as factors, with 
repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected).  Once again, there was a 
significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 102) = 4.43, p < .05. Planned pairwise comparisons 
revealed that the activity to S3 was greater than the activity to all the other stimuli; 
however there was no difference in the activity between S1, L1 and L3.  
Delay-1 Period 
Of the 207 cells, 25 displayed a significant effect of Stimulus (one-way ANOVA) 
during the Delay-1 period. The population response for these 25 cells is shown in Figure 





Figure 2.5. Population plot: Delay-1 filtering. Normalised firing rate for cells that show 
a significant effect of Stimulus across the four trial types during the Delay-1 period. The 
ITI represents the entire 5-sec ITI period, the Sample period (S) represents a 300 ms 
period, and Delay-1 (Del-1) and Delay-2 (Del-2) periods represent the first and second 
second of the 2-sec (for S1 and S3) or 8-sec (for L1 and L3) delay period. Reward-1 
(Rew-1) is the first second of reward presentation. In S1 and S3, this is the second 
immediately following Delay-2, while in L1 and L3, it is the second following the entire 
8-sec delay period.  
The data in the Sample, Delay-1, Delay-2 and the first second of the reward period 
were subjected to separate two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus (4: S1, S3, 
L1, L3) and bin (6: bins 1-6 for the Sample period, or 20: bins 1-20 for the delay and 
reward periods) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected). In neither the Sample period, Delay-1 period, or Delay-2 period, was there 
was a significant effect of stimulus, all Fs(3, 72) < 1.49, all ps > .26.  
Overall, in the Reward-1 period there was a significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 72) 
= 3.82, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons revealed that activity to S3 differed from activity 
to all other stimuli. Activity in S1, L1 and L3 did not differ. We also analysed the first 
500 ms of the reward period and again noted a significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 72) = 
4.75, p < .01. Pairwise comparisons revealed that activity to S3 differed from activity to 
both L1 and L3, but not S1. There was no difference between activity to S1 and any other 
stimulus, and the activity to L1 and L3 did not differ from one another. In the second 500 
ms of the reward period, there was no significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 72) = 1.75, p = 
.17. 
Delay-2 Period 
Of the 207 cells, 39 displayed a significant effect of stimulus (one-way ANOVA) 
during the Delay-2 period. The population response for these 39 cells is shown in Figure 
2.6. Five of the cells were used in both previous analyses, four were used only in the first 





Figure 2.6. Population plot: Delay-2 filtering. Normalised firing rate for cells that show 
a significant effect of Stimulus across the four trial types during the Delay-2 period. The 
ITI represents the entire 5-sec ITI period, the Sample period (S) represents a 300 ms 
period, and the Delay-1 (Del-1) and Delay-2 (Del-2) periods represent the first and second 
second of the 2-sec (for S1 and S3) or 8-sec (for L1 and L3) delay period.  Reward-1 
(Rew-1) is the first second of reward presentation. In S1 and S3, this is the second 
immediately following Delay-2, while in L1 and L3, it is the second following the entire 
8-sec delay period.  
The data in the Sample, Delay-1 and Delay-2 period were subjected to separate 
two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and bin (6: bins 
1-6 for the Sample period, or 20: bins 1-20 for the delay and reward periods) as factors, 
with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In the Sample period, 
there was a significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 111) = 4.57, p < .05. Planned pairwise 
comparisons (p < .05) revealed that S3 differed from S1 and L3, but not L1. S1 differed 
from S3 and L3, but not L1, and L1 did not differ from any of the stimuli. There was no 
significant effect of stimulus in the Delay-1 and Delay-2 periods, all Fs(3, 111) < 2.28, 
all ps  > .10.  
Although we failed to find any evidence of value coding in the Delay-2 period, an 




the Delay-2 period. To examine the effect further, we examined the last 500 ms of the 
Delay-2 period. The data were subjected to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with 
stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and bin (10: bins 1-10 for the delay period) as factors, with 
repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a significant 
effect of stimulus, F(3, 114) = 3.44, p < .05. Planned pairwise comparisons (p < .05) 
revealed that firing to S1 differed from firing to L1 and L3, while there was no difference 
in firing between S1 and S3. Firing to S3 differed significantly from L3, and the difference 
between S3 and L1 neared significance. L1 and L3 did not differ from one another.  
 Overall, in the Reward-1 period there was no significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 
114) = .07, p = .36. We also analysed the first 500 ms of the reward period and again there 
was a significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 114) = 3.37, p < .05. Planned pairwise 
comparisons (p < .05) revealed that there was no difference in firing among S3, S1 and 
L1 and the activity to L3 differed from the activity to all other stimuli. In the second 500 
ms of the reward period, there was no effect significant of stimulus, F(3, 114) = .22, p = 
.85. 
2.4 Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
In the present study, we explored how cells in NCL encode value as an integrative 
sum of reward amount and delay to reward. We recorded from 207 NCL cells during a 
task where birds were required to peck a stimulus that predicted either a small or large 
reward, following either a short or long delay period. We examined the firing of these 
cells during the period that the birds were presented with each stimulus, and in the delay 
period prior to reward. 
When cells were filtered on the basis of showing a significant stimulus effect in 
the Sample period, 16.9% of cells fired in a pattern that mirrors the birds’ stimulus 
preferences. A shorter response latency to a stimulus indicated that the birds valued the 
stimulus higher. Specifically, the birds responded fastest to the stimulus that predicted a 
short delay followed by a large reward (S3) over the stimulus that predicted a short delay 
followed by a small reward (S1), and both of these stimuli were preferred over the two 
stimuli that predicted a long delay (L3 and L1) which were no different from each other. 
The neural data in the Sample period of these 35 cells mirrored these stimulus preferences. 
Despite evidence for value coding in the Sample period, the stimulus preferences of these 
sample-selective cells were not carried over into either the Delay-1 or Delay-2 periods. 




to S3 than to L1. The difference in firing was not evident in the second 500ms of the 
reward period.  
When cells were filtered based on activity in the Delay-1 period, 12% of cells 
showed a significant effect of stimulus. There was no difference in firing to any of the 
four stimuli in the Sample, Delay-1, or Delay-2 periods of these cells. In other words, 
although a particular cell might have shown a preference for one trial type over another, 
a different cell would have shown a different pattern of preference, such that when all 
these cells were combined, as in our population plot, no clear stimulus preference 
emerged. The firing of cells filtered based on the Delay-1 period did however show some 
difference in firing in the first 500ms of the reward period. Cells fired more to S3 than to 
either L1 or L3, but the difference in firing disappeared in the second 500ms of the reward 
period.  
Finally, when the cells were filtered on activity in the Delay-2 period, 18.8% of 
cells displayed a significant effect of stimulus. Interestingly, the cells that were selected 
on the basis of their firing during the Delay-2 period did display some evidence of value 
coding in the Sample period in that the cells fired significantly more to S3 than to all 
stimuli except L1. Similar to the situation for the Delay-1 period, there was no difference 
in firing to any of the four stimuli in the Delay-1 or Delay-2 periods. However, we found 
that differentiation did occur to some extent in the last 500 ms of the Delay-2 period in 
that the neural responses to S1 and S3 were no different to each other, S1 differed from 
both L1 and L3, but S3 only differed from L3 and the difference between S3 and L1 
neared significance. In other words, cell firing in the last half of the Delay-2 period began 
to differentiate between short and long delay. While there was no evidence of actual value 
coding from the Delay-2 period cells, the change in firing pattern seems to reflect 
anticipation of reward.  
There was also very little evidence for value coding in the reward period. The only 
evidence for value coding was in the first 500 ms of the reward period expressed generally 
as an increased firing to S3, but the effect was weak. By the second 500 ms of the reward 
period there was no evidence of any value coding.  
Comparison to Other Studies 
Previous studies showed that NCL appears to encode reward amount (Koenen et 
al., 2013) as well as subjective reward value of a stimulus by integrating reward amount 




studies, the NCL activity showed modulation during the delay period prior to the delivery 
of the reward. The findings of the current study support the role of NCL in detecting value 
of a single conditioned stimulus and coding the “best” option (short delay-high reward) 
during the Sample period when the bird is shown the stimulus. The firing patterns also 
show that the modulation of NCL activity based on reward amount and delay-to-reward 
is not exclusive to choice paradigms. Instead, NCL cells react in response to a single 
stimulus that indicates a reward, so any change in activity cannot be explained by factors 
that could be at play in choice paradigm, such as an integrated value assessment based on 
being presented with two different options.  
Previously, NCL activity has been found to be modulated by reward delivery (Kalt 
et al., 1999; Koenen et al., 2013). At the most, the firing patterns observed in the current 
study in the reward period reflected to some extent the “best” reward outcome when cells 
were filtered by activity in the Sample and the Delay-1 periods. The fact that activity 
reflected the best option is consistent with findings of neural activity of mammalian OFC. 
The OFC is thought to play an important in updating information about expected rewards 
(Roesch et al., 2008). Our finding that activity of NCL cells during reward delivery was 
modulated to some extent by value of a reward suggests that NCL may play a role similar 
to the OFC in updating expected reward outcomes. 
Our findings also have implications for the study by Kasties et al (2016), whose 
design was on the surface similar to that of the current study, yet failed to find any 
evidence for value coding in NCL. They found that while NCL cells responded differently 
to four different stimuli, there was no evidence of modulation in NCL activity in response 
to reward amount, delay length, nor an interaction of reward and delay length. The 
absence of value coding in NCL neural activity occurred despite the fact that, based on 
latencies, their subjects showed clear preferences for the stimuli that were similar to that 
of our own birds. In contrast, we did find modulation in NCL activity in response to 
stimuli that predicted different reward amounts. What may have accounted for the 
differences between the two studies? We incorporated a number of small changes that we 
believe assisted the pigeons to differentiate between the different stimuli and the reward 
outcomes they predicted. First, in contrast to Kasties et al (2016) who delivered reward 
on only 50% of trials, we delivered reward on 100% of trials. Furthermore, while Kasties 
et al (2016) manipulated reward amount by increasing the duration for which access to 




presentation periods. We believe that by increasing the reward delivery periods, and by 
delivering reward on 100% of the trials, the birds were better able to determine the “best” 
option. As a result, we saw that in both the behavioural data, and in the neural data during 
the Sample period, NCL cells clearly reflected that most valuable outcome, followed by 
the next most valuable.  
Our finding of no value coding in the delay seems to stand in contrast to that of 
Koenen et al (2013), who reported reward modulation during the delay period. Closer 
inspection of our data, however, revealed the emergence of reward modulation in the last 
half of the Delay-2 period. The fact that Koenen et al (2013) reported more evidence of 
reward modulation in the delay period may be due to the fact that they employed a 3-sec 
delay whereas we only employed a 2-sec delay. More to the point, it is more likely that 
the activity we began to witness towards the end of the Delay-2 period, and that observed 
by Koenen et al (2013) is better classified as activity related to the anticipation of reward 
than value coding: The reason in the case of the current study is that the increase in neural 
activity was observed on short delay trials irrespective of whether there were one (S1) or 
three (S3) rewards imminent. Thus, the neural activity in the last half of the Delay-2 
period was more likely coding an upcoming reward rather than the value of the recently-
seen stimulus. The same outcome was reported by Koenen et al (2013) in the no-choice 
condition, where reward modulation was observed in that the cells displayed much less 
firing to upcoming rewards than to 1 or 3 upcoming reward, the latter two being neurally 
indistinguishable. It thus appears that reward modulation in the delay is more a 
representation of whether a reward is imminent, than a code for the value of the recently 
seen stimulus.  
 
Implications for Value Coding in NCL 
The literature supporting NCL as a functional analogue to the mammalian PFC, 
at least with respect to value coding, is relatively small. Based on the mammalian 
literature the PFC, and in particular the OFC, is involved in encoding value. Studies of 
the mammalian OFC find that firing is modulated by reward magnitude and in 
anticipation of reward delivery (Bechara, 2003; Horn et al., 2003; Roesch et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, OFC activity is modulated in response to changes in reward value achieved 
by manipulating the delay to reward only at the presentation of a stimulus, during the 




Olson, 2005). To date, the research in the avian brain has confirmed that NCL is 
implicated in encoding reward amount and in encoding delay to reward (Kalenscher et 
al., 2005; Koenen et al., 2013).  
Conclusions 
We found cells in the pigeon NCL that encoded value as a function of delay 
discounting. The present study adds to the current knowledge in that NCL appears to 
show properties similar to the OFC with respect to encoding value based on both delay 
to reward and reward amount. We can now add value coding relating to temporal 
discounting to the list of functional similarities with the mammalian PFC. Whether NCL 
acts as a general value coding domain, or whether the value representation is unique to 
delay discounted information will be revealed in the following chapters, as more facets 









Chapter 3: The Neural Representation of Physical Effort 
Discounting in the Pigeon NCL 
3.1 Rationale for the Study of Effort Discounting in Pigeons 
The first experiment builds on a body of literature to support the notion the NCL 
is involved in representing value, in particular in respect to delay discounting. For the 
second experiment, we wanted to explore the extent to which NCL also encodes value 
representation in respect to effort discounting. Manipulating effort changes a bird’s 




(Bautista, Tinbergen, Kacelnik, & Southwood, 2001; Zentall, 2010) suggesting that the 
effort required to achieve a reward changes the perceived value of that reward. However, 
the neural encoding of effort discounting is yet to be explored in the avian brain. As 
described in the introduction, the mammalian brain encodes the different facets of value, 
including value discounting by effort, in a number of frontal areas, and in particular, the 
ACC (Hillman & Bilkey, 2012; Porter et al., 2019). The NCL is an area in the avian brain 
that has been defined as the equivalent of the mammal PFC (Güntürkün, 2005a, 2005b) 
and has been implicated in value representation (Hartmann, Veit, & Nieder, 2018; Koenen 
et al., 2013; Starosta et al., 2013). NCL is therefore a reasonable candidate in which to 
explore effort discounting. 
NCL is reported to have properties similar to frontal regions of the mammalian brain 
in terms of reflecting reward amount, and some aspects of reward value (Johnston et al., 
2017; Kalenscher et al., 2005; Koenen et al., 2013). Whether NCL activity is influenced 
by reward value as a function of effort cost, similar to the mammal ACC, is yet to be 
explored.  A study by Liu et al (2017) aimed to examine the role of NCL in goal directed 
behaviour, a function that ACC activity has been related to (Cowen et al., 2012; Hillman 
& Bilkey, 2010, 2012). Goal directed behaviour is related to effort discounting, as it 
implies requiring an effort cost in order to achieve a goal. The authors recorded from NCL 
while a pigeon moved around a T-shaped maze. The birds made a choice between moving 
down one of the three arms, one of which contained a reward, indicated by a light at the 
end of that arm. They found that firing increased after birds had made the turn to the 
correct arm. There was no difference in firing when birds selected the incorrect arm, nor 
before the birds had reached the choice area from where they could establish the correct 
arm based on seeing the arm that is lit up. The authors concluded that NCL firing was 
representing goal directed behaviour (Liu, Wan, Li, Shang, & Shi, 2017). However, it 
seems likely that the firing rate was more so affected by reward rather than goal directed 
behaviour a finding not surprising given other studies relating NCL firing to predicted 
reward (Johnston et al., 2017; Koenen et al., 2013).   
The current study aimed to identify similarities between NCL and the mammalian 
ACC, especially exploring value coding as a function of effort cost. Pigeons were trained 
to peck a stimulus that was associated with a fixed amount of reward following either a 
low effort task or a high effort task while recording from cells in NCL. High effort (HE) 




(LE) trials required the pigeons to peck four times at a single location in the centre of the 
screen. If NCL cells predicted the most valuable outcome, the theory of effort discounting 
would suggest that NCL cells will fire more towards a stimulus associated with LE, as 
this is likely the “best” stimulus. Encoding the most valuable outcome in relation to effort 
costs would also mean that NCL is responding in a similar manner to the mammalian 
ACC, indicating that it may play an important role in dynamic decision making (Cowen 
et al., 2012; Hillman & Bilkey, 2010; Porter, Hillman & Bilkey, 2019). 
One area of the avian brain that has previously remained unexplored by 
electrophysiological studies is the area corticoidea dorsolateralis (CDL). The CDL is a 
thin area on the outermost layer of the brain connecting the caudal pallium and the 
hippocampus (Atoji & Wild, 2005). CDL is part of the limbic/olfactory sub-module that 
makes up the cortico-hippocampal module of the avian brain network (Shanahan, 
Bingman, Shimizu, Wild, & Güntürkün, 2013). The majority of studies that make 
mention of CDL are lesion studies, where CDL is used as a control area. Therefore, it has 
been established that lesions to CDL do not impair visual discrimination (Gagliardo, 
Bonadonna, & Divac, 1996; B. Hartmann & Güntürkün, 1998), delayed alternation task 
performance (Gagliardo et al., 1996), go/no-go task performance or reversal learning 
(Hartmann & Güntürkün, 1998).  
The  CDL has been compared to the limbic system, and in particular, the cingulate 
cortex of the mammalian brain (Atoji & Wild, 2005; Csillag & Montagnese, 2005). In a 
study using neural tracers to map the connection of CDL to other areas of the brain, the 
authors noted similarities and differences between CDL and mammalian cingulate 
cortices. For example, CDL has connections to the hippocampal complex, basal ganglia 
and amygdala, as well as visual and motor cortices, as does the cingulate cortex in 
mammals. On the other hand, CDL does not connect to motor areas and to brain stem in 
the way mammalian cingulate cortex does, and CDL has connections to olfactory areas 
that do not exist in the cingulate cortex (Atoji & Wild, 2005).  
Given the gap in the literature concerning the function of CDL, and the potential 
comparison the cingulate cortex, we decided to also record from single cells in the CDL. 
We predicted that consistent with previous studies of cells in the avian brain, NCL would 
encode the relative value of LE and HE trials, while CDL would show no value 




comparisons have be drawn between CDL and the mammalian cingulate cortices, CDL 
cells may fire in a similar way to the mammalian ACC, and we would therefore see CDL 
cells firing in preference of LE trials, while NCL will not show such modulation. 
Alternatively, perhaps “value cells” exist across the brain, and as such, cells in both NCL 
and CDL will exhibit firing during the higher value LE trials.   
3.2 Methods 
Behavioural Task 
Six birds were trained in the Effort Discounting behavioural task. At the end of a 
5 sec intertrial interval, one stimulus appeared in the top center square hole (see Figure 
3.1). Three pecks to the stimulus turned it off and initiated a 2 sec Pre-Effort delay period, 
followed by either a high-effort (HE) or low-effort (LE) period. On HE trials four dots 
appeared, one in each of the top-left, top-right, bottom-left, and bottom-right holes, and 
the pigeon was required to peck each dot twice. The pigeon was allowed to peck the dots 
in any order, and each dot disappeared after it had been pecked twice. On LE trials, a dot 
appeared in the top center hole and the pigeon was required to peck it four times. If the 
pigeon pecked at a dot location after the dot had disappeared, the peck tone sounded, but 
the trial sequence was not otherwise interrupted. After all dots had been pecked in the 
Effort period, there followed a 2 sec Post-Effort period, followed by a Reward period 
during which the pigeon was given 2 sec access to wheat, irrespective of whether the 
effort condition was HE or LE. Each session consisted of 64 trials with 32 trials dedicated 





Figure 3.1. Behavioural procedure. At the end of the ITI, either a high effort (HE) or 
low effort (LE) sample stimulus was presented in the centre top hole. Three pecks to the 
stimulus turned it off and initiated a 2 sec Pre-Effort period.  On HE trials, four dots 
appeared, one in each corner of the screen. The bird was required to peck each dot twice 
before being rewarded. On LE trials, the bird was simply required to peck one dot in the 
middle of the screen four times. Following the effort period was a 2 sec Post-Effort 
period, followed by 2 sec of access to reward. 
Data Analysis  
The 300 ms sample period (Sample), the 2 sec Pre-Effort period (Pre-Effort), the 
300 ms effort period (Effort), the 2 sec Post-Effort period (Post-Effort) and the 2 sec 
reward period (Reward) were all subject to analysis. With respect to the Sample period, 
unlike studies with primates where one can monitor the exact position of the eyes, it is 
difficult in pigeons to monitor when they are looking at the visual stimulus. Colombo, 
Frost, and Steedman (2001) adopted a convention that neural activity to a visual stimulus 
was measured during a period from -400 ms to -100 ms prior to the first peck to that 
stimulus. The reason the period ends 100 ms prior to contact with the keys is because 
pigeons close their eyes approximately 80 ms prior to a key peck (Colombo, Frost, & 
Steedman, 2001).  In the ITI, the Pre-Effort, and the Post-Effort periods, the first 500 ms 




driven by the period that took place immediately before (Reward, Sample, and Effort 
periods, respectively). With respect to the Effort period analysis, the LE and HE periods 
differed in both latency to complete the effort requirement and in the number of pecks 
required. Therefore, the 300 ms period prior to making the first effort peck was analysed 
rather than then entire effort period.   
All cells that fired at less than 0.1 spikes/sec in the ITI were excluded from further 
analysis. Each cell’s Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period data was 
subjected to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with period (2: ITI and defined 
period) and stimulus (2: HE and LE) as a factor. The dependent variable was the firing 
rate on each trial of a cell during the ITI and defined period. An effect of Stimulus 
indicated that the cell responded differently on HE and LE trials. A Period effect indicated 
that a cell either increased or decreased its firing rate in the defined period compared to 
in the ITI. The cell’s data was entered into a population plot on the basis of whether the 
main effect of Stimulus (HE vs LE) was significant, thereby illustrating the firing pattern 
of cells that differentiate between HE and LE trials in a given period.  
Those cells that did show an effect of stimulus were defined as “Effort Selective”. 
In other words, they fired differentially to LE and HE trials. We then also examined 
whether the Effort Selective cells, as a group, showed a LE Value Preference. In order to 
establish a whether they showed a LE Value Preference, the data in the Sample, Pre-
Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period of the sub-population of all Effort Selective 
cells for the defined period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA with 
Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms, 6: bins 1-6 for the Sample and Effort 
periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1-40 for the Reward 
period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). If 
the sub-population of Effort Selective cells fired significantly more during LE trials 
compared to HE in the defined period, they were characterized as having a LE Value 
Preference. 
Histology 
When the electrodes reached the end of NCL, 3mm into the brain, or CDL, 2.5 
mm into the brain, an electrolytic lesion was created by sending a 9V current through 
each electrode for 10 s, which marked the final recording position. The pigeons were then 
euthanised using carbon dioxide gas and perfused with a mixture of physiological saline 




formalin for at least 5 days and then sucrose formalin (10% formalin, 30% sucrose) until 
the brains had sunk. Using a cryostat, the brains were frozen and sliced into 40 µm 
sections and then stained with Thionin. The position of the electrolytic lesions and depth 
records were used to reconstruct electrode tracks in each of the birds. 
3.3 Results 
Histology 
For NCL and CDL birds all electrode tracks were within the targeted region as 
defined by Karten and Hodos (Karten & Hodos, 1967), and the histology results are 
shown in Figure 3.2. The intended track positions for NCL electrodes were AP +5.5 and 
ML ±7.5. The track position for the right hemisphere NCL bird Eli was AP +6.75 and 
ML + 8.9, differing from the intended AP position by 1.25 mm and the intended ML 
position by 1.4 mm. The track position for the right hemisphere NCL bird Eva was AP 
+6.25 and ML +8, differing from the intended AP position by 0.75 mm and the intended 
ML position by 0.5 mm. The track position for the left hemisphere NCL bird Leo was AP 
+6 and ML -9, differing from the intended AP position by 0.5 mm and the intended ML 
position by 1.5 mm. We were unable to identify the electrode tracks in the remaining left 
hemisphere bird, Mac, although the entry point was located at AP +5.3, differing from 
the intended AP position by only 0.2 mm. The intended entry point for CDL electrodes 
were AP +6 and ML ±4. The entry point for the right hemisphere CDL bird D2 was AP 
+6.75 and ML +4, differing from the intended AP position by 0.75 mm. The entry point 
for the left hemisphere CDL bird M9 was AP +6.5 and ML -3.5, differing from the 





Figure 3.2. Electrode track reconstruction. Electrode track position reconstructions for 
the two right NCL birds (Eli and Eva), the right CDL bird (D2), one left NCL bird (Leo), 
and one left CDL bird (M9). All recordings were within the full dorsal-ventral extent of 
NCL and CDL.  We were unable to recover the electrode tracks of the second left NCL 
bird (Mac), but the termination point indicated by the depth records is represented by the 
star. The following are the brain regions as defined by Reiner et al (2004). A, arcopallium; 
DA, tractus dorso-arcopallialis; CDL, area corticoidea dorsolateralis; Hp, hippocampus; 
N, nidopallium; Rt, nucleus rotundus; TeO, tectum opticum; TrO, tractus opticus; V, 
ventricle. 
Behavioural Data 
For each session, the median latency to the first peck of the sample stimulus 
(indicating either high or low effort) was calculated across the 32 trials dedicated to each 
stimuli. The latency to the first peck averaged across all sessions from which cells were 
recorded is displayed in Figure 3.3. The latencies for each bird were subjected to a 
Wilcoxon’s signed rank test and in all cases, the latency to the stimulus indicating a HE 
trial was significantly longer than the latency to the LE stimulus (Mac: t(39) = 15.40, p < 
.001; Leo: t(43) = 8.92, p < .001; Eva t(31) = 9.98, p < .001; Eli t(44) = 9.85, p < .001; 





Figure 3.3. Behavioural performance. Mean latency to the first peck for the LE and HE 
stimuli for each of the four NCL birds (Mac, Eli, Leo, and Eva) and two CDL birds (D2 
and M9), averaged across sessions during which neurons were recorded. Note that the 
shorter latencies indicate higher value to the pigeon. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM. 
Period Selective and Effort Selective cells 
We recorded from a total of 245 NCL cells. Four cells were removed on the basis 
that their average firing rate across the entire intertrial interval period was less than 0.1 
spikes per second, leaving 241 cells that were used for the NCL analysis (Eva = 46, Eli = 
74, Mac = 55, Leo = 66). We recorded from a total of 57 cells in CDL. Two cells were 
removed because the firing rate in the ITI was less than 0.1 spikes per second, leaving 55 
cells that were used for the CDL analysis (D2 = 31, M9 = 24). A repeated-measures two-
way ANOVA with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Period (2: the defined period and ITI) as 
factors was carried out on each of the NCL and CDL cells, separately. The results are 







Table 3.1. Effort Selective and Period Selective cells in each trial period 
Column1 NCL Column2 CDL Column5 






Stimulus 67 (28%)  31 (13%) 16 (29%)  3 (6%) 
Pre-Effort  
(peck adjusted) 
100 (42%)  34 (14%) 23 (42%)  8 (14.5%) 
Effort 135 (59%)  23 (10%) 52 (95%)  2 (4%) 
Post-Effort 185 (77%)  26 (11%) 47 (86%)  8 (15%) 
Reward 174 (72%)  25 (10%) 40 (73%)  10 (18%) 
 
  
Effort Selective Cells in the Sample Period 
NCL Cells. The population plot of the 31 Effort Selective NCL cells, irrespective 
of whether they fired more in HE or LE trials, is shown in Figure 3.4. Twenty one of the 
cells fired more to the LE stimulus, while the remaining 10 cells fired more in response 
to the HE stimulus. A Chi-square test revealed that the number firing more to LE than HE 
was greater than expected by chance, X2 (1, n=31) = 3.90, p < .05. The data in the Sample, 
Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a repeated-measures 
two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms, 6: bins 1-6 for 
the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: 
bins 1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a significant effect of Stimulus during the 
Sample period, F(1, 30) = 4.49, p < .05, and in the Pre-Effort period, F(1, 30) = 6.46, p < 
.05, with cells firing more during LE trials than HE trials, and therefore the Effort 
Selective cells, as a population, showed a LE Value Preference. There was no effect of 
Stimulus, in the Effort, Post-Effort and Reward period, all Fs(1, 30) < 0.8, all ps > .38. 
An example of an Effort Selective NCL cell in the Sample period is shown in Figure 3.5a. 
In CDL, only three cells were Effort Selective and so given the small number, no further 






Figure 3.4. Population plot: Effort Selective NCL cells in the Sample period. Normalised 
firing rate for Effort Selective cells during the Sample period. The ITI represents the last 
4500 ms of the 5000 ms intertrial interval. The Sample period (S) represents the 300 ms 
period prior to the first peck to the stimulus. The Pre-Effort period (PRE-EFF) represents 
the 1500 ms before the effort stimuli appear, and the Effort period (EFF) represents the 
300 ms prior to the first effort peck. The Post-Effort period (POST-EFF) is the 1500 ms 
prior to reward delivery, and Reward represents the 2000 ms reward delivery period. ITI: 
intertrial interval; S: Stimulus period; PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: Effort period; 







Figure 3.5. Examples of NCL single-unit activity. Panel A and B show two different cells, 
each from different birds. Each panel displays the raster (top) and histogram (bottom) 
activity of the cell over a 64 trial session. a) An NCL cell that displays a noticeable 
increase in firing to the presentation of the LE stimulus compared to the HE stimulus. The 
cell also fires in an inhibitory manner during the Pre-Effort period of HE trials. b) An 
NCL cell that displays an increased firing rate during the Pre-Effort period of LE trials, 
but not during HE trials.  ITI: intertrial interval; Stim: Stimulus period; Pre: Pre-Effort 
period; Eff: Effort period; Post: Post-Effort period. 
Effort selective cells in the Pre-Effort period  
NCL cells. The activity of the 34 Effort Selective cells in the Pre-Effort period, 
after adjusting to control for peck related activity, irrespective of whether they fired more 




Selective NCL cells fired more during LE trials, while seven fired more during HE trials. 
A Chi-squared test revealed that there were more cells that fired to LE than would be 
expected by chance, X2 (1, n=34) = 11.77, p < .001. An example of an Effort Selective 
NCL cell in the Pre period is shown in Figure 3.5b. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, 
Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way 
ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms 6: bins 1-6 for the Sample 
and Effort periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1-40 for 
the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected). There was a significant effect of Stimulus in the Sample period, F(1,33) = 
4.80, p < .05, and the Pre-Effort period, F(1, 33) = 16.71, p < .001, with cells firing 
significantly more during LE trials than HE trials, and therefore the Effort Selective cells, 
as a population, showed a LE Value Preference. In the Effort period, there was a slight 
difference between firing in HE and LE trials, with more firing during LE trials, however 
the difference fell short of significance, F(1, 33) = 3.71, p = .06. There was no significant 
difference firing between HE and LE trials during the Post-Effort and Reward periods, 
all Fs(1, 33) < 2.16, all ps > .15.  
CDL cells. The population plot of the eight Effort Selective CDL cells, after 
controlling for the possible effect of pecks, is shown in Figure 3.6b. Of the eight cells, 
five fired more during HE trials, while the remaining three fired more during LE trials. A 
Chi-squared comparison revealed that no more cells fired to LE compared to HE than 
would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n=8) = .5, p = .48. The data in the Sample, Pre-
Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a two-way ANOVA, with 
Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms 6: bins 1-6 for the Sample and Effort 
periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1-40 for the Reward 
period) as factors, with repeated-measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). 





Figure 3.6. Population plot: Effort Selective Cells in the Pre-Effort period. a) Normalised 
firing rate for Effort Selective NCL cells during the Pre-Effort period, correcting for peck 
related activity. b) Normalised firing rate for the Effort Selective CDL during the Pre-
Effort period, correcting for peck related activity. For details on the timing of the periods, 
see Figure 3.4. ITI: intertrial interval; S: Stimulus period; PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; 
EFF: Effort period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period. 
Effort Selective Cells in the Effort Period 
NCL cells. The population response of the 23 Effort Selective NCL cells, 
irrespective of whether firing was higher during LE and HE trials, is shown in Figure 3.7. 
Ten cells fired more during LE trials, while the remaining 13 fired more in HE trials. A 




would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n=23) = 0.39, p = .53. The data in the Sample, Pre-
Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a repeated-measures two-
way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms 6: bins 1-6 for the 
Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 
1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected). In the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward periods, 
there was no effect of Stimulus, all Fs(1, 22) < 3.53, all ps > .07. In CDL, only two cells 
were Effort Selective and so given the small number, no further analysis was conducted.  
 
Figure 3.7. NCL Population plot: Effort Selective NCL Cells in the Effort period. 
Normalised firing rate for Effort Selective NCL cells during the Effort period. For details 
on the timing of the periods, see Figure 3.4.  ITI: intertrial interval; S: Stimulus period; 
PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: Effort period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period. 
Effort Selective Cells in the Post-Effort Period  
NCL cells. The population response of all 26 Effort Selective NCL cells, 
regardless of whether they fired more during LE or HE trials is shown in Figure 3.8a. 
Twelve fired more during LE trials, while the remaining 14 fired more in HE trials. A 
Chi-squared test revealed that there were no more cells firing more to HE to LE than 
would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n=26) = 0.15, p = .70. The data in the Sample, Pre-




way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms 6: bins 1-6 for the 
Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 
1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected). In the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward periods, 
there was no effect of Stimulus, Fs(1, 25) < 1.71, all ps > .29. 
CDL cells. The population plot of all eight Effort Selective CDL cells, irrespective 
of whether they fired more during HE or LE trials is shown in Figure 3.8b. Of the eight 
Effort Selective cells, seven fired more during the Post-Effort period in LE trials, while 
the remaining cell fired more during the Post-Effort period in HE trials. An example CDL 
cell that shows a difference in firing between HE and LE trials in the Post-Effort period 
is shown in Figure 3.9. A Chi-squared comparison revealed that more cells fired at higher 
rates during LE trials compared to HE trials than would be expected by chance, X2 (1, 
n=8) = 4.5, p < .05. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward 
period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or 
LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms 6: bins 1-6 for the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1-30 
for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, 
with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was no 





Figure 3.8. Population plot: Effort Selective Cells in the Post-Effort period. a) 
Normalised firing rate for Effort Selective NCL cells during the Post-Effort period. b) 
Normalised firing rate for Effort Selective CDL cells during the Post-Effort period. For 
details on the timing of the periods, see Figure 3.4. ITI: intertrial interval; S: Stimulus 





Figure 3.9. Examples of CDL single-unit activity. Each panel displays the raster (top) and 
histogram (bottom) activity of the cell over a 64-trial session. The cell displays a 
significant increase in firing during the Post-Effort period of LE trials compared to HE 
trials. ITI: intertrial interval; Stim: Stimulus period; Pre: Pre-Effort period; Eff: Effort 
period; Post: Post-Effort period. 
Effort Selective cells in the Reward Period 
NCL cells. The population response of all 25 Effort Selective NCL cells, 
irrespective of whether they fired more during HE or LE trials, is shown in Figure 3.10a. 
Fourteen fired more during HE trials and 11 fired more during LE trials, and a Chi-
squared test revealed that this was no more than would be expected by chance, X2(1, 
n=25) = 0.36, p = .55. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward 
period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or 
LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms 6: bins 1-6 for the Sample and Effort period, 30: bins 1-30 for 
Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods, or 40: bins 1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, 
with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a 
significant effect of Stimulus in the Pre-Effort period, with cells firing more during LE 
than HE trials, F(1, 24) = 7.69, p < .05. In the Sample period, there was a slight difference 
between firing in HE and LE trial, with more firing during HE stimuli, however the 




effect of Stimulus in the Sample, Effort, Post-Effort, or Reward periods, all Fs(1, 24) < 
4.11, all ps > .05. 
CDL cells. The population plot of all 10 Effort Selective cells in the reward period, 
irrespective of whether they fired more during HE or LE trials, is shown in Figure 3.10b. 
Of the 10 cells, eight fired more during the during the Reward period of HE trials, while 
the remaining two fired more during the Reward period in LE trials. A Chi-squared 
comparison revealed that the number of cells with higher firing rates during HE trials 
compared to LE just fell short of chance, X2 (1, n=10) = 3.6, p = .06. The data in the 
Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a repeated-
measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50ms 6: bins 
1-6 for the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort 
periods; 40: bins 1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over 
Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was no significant effect of Stimulus in any 





Figure 3.10. Population plot: Reward period filtering. a) Normalised firing rate for Effort 
Selective NCL cells during the Reward period. b) Normalised firing rate Effort selective 
CDL cells during the Reward period. For details on the timing of the periods, see Figure 
3.4. ITI: intertrial interval; S: Stimulus period; PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: Effort 
period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period. 
3.4 Discussion 
Summary of Findings  
In the present study, we explored how NCL and CDL cells encode the value of a 
reward when it is discounted by effort costs. We recorded from 245 cells in NCL and 57 
in CDL during a task where birds were required to peck a stimulus predicting a subsequent 
high effort task (peck a total of eight times across four spatially-distributed positions on 




on the screen). The latency-to-peck data strongly supports the fact that the birds preferred 
the low effort trials over the high effort trials. We examined whether NCL and CDL cells 
exhibited Effort Selectivity, and, if so, whether or not they were Value Selective (fired 
preferentially to the Low Effort trials) in the period that the birds were presented with 
each stimulus that would predict the upcoming effort condition, the periods before and 
after exerting the effort, and the reward period. 
 Mirroring the behavioural preferences of the birds for the stimuli that predicted 
the LE trials, cells in NCL that were Effort Selective in both the Stimulus and the Pre-
Effort periods fired significantly more during LE trials than HE trials, even when 
controlling for pecking. The stimuli indicating the trial types were balanced across birds, 
and we saw higher firing rates to the LE stimulus across all birds, therefore it is unlikely 
that the difference in firing rates was simply due to stimulus selectivity. In contrast to the 
Sample and Pre-Effort periods, Effort Selective cells showed no neural preference for LE 
trials over HE trials during the Effort, Post-Effort, or Reward periods. In contrast to NCL, 
while a number of CDL cells were Effort Selective, the population of Effort Selective 
cells showed no increase in firing towards LE trials compared to HE trials during any 
period of the task, indicating no LE Value Preference in CDL cells.  
Implications for Value Coding in NCL  
Given that for both HE and LE trials the reward amount was the same but the 
physical effort different, the pattern of firing we saw in NCL is consistent with the notion 
that NCL is important for representing the effort-discounted value of a stimulus. 
Naturally, the LE and HE trials differ along a few other dimensions in addition to effort, 
and it is important to consider whether these factors could also be driving the observed 
neural differences. Given that NCL activity is modulated by the animals’ pecking 
(Starosta et al., 2013), a main factor to consider is whether higher peck rates to the LE 
stimulus that continued into the Pre-Effort period could account for the higher neural 
activity during the Sample and Pre-Effort periods. However, we do not believe this is 
likely for two reasons. First, in the Pre-Effort period, we statistically controlled for any 
peck-related neural activity, and even when doing so significant differences in neural 
activity emerged during the LE and HE trials. Second, the differences in neural activity 
were also present during the Sample period where, because the period of analysis was 




differences in NCL activity between HE and LE trials was likely driven by effort 
discounting of reward value and not an artefact of peck frequency. 
The HE and LE trials also differ in terms of the spatial arrangements of the stimuli 
in that following the LE stimulus, the animal needs only to peck to one spatial position in 
the Effort period, whereas following the HE stimulus the animal needs to peck at four 
different spatial positions in the effort period. Thus either the spatial positions themselves, 
or the movement differences that the two different spatial arrays would engender, might 
also account for the observed neural differences. Again, the same logic that we applied to 
our peck data would apply to an explanation based on differences in spatial arrays or 
movement. Although both differences in spatial arrays or movements could account for 
the differences in neural activity between LE and HE trials during the Pre-Effort period, 
neither could account for the differences in neural activity during the Sample period 
where the stimuli that predicted the LE and HE trials were presented in the same central 
position. Overall, we believe it was the impending difference in effort requirements that 
was driving the neural differences observed during the Sample and Pre-Effort delay 
periods.  
A final point to consider is whether the longer latency to peck the HE stimulus 
compared to the LE stimulus could explain the difference in firing during the Sample 
period. The longer latency to peck the HE stimulus is a useful indicator of preference, or 
lack thereof, and our method of analysing the time period from -400 ms to -100 ms prior 
to the first peck is important because it is the only time we know the bird is looking at the 
stimulus. One possibility is that the longer latency to peck the HE stimulus could have 
resulted in neural habituation of the response to that stimulus. However, although neural 
habituation might explain the difference observed between LE and HE during the 
Stimulus period, it does not explain why we still see the difference during the Pre-Effort 
period.  
The apparent coding of value in NCL as a function of effort cost is similar to that 
seen in the ACC of mammals. In effort studies with rats, ACC cells fire to the “best” 
outcome when effort based options are manipulated (Hillman & Bilkey, 2010; Hillman 
& Bilkey, 2012; Porter et al., 2019). While our task did not require dynamic changes in 
value appraisal, the current design allows us to see the encoding of a stimulus that, 




findings in NCL are similar to Porter et al (2019) who showed rodent ACC neural 
populations respond to behaviours with the highest value, even in effort tasks where no 
decision between behaviours needs to be made (Porter et al., 2019). 
Implications for CDL function  
A handful of CDL cells were Effort Selective in that they fired during either LE 
or HE trials. However, unlike in NCL, as a population, cells in CDL showed no 
modulation in firing that reflected a preference for the LE or HE trials. Of course, we 
exercise some caution in this conclusion as we recorded from a smaller number of CDL 
cells than NCL cells. Although overall CDL cells seemed to exhibit no neural activity 
indicative of a preference for either the LE or HE trials, an interesting observation was 
noted in the number of inhibitory and excitatory cells in each period of the task. For 
example, 95% of CDL cells fired in an inhibitory manner during the 300 ms prior to the 
first effort peck, and 60% fired in an inhibitory manner during the Reward period. In 
contrast, during the Post-Effort period, 86% of cells fired in an excitatory manner. So 
while not firing differentially between HE and LE trials, a large proportion of CDL cells 
appeared to be inhibited during the Effort period, and then seem to ‘rebound’, firing in an 
excitatory manner during the Post-Effort period, before being again inhibited during the 
Reward period. Although neurons in CDL may not play a role in value coding, CDL cells 
could be involved in response-outcome coding, playing an important role in associating 
the effortful action of pecking to the beneficial reward outcome. If this is the case, CDL 
could still play an important role in learning and associating actions with outcomes.  
It is interesting that despite the fact that CDL has some connectivity patterns 
similar to the ACC (Atoji & Wild, 2005), cells in CDL do not appear to directly modulate 
their firing rate in response to effort discounting in the same way that ACC does (Atoji & 
Wild, 2005; Cowen et al., 2012;  Hillman & Bilkey, 2010). The current literature on the 
function of CDL is limited, and to our knowledge, no other study has conducted 
electrophysiology recordings from CDL. CDL is part of the limbic/olfactory sub-module 
that makes up the cortico-hippocampal network of the avian brain (Shanahan et al., 2013). 
The majority of studies that make mention of CDL are lesion studies, where CDL is used 
as a control area, and in most of these cases the lesion is imprecise and affects surrounding 
areas. As such, it is difficult to draw on any previous literature to speculate on why CDL 




We found that CDL does not seem to directly code value, but does seem to fire in a pattern 
that may be useful in associating action and reward. We therefore posit that CDL may be 
involved more in the updating of the mental model of an action-outcome sequence 
(Kolling, Behrens, Wittmann, & Rushworth, 2016) rather than representing the value of 
each outcome in the way that NCL does. 
Conclusions  
We found the cells in the pigeon NCL encode value as a function of effort 
discounting. Our findings are consistent with a growing body of literature suggesting the 
NCL is an important area of the pigeon brain for encoding value (Kalenscher et al., 2005; 
Koenen et al., 2013; Starosta et al., 2013). Unlike the mammalian brain, the avian brain 
does not seem to process delay discounted value and effort discounted value in separate 
brain areas, but rather NCL acts as one more generalized value coding region. Despite 
some analogies between ACC and CDL in terms of connections patterns, we found no 
evidence that CDL cells encoded value or differentiate between high and low effort 
requirements. Nevertheless, it is still possible that CDL plays a role in associating 















Chapter 4: The Neural Representation of Cognitive Effort 
Discounting in the Pigeon NCL 
4.1 Rationale for the Study of Cognitive Effort Discounting in Pigeons 
The previous chapter explored the neural basis of physical effort in the NCL, and 
clearly demonstrated physical effort discounting related value preference in NCL cells. 
In the current chapter, we wanted to explore whether we could develop a task that would 
elicit behaviour indicative of cognitive effort discounting; in other words, a subjective 
preference for expending less cognitive resources in order to reach a rewarding outcome.  
The current literature exploring cognitive effort in animals almost entirely pertains 
to the rat cognitive effort task (rCET) developed by the Winstanley lab (Cocker et al., 
2012; Hosking, Cocker, & Winstanley, 2014; Hosking, Floresco, & Winstanley, 2015; 
Silveira, Tremblay, & Winstanley, 2018; Zeeb & Winstanley, 2011). The rCET is based 
on a 5-choice serial reaction time task, and requires rats to choose between carrying out 
an easy or hard visual discrimination. The rats are presented with a wheel containing 8 
nose-poke holes, and after the rats select a lever representing an “easy” or “hard” trial, 
one of the nose-poke holes lights up. The rats must make a nose poke in the hole that was 
lit up in order to correctly complete the trial. In easy trials, the hole lit up for 1.0 seconds, 
while in hard trials, it only lit up for 0.2 seconds. Following a correct nose-poke, rats 
received reward, gaining twice the amount of reward if it was a hard trial compared to an 
easy trial. The authors propose that greater cognitive effort, in the form of visual-spatial 
attention, is required to successfully complete the hard task compared to the easy task. In 
some studies, they yoked the rats’ reward schedule, by rewarding the rats based on master 
rat’s task performance, rather than their own performance, therefore their reinforcement 
probabilities were not based on their task choice. The aim of the yoked rewards was to 
control for neural encoding of predicted reward differences that the rats might come to 
expect given the differences on cognitive effort requirements between the two tasks 
(Cocker et al., 2012). 
Using the rCET paradigm, the Winstanley group have been able to establish 
“worker” and “slacker rats”, who prefer to either put in more effort for greater reward, or 
expend less effort for smaller rewards. Based on the “worker/slacker” categorisations, the 




cortex areas. Initially, they explored the effects of amphetamine, caffeine and ethanol on 
the rats. They found that giving the rats both amphetamine and caffeine saw “worker” 
rats exert less effort. On the other hand, “slackers” exerted more cognitive effort under 
amphetamine, but showed no changes in response to caffeine. While amphetamine 
resulted in changes in effort exertion for each group, when the rats’ behaviour was 
analysed as one group, there was no main effect of amphetamine on behaviour. Ethanol 
did not change the rats’ choices, but saw a decrease in latency to respond, and more trials 
being completed in a session (Cocker et al., 2012). As an initial experiment using the 
rCET, Cocker et al.’s study provided a basis for studying the phenomenon of cognitive 
effort in animals, and furthermore, beginning to explore the underlying neural pathways 
involved. 
Further studies using the rCET began to explore more effects of psychostimulants, 
as well as deactivations of areas of the brain implicated in effort exertion. In one study, 
rats were again separated into workers and slackers and administered nicotine. Nicotine 
was found to moderately increase the rats’ attention levels, but decreased willingness to 
exert effort, especially in the “slacker” rats (Hosking, Lam, & Winstanley, 2014). A 
further study used the same paradigm, but this time explored the effects of temporarily 
deactivating the BLA and the ACC. BLA deactivation saw “workers” exert less cognitive 
effort, and “slackers” exert more cognitive effort. On the other hand, ACC deactivation 
saw a reduction in cognitive effort exertion across all rats (Hosking et al., 2014). The 
authors suggested that the behaviour changes were consistent with what one may expect 
given previous studies that implicate the BLA in representing subjective value, and the 
ACC in driving behaviour to the most advantageous option. 
The most direct comparison between cognitive effort and physical effort tasks is 
described by Hosking, Floresco & Winstanley (Hosking et al., 2015), who compared the 
effects of dopamine antagonism on behaviour in the rCET, and a physical effort 
discounting task. Interestingly, dopamine antagonists decreased willingness to exert 
effort in the physical effort task, but did not affect behaviour on the rCET. The findings 
highlight that the neural pathways in the mammal brain that drive cognitive and physical 
effort are likely distinct ones, with dopamine playing a large part in physical effort 




At present, the rCET is the only task that succeeds in manipulating cognitive effort 
in animals. The challenge in manipulating cognitive effort and recording the neural 
response, is designing a task with two options, one requiring the bird to exert more 
cognitive effort, but to have the bird perform at the same level of accuracy in both tasks. 
The reason such a condition is important is to ensure that cognitive effort requirements, 
rather than reward probability, is the factor influencing any observed neural modulation. 
If the bird is performing at a higher level of accuracy in the easier task, any neural 
modulation could be explained better by the higher likelihood that they will receive 
reward in low effort trials.  
We aimed to design a pigeon cognitive effort task, the ‘pCET’, with the aim of 
exploring whether NCL, the area of the avian brain thought to act as the functional 
equivalent of mammalian prefrontal cortex (Güntürkün, 2005a), is involved in cognitive 
discounting. To do so, we developed a search task, where the pigeon was required to 
select the non-vertical line among an array of eight vertical lines. On low cognitive effort 
(LCE) trials, the non-vertical line was horizontal, therefore contrasting highly from the 
other, vertical lines. On high cognitive effort (HCE) trials, the non-vertical line was 45°, 
meaning the birds had to search with more care to find the non-vertical line. In other 
words, the cognitive effort was manipulated by altering the extent to which the task 
required the bird to inhibit the impulses they might have to peck the other, incorrect lines.   
We established the following criteria to indicate whether a bird was showing 
cognitive effort discounting. First, the bird had to show a preference for the LCE trials, 
as evidenced by their latency to peck the stimuli indicating the trial type. On top of a 
preference, they also had to perform the task at a level where there was no significant 
difference in their performances between LCE and HCE trials. We used the birds’ latency 
to peck the stimuli to assess whether the birds had a preference for LCE trials (a shorter 
latency indicated a greater preference). It was hypothesised that if the birds showed a 
preference for LCE, and their performance in both LCE and HCE trials was the same, 
then neurons in the NCL that fire differentially to the two trial types would reflect a neural 









Following a 5000ms inter trial interval, one of the four stimuli, indicating whether the 
trial would require high or low cognitive effort, appeared in the central square hole (see 
Figure 4.1). Three pecks to the stimulus turned it off and initiated a two-second Pre-
effort delay period, followed by ether a high effort or low effort period. In HCE trials, 
nine individual lines, 1.6 cm in length, appeared in each of the outer response holes. 
Seven of the lines were vertical, and the remaining line was either horizontal or 45°. In 
LCE trials, the non-vertical line was horizontal. The bird was required to search for the 
non-vertical line, and peck it once. If the bird correctly pecked the non-vertical line, the 
effort stimuli disappeared and the reward period commenced, allowing the bird two 
seconds of access to the wheat. If the bird made an incorrect response to a vertical line, 
the effort stimuli disappeared and the house light turned off for 1 sec, and birds were not 
given access to wheat. Each session consisted of 96 trials, with 24 dedicated to each of 
the stimuli, randomly intermixed. The birds were trained until they showed an effort 
preference, as indicated by their latency to peck the stimulus, but no significant 







Figure 4.1 Behavioural Procedure. Following the HCE (high cognitive effort) stimulus 
an array of nine lines appeared, one of which was at a 45° angle, while the rest were 
vertical, and the bird was required to peck the 45° line. Following the LCE (low cognitive 
effort) stimulus, an array of nine lines appeared, one of which was horizontal while the 
rest were vertical, and the bird was required to peck the horizontal line. In both trial types, 
if the bird correctly pecked the non-vertical line, they received 2 sec access to wheat. If 
the bird incorrectly pecked one of the vertical lines, no reward was delivered and the 
house light switched off for 2 sec.  
Data Analysis  
The sample period (Sample), the pre-effort period (Pre-Effort), and a 300 ms 
window before the first effort peck (Effort) were all subject to analysis. The reward period 
was not analyzed as reward was only delivered following correct responses. With respect 
to the Sample period, unlike studies with primates where one can monitor the exact 
position of the eyes, it is difficult in pigeons to monitor when they are looking at the visual 
stimulus. Colombo, Frost, and Steedman (Colombo et al., 2001) adopted a convention 
that neural activity to a visual stimulus was measured during a period from -400 ms to -
100 ms prior to the first peck to that stimulus. The reason the period ends 100 ms prior to 




key peck (Colombo et al., 2001). In the ITI and the Pre-Effort, the first 500 ms of each 
period was excluded from analysis in order to avoid including residual activity driven by 
the period that took place immediately before (Reward and Sample periods, respectively).  
All cells that fired at less than 0.1 spikes/sec in the ITI were excluded from further 
analysis. Each cell’s Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period data was 
subjected to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with period (2: ITI and defined 
period) and stimulus (2: HCE and LCE) as a factor. The dependent variable was the firing 
rate on each trial of a cell during the ITI and defined period. An effect of Stimulus 
indicated that the cell responded differently on HCE and LCE trials. A Period effect 
indicated that a cell either increased or decreased its firing rate in the defined period 
compared to in the ITI. The cell’s data was entered into a population plot on the basis of 
whether the main effect of Stimulus (HCE vs LCE) was significant, thereby illustrating 
the firing pattern of cells that differentiate between HCE and LCE trials in a given period.  
Those cells that did show an effect of stimulus were defined as “Effort Selective”. 
In other words, they fired differentially between LCE and HCE trials. We then also 
examined whether the Effort Selective cells, as a group, showed a LCE Value Preference. 
In order to establish a whether they showed a LCE Value Preference, the data in the 
Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period of the sub-population of all 
Effort Selective cells for the defined period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way 
ANOVA with Stimulus (2: HCE or LCE) and Bin (all bins 50ms, 6: bins 1-6 for the 
Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 
1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected). If the sub-population of Effort Selective cells fired significantly more 
during LCE trials compared to HCE in the defined period, they were characterized as 
having a LCE Value Preference. 
4.3 Results 
Histology  
The histology results are shown in Fig. 2. The intended track positions for NCL 
were AP +5.5 and ML +7.5. The track position for the first right NCL bird (D5) was AP 
+5.75 and ML +6.5, differing from the intended AP position by .25 mm, and the ML 
position by 1mm. The track position for the remaining birds were unable to be recovered, 





Figure 4.2. Electrode track reconstruction. Electrode track position reconstructions for 
the three right NCL birds (B3, D5 and D7) and two left NCL birds (D8 and D6). All 
recordings were within the full dorsal-ventral extent of NCL. The following are the brain 
regions as defined by Reiner et al. (2004): A, archopallium; DA, tractus dorso-
arcopallialis; CDL, area corticoidea dorsolateralis; Hp, hippocampus; N, nidopallium; Rt, 
nucleus rotundus; TeO, tectum opticum; TrO, tractus opticus; V, ventricle. 
Behavioural Data 
For each session where a cell was recorded, the median latency to the first peck 
to the HCE and the LCE sample stimuli were calculated and averaged across the trials. 
The average latency across all sessions from which cells we recorded cell is displayed in 
Figure 4.3. The latencies to peck the HCE and LCE stimuli in all the sessions during 
which a cell was recorded were subjected to a paired samples T-Test HCE and LCE trials, 
and there was no difference found t(119) = .79, p = .43 (Figure 4.3a). The individual data 
from each bird was also subject to paired-sample T-tests (Figure 4.3b), and for D3 and 
D7, the latency to peck the HCE stimulus was significantly greater than to peck the LCE 
stimulus, D3: t(8) = 5.0, p < .05, D7: t(27) = 2.40, p < .05. For D6 and D8, the latency to 
peck the LCE stimulus was significantly greater than the latency to peck the LCE 
stimulus, D6: t(31)=2.60, p < .05, D8: t(14) = 2.88. p < .05. D5 showed no difference in 






Figure 4.3 Behavioural performance. a) Latencies to high and low effort stimuli averaged 
across all birds in sessions during which a cells was recorded. b) The latency differences 




different birds contributed a different number of sessions (D3 = 9, D5 = 36, D6 = 32, D7 
= 28, D8 = 15).  ‘*’ indicates a significant difference, ‘ns’ indicates no significant 
difference. Error bars indicate ± 2 SEM. 
For each session, the performance on both HCE and LCE trials was recorded. The 
average performance across all HCE and LCE trials from sessions during which cells 
were recorded is displayed in Figure 4.4. The data were subject to a paired samples T-
test, and there was no difference in performance between HCE and LCE trials across all 
birds, t(119) = 1.52, p = .13, (figure 4.4a). The individual data from each bird was also 
subject to paired-sample T-tests (figure 4.4b), and there was no significant difference in 
performance for any of the 5 birds, D3 t(8) = .39, P = .71, D5 t(35) = .33, p = .74, D6 





Figure 4.4. Percentage of correct trials in HCE (high cognitive effort) and LCE (low 
cognitive effort) trials. a) The percentage of correct trials in HCE and LCE trials averaged 
across all birds in sessions during which a cell was recorded. b) The percentage of correct 
trials in sessions where a cells was recorded, separated into individual birds. Note that 
different birds contributed a different number of sessions (D3 = 9, D5 = 36, D6 = 32, D7 






We recorded from a total of 125 cells. Ten cells were removed on the basis that 
their average firing rate across the entire inter-trial interval period was less than one spike 
per second, leaving 115 cells (D3 = 8, D5 = 32, D6 = 32, D7 = 28, D8 = 15). A repeated-
measures two-way ANOVA with Stimulus (2: HCE or LCE) and Period (2: the defined 
period and ITI) as factors was carried out on each of the cells in each trial period. Cells 
that showed a significant difference in firing rate comparing the defined period to the ITI, 
were classified as “Period Selective”, and cells that showed a significant difference in 
firing between HCE and LCE trials were classified as “Effort Selective”. The results are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 4.1. Effort Selective and Period Selective cells in each trial period 
Trial Period Period Selective Effort Selective 
   
Stimulus 50 (43.5%) 6 (5.2%) 
Pre-Effort  
(peck adjusted) 
72 (62.6%) 9 (7.8%) 
Effort 60 (52.2%) 12 (10.4%) 
  
Effort selective cells in the Sample Period 
Six of the 115 cells were Effort Selective in the Sample period. Two had a higher 
firing rate during HCE trials compared to LCE trials, while the remaining four fired more 
during LCE trials. A Chi-square test revealed that there were no more cells firing to LCE 
stimuli than would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n=6) = .67, p = .41.  The population plot 
of the six Effort Selective cells, irrespective of whether they fired more during HCE or 
LCE trials, is shown in Figure 4.5. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort and Effort periods 
was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HCE or LCE) 
and Bin (6: bins 1-6 for the Sample and Effort period, 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort period) 




no significant effect of Stimulus in any of the periods analysed, all Fs(1, 5) < .66, all ps 
> .05.  
 
Figure 4.5. Population plot: Sample period filtering. Normalised firing rate for NCL cells 
showing an effect of Stimulus during the Sample period. The ITI represents the last 
4500ms of the 5000ms ITI. Sample represents the 300ms period prior to the first peck to 
the stimulus. Pre-Effort represents the 1500ms before the effort stimuli appear, and Effort 
represents the 300ms prior to the first effort peck.  
Nine of the 115 cells were Effort Selective in the Pre-Effort period. Two fired 
more during HCE trials, and the remaining seven fired more during LCE trials. A Chi-
square test revealed that there were no more cells firing to LCE stimuli than would be 
expected by chance, X2 (n=9) = 2.78, p= .10.  The population plot of the nine Effort 
Selective cells, irrespective of whether they fired more during HCE or LCE trials, is 
shown in Figure 4.6. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort and Effort periods was subject to 
a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HCE or LCE) and Bin (6: bins 
1-6 for the Sample and Effort period, 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort period) as factors, with 
repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was no significant 





Figure 4.6. Population plot: Pre-Effort period filtering. Normalised firing rate for NCL 
cells showing an effect of Stimulus during the Pre-Effort period. The ITI represents the 
last 4500ms of the 5000ms ITI. Sample represents the 300ms period prior to the first peck 
to the stimulus. Pre-Effort represents the 1500ms before the effort stimuli appear, and 
Effort represents the 300ms prior to the first effort peck. 
Twelve of the 115 cells were Effort Selective in the Effort period. Seven fired 
more during HE trials, and the remaining five fired more during LCE trials. A Chi-square 
test revealed that there were no more cells firing to LCE stimuli than would be expected 
by chance, X2 (1, n=12) = .33, p = .56.  The population plot of the 12 cells, irrespective of 
whether they fired more during HCE or LCE trials, is shown in Figure 4.7. The data in 
the Sample, Pre-Effort and Effort periods was subject to a repeated-measures two-way 
ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HCE or LCE) and Bin (6: bins 1-6 for the Sample and Effort 
period, 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was no significant effect of stimulus in any of the 





Figure 4.7. Population plot: Effort period filtering. Normalised firing rate for NCL cells 
showing an effect of Stimulus during the Effort period. The ITI represents the last 4500ms 
of the 5000ms ITI. Sample represents the 300ms period prior to the first peck to the 
stimulus. Pre-Effort represents the 1500ms before the effort stimuli appear, and Effort 
represents the 300ms prior to the first effort peck. 
4.4 Discussion 
Summary of Findings  
In the current study, we explored whether bird’s behaviour is affected by cognitive 
discounting, and if so, how NCL encodes the value of a reward when a reward is 
discounted by cognitive effort requirements. We recorded from 115 cells during a task 
where pigeons had to search for either a horizontal line (low cognitive effort) or a 45° 
line (high cognitive effort) among an array of vertical lines, in order to receive two 
seconds of access to reward. In the early phases of training, the birds displayed a 
preference for lower cognitive effort, evidenced by shorter latencies to initiate a LCE 
trial.  However, during the neural recording phase of the experiment, the birds showed 
inconsistent preferences to high and low cognitive effort requirements. Not surprisingly, 
we saw no neural modulation in response to trials type, during any of the periods of the 
task.  
The failure to demonstrate behaviour indicative of cognitive effort discounting (a 




an inherent problem with studying cognitive effort in any animal other than a human. It 
proved difficult to design a behavioural task where the animals were required to exert 
more cognitive effort but could still perform to the same level in HCE and LCE trials. 
Furthermore, we cannot draw any meaningful conclusions about what the neural data 
represents, given that the behaviour did not reflect any clear value preference in the way 
that we intended. 
Before conducting future studies, it is important to consider why our task design 
did not elicit the expected behaviour to indicate cognitive effort discounting. In the 
current study, the birds reached a point where they could successfully carry out both the 
HCE and LCE tasks, with a high level of accuracy, and based on the latencies, there was 
no evidence that they preferred the lower effort task. One possibility is that there was a 
“ceiling effect” where the HCE task was too easy for the bird and that once they 
understood the requirements of the task, they did not need to exert any more effort in the 
HCE task than they did in the LCE task. 
In order to explore whether making the task harder could restore a preference for 
the LCE trials, we ran three of the birds on an adjusted version of the task after recording 
had finished. In the adjusted task, the high effort task required the birds to select a line 
that was on a 22° angle, as opposed to the 45° angle in the original task. The aim was to 
increase the discrepancy in task difficulty between HCE and LCE trials, and see if the 
birds would retain their performance, but prefer the LCE task. The methods and results 
of the adjusted, more difficult cognitive effort task are described in Appendix 1. To 
summarize, even after 20 days on the adjusted task, the three birds had much poorer 
accuracy in the HCE task compared to the LCE task. While they all showed a much 
shorter latency to peck the LCE stimulus, the preference cannot be attributed to cognitive 
effort discounting but rather to the difference in likelihood of receiving reward. We 
therefore chose to end the experiment. 
Another reason the task did not elicit the desired behaviour, could be that while 
they did need to exert more cognitive effort to find the 45° line, the effort was not in fact 
costly to the bird and therefore did not decrease the perceived value of the HCE trials. 
Based on the existing literature around cognitive effort, we know that most humans prefer 
to exert less cognitive effort if it can result in an equal outcome, according to the “law of 




goal-oriented behaviours (Westbrook & Braver, 2015), it is assumed that engaging 
cognitive effort must present a cost in resources. There is limited literature that 
successfully explores the specific nature of cognitive effort costs; when considering 
physical effort, the energy cost required to exert the effort presents an objective and 
measurable metabolic cost (Westbrook & Braver, 2016). However whether the cost of 
cognitive effort is a metabolic cost required to engage the required cognitive effort, or a 
more complex opportunity-cost equation is unclear (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). 
Nevertheless, the current task paradigm is based on the assumption that cognitive effort 
presents a cost to the pigeons in the same way that it does humans, and it may be that that 
assumption is incorrect. 
Comparison to rCET  
In the rCET manipulations, the authors often found a difference in the direction 
of behaviour change in response to the manipulations that were carried out, between 
‘workers’ and slackers’. For example, BLA deactivation made ‘slacker’ rats exert more 
effort, as did amphetamine administration, but the ‘worker’ rats were inclined to exert 
less effort under BLA deactivation and amphetamine. However, in both of these 
examples, when the performance of the group of rats as a whole was considered, the 
effects of amphetamine, or BLA activation, were minimal, as the two groups cancelled 
the effect (Cocker et al., 2012; Hosking et al., 2014). As the authors describe, the animals’ 
preference “move towards the baseline mean” (Hosking et al., 2014). The pCET paradigm 
used in the current experiment did not establish individual profiles of the birds used in 
the study, but rather treated them all as a homogenous group. Perhaps if we established 
each animal’s baseline preferences, and created a paradigm to suit each bird individually, 
we may have successfully elicited some behavioural evidence of cognitive discounting.  
Implications for Value Coding in NCL 
 It is difficult to draw any solid conclusions about the way in which neurons 
in NCL encode cognitive effort, because the behavioural task did not elicit behaviour to 
indicate that cognitive effort discounting was taking place. The study of cognitive effort 
yielded an interesting comparison to the studies of physical effort discounting and delay 
discounting. In the latter two studies, the behaviour of the birds clearly indicated a 
preference for the more valuable option. However, the same value preference as not 




the patterns of neural activity reflected the behavioural preferences, or lack thereof. We 
saw that in the first two experiments, cells fired overwhelmingly more during the 
preferred trials, be it to the stimulus predicting those trials, or in anticipation of 
completing one. However, in the cognitive effort experiment, while we saw some ‘Effort 
Selective’ cells that fired differently during HCE compared to LCE trials, we saw no 
firing rate bias towards either trial type. Therefore, while at face value the findings from 
Chapter 3 are inconclusive, they could provide more evidence for NCL activity as a 
reflection of perceived value. 
Conclusions 
The current experiment aimed to establish whether NCL cells encoded cognitive 
effort discounting. The findings were inconclusive, owing to the task design, which did 
not succeed in producing the desired behavioural and performance patterns that would 
reflect cognitive effort discounting. However, we can report that when there is no clear 
behavioural preference, we do not see any preference in the firing patterns of NCL cells, 
which indirectly supports the assertion that NCL firing is related to value discounting. 
Future research should aim to develop a successful cognitive effort task, so that we can 






Chapter 5: The Neural Representation of Probabilistic 
Discounting in the Pigeon NCL 
5.1 Rationale for the Study of Probabilistic Discounting in Pigeons 
In tasks where the probability of a reward being delivered is manipulated, pigeons 
make similarly sub-optimal choices to humans. For example, pigeons show a preference 
for a signal of a high reward but low probability outcome over a signal for smaller reward 
at a higher probability, even when the smaller reward ultimately leads to more reward 
across the entire session (Gipson, Alessandri, Miller, & Zentall, 2009; Zentall & Stagner, 
2011). Furthermore, a stimulus associated with ‘winning’ an unlikely high reward 
outcome is particularly reinforcing for a pigeon (Zentall & Stagner, 2011). The pigeon’s 
tendency to over value low probability wins is similar to aspects of behaviour observed 
in humans gambling. Like humans, the birds appear to overestimate the likelihood of the 
large reward being delivered, which is linked to an apparent increase in salience and 
perceived value of a signal indicating that an individual has ‘won’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). It is as though the positive association of the rare ‘wins’ override the more common 
negative association of losses, and therefore can result in sub-optimal decisions being 
made in pursuit of a one-off high reward. 
Similar aspects that affect behaviour in gambling tasks in mammals also affect 
choices in pigeons. Zentall and colleagues trained pigeons to choose either a left or right 
key. They had learned that a one key would lead to a 50% chance of either a red or a 
green key appearing, where the red would always lead to reward, and the green would 
never lead to reward. However if they chose the other key, there was a 50% chance of 
being presented with either a blue key, which led to reward 75% of the time, or a yellow 
key, which led to reward 25% of the time. In other words, the first, suboptimal key only 
led to a 50% reinforcement schedule across all trials, whereas the other key led to reward 
on 75% of trials overall. The authors tested how different conditions that affect mammals’ 
optimal decision-making would affect the pigeons’ decision-making. Pigeons that were 
raised in laboratory cages were more likely to make sub-optimal choices than pigeons 
raised in an enriched environment, a behaviour pattern that has also been documented in 
rats (Pattison, Laude, & Zentall, 2013). Furthermore, hungry pigeons were more likely to 
make sub-optimal decisions than those on a less restricted diet, in a similar way that 




evidence that pigeons are susceptible to the same decision making errors of humans and 
other mammals. 
Dysfunctions in probabilistic discounting is thought to be a driver of problematic 
gambling behaviour (Kyonka & Schutte, 2018). Probabilistic discounting explains the 
extent to which a decrease probability of a reward affects the value placed on the reward.  
Problematic gambling behaviour represents a problem of probabilistic discounting; while 
a person should opt for an option where gain is more likely, even if it is small (for example 
putting their money in a savings account to gain interest), problem gamblers instead 
choose to opt for the option where there is a very small probability of attaining a large 
reward. In other words, they show a shallow probability discounting curve (Rachlin, 
Raineri, & Cross, 1991). In fact, a meta-analysis consolidating probabilistic discounting 
data of gamblers, and found that problem gamblers do behave in a way that indicates a 
shallow probabilistic discounting curve, that places too much value on low probability 
rewards. Therefore, the numerous studies in the behaviour of animals and humans in 
gambling like tasks require the engagement of the cognitive process of probabilistic 
discounting. In humans, mammals and birds we see examples of adaptive and 
maladaptive probabilistic discounting. 
In the current experiment, we explore neurons in the avian brain that might be 
responsible for encoding value as a function of probabilistic discounting. We hypothesize 
that there exists an area where cells encode the “best” option given the known 
probabilities of reward. In order to observe a neural representation of probabilistic 
discounting however, we first aimed to find whether pigeons truly do prefer a stimulus 
the predicts more probable reward over a stimulus that predicts less probable reward. If 
so, we wanted to explore whether NCL, which the previous chapters find encode delay 
discounting related value and physical effort discounting related value, would also encode 
probabilistic discounting related value.  
NCL is a viable candidate for encoding the value associated with different 
probabilities of reward.  As discussed in the previous chapters, NCL is associated with 
representing aspects of reward value (Kalenscher et al., 2005; Koenen et al., 2013), 
including effort and delay discounting, as evidenced by the first two studies described in 
this thesis. Furthermore, NCL is generally considered the avian equivalent of the 




area for the ‘top-down’ control of behaviour, and for adjusting goal-directed behaviours 
(Carlen, 2017; Duncan, 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ott & Nieder, 2019). Therefore it 
is reasonable to assume that NCL would be involved in encoding the value of probabilistic 
outcomes, as part of the assessment required to carry out adaptive and goal directed 
behaviour. 
In the current study, four pigeons were trained to peck four different stimuli, each 
associated with a different probability of receiving reward (100%, 66%, 33% and 0%). 
We observed their peck latencies as they learned to associate each stimulus with a certain 
probability, and established whether they showed a linear preference across the different 
probabilities. We then recorded from NCL neurons and analysed the cell activity when 
the bird was presented with each stimulus, and in the one-second delay period before the 
potential reward delivery time. We hypothesized that the birds’ behaviour would reflect 
a preference for more probable rewards, and that the neural activity in NCL would mirror 
the bird’s behavioural preference.  
5.2 Methods 
Behavioural Task 
At the end of a 5 sec intertrial interval, one stimulus appeared in the central square 
hole (see Figure 5.1). The pigeons were trained prior to associate four different stimuli 
with different probabilities of reward delivery; 0%, 33%, 66% and 100%. Three pecks to 
the stimulus turned it off and initiated a 2 sec anticipation period. Whether or not the trial 
was rewarded or not depended on the probability represented by the most recent stimulus. 
For rewarded trails, the hopper would raise and a hopper light illuminated turned on while 
the pigeon was allowed two seconds of access to wheat. In non-reward trials, the hopper 
light came on but the hopper did not rise, meaning the bird had no access to reward. The 
birds were trained until their peck latencies to the four stimuli formed a linear pattern for 
5 out of 7 consecutive days, with the shortest latency to 100% trials and the longest to 0% 
trials. Each session consisted of 60 trials with 15 trials dedicated to each of the stimuli, 






Figure 5.1 Behavioural procedure. At the end of the ITI a sample stimulus indicating 
either a 100, 66, 33 or 0 trial was presented in the centre top hole. Three pecks to the 
stimulus turned it off and initiated a 2 second anticipation period. In rewarded trials, 
thebird was then allowed two seconds of access to wheat, and at the same time the house 
light and hopper light turned on. In non rewarded trials the house light and hopper light 
would turn on, but birds would gain no access to wheat.  
Data Analysis  
All cells that fired at less than one spike/sec in the ITI were excluded from further 
analysis. The sample period (Sample), the Anticipation period (Anticipation), the reward 
or no reward period (Outcome) were all subject to analysis. With respect to the Sample 
period, unlike studies with primates where one can monitor the exact position of the eyes, 
it is difficult in pigeons to monitor when they are looking at the visual stimulus. Colombo, 
Frost, and Steedman (2001) adopted a convention that neural activity to a visual stimulus 
was measured during a period from -400 ms to -100 ms prior to the first peck to that 
stimulus. The reason the period ends 100 ms prior to contact with the keys is because 
pigeons close their eyes approximately 80 ms prior to a key peck (Colombo et al., 2001). 
In the ITI, the first 500 ms of each period was excluded from analysis in order to avoid 





All cells that fired at less than 0.1 spikes/sec in the ITI were excluded from further 
analysis. Each cell’s Sample, Anticipation and Reward period data was subjected to a 
two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with period (2: ITI and defined period) and 
stimulus (4: 0. 33, 66 and 100) as factors. The dependent variable was the firing rate on 
each trial of a cell during the ITI and defined period. An effect of Stimulus indicated that 
the there was a significant difference in responding to one of the stimuli. The cell’s data 
was entered into a population plot on the basis of whether the main effect of Stimulus was 
significant, thereby illustrating the firing pattern of cells that differentiate between the 
different trial types in a given period.  
Those cells that did show an effect of stimulus were defined as “Probability 
Selective”. In other words, they fired differentially to at least one of the probabilities. We 
then also examined whether the Probability Selective cells, as a group, showed a 
Probability Preference. In order to establish whether they showed a Probability 
Preference, the data in the Sample, Anticipation, and Outcome period of the sub-
population of all Probability Selective cells for the defined period was subject to a 
repeated-measures two-way ANOVA with Stimulus (4: 100, 66, 33 or 0) and Bin (all bins 
50ms, 6: bins 1-6 for the Sample period; 30: bins 1-30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort 
periods; 40: bins 1-40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). If the sub-population of Probability Selective cells fired 
significantly more during higher probability trials compared to lower probability trials in 
the defined period, they were characterized as having a Probability Preference. 
5.3 Results 
Histology 
The histology results are shown in Figure 5.2. The intended track positions for 
NCL electrodes were AP +5.5 and ML ±7.5. The track position for the left hemisphere 
bird X31 was AP +5.75 and ML -8.8 differing from the intended AP position by .25 mm 
and the intended ML position by 1.3mm. The track position for the second left hemisphere 
bird X34 was AP +5.25 and ML -7.5, differing from the intended AP position by .25 mm. 
The track position for the right hemisphere bird X30 was AP +5.5, ML +8.5, differing 
from the intended ML position by 1 mm. In the final right hemisphere bird X41, the 




ML +8, differing from the intended entry point AP by .5 mm and the intended ML 
position by .5mm. 
 
Figure 5.2. Electrode track reconstruction. Electrode track reconstruction for the right 
hemisphere birds (X31) and the two left hemisphere birds (X30 and X34). All recordings 
were in the full dorsal-ventral extent of NCL. We were unable to recover the electrode 
track of the second right hemisphere bird (X41), but the entry point was recovered and is 
represented by the star. The following are the brain regions as defined by Reiner et al. 
(2004) A, arcopallium; DA, tractus dorso-arcopallialis; CDL, area corticoidea 
dorsolateralis; Hp, hippocampus; N, nidopallium; Rt, nucleus rotundus; TeO, tectum 
opticum; TrO, tractus opticus; V, ventricle. 
Behavioural Data 
For each session, the median latency to the first peck of the sample stimulus 
(indicating the trial type) was calculated across the 15 trials dedicated to each stimulus. 
The latency to the first peck averaged across all sessions from which cells were recorded 
is displayed in Figure 5.3. The average of all latencies across each probability, for each 
bird were subject to a log10 transformation in order to reduce across subject variability. 




0, 33, 66, 100) as the factor. There was a significant effect of stimulus, F(3, 15) = 92.0, p 
< .05, and planned pairwise comparisons confirmed that that all latencies differed from 
one another except for the latencies to 66 and 100, for which the latency differences were 
not significant.  
 
Figure 5.3. Behavioural performance. Mean latency to the first peck for the 0%, 33%, 
66% and 100% stimulus, averaged across each of the four birds in sessions during which 
a cells was recorded. Not that the shorter latencies indicate higher value to the pigeon. 
Error bars  ± 1 SEM. 
Probability Selective Cells in Stimulus Period  
We recorded from a total of 167 neurons across the four birds. There were no 
differences between birds or hemispheres, so the data were collapsed across bird and 
hemisphere. Twenty cells showed a significant effect of Probability (one-way ANOVA) 
in the 300 ms Sample period, and were considered Probability Selective. Of the cells, four 




The population of the 20 Probability Selective cells in the Sample period are 
displayed in Figure 5.4. The data in the Sample, Anticipation and the Outcome period 
were subject to separate two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Probability (4: 0, 33, 
66, 100) and bin (bins 1-6 for Sample or 20: bins 1-20 for anticipation and outcome) as 
factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In neither the 
Sample nor the Anticipation period was there an effect of Probability, F(3, 456) = 1.21, p 
= .31; F(3, 3040) = 1.66, p = .17. In the outcome period there was a significant effect of 
probability, F(3, 2040) = 40, p < .001. However when unrewarded trials were removed, 
there was no effect of probability, F(2, 2280) = .45, p = .64.  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Population plot: Probability Selective cells in the Sample period. Normalised 
firing rate for probability selective cells in the Sample period. The ITI represents the last 
4500 ms of the 5000 ms intertrial interval. The Sample period (S) represents the 300 ms 
period prior to the first peck to the stimulus. Anticipation represents the 2000ms period 
between pecking the stimulus and the outcome, and, and Outcome represents the 2000 





Probability Selective Cells in the Anticipation Period 
Next, cells were filtered based on firing rates in the Anticipation period. Of the 
167 cells, 29 showed a significant Probability effect during the Anticipation period (One-
Way ANOVA). Of those, eight fired more during 100 trials, two fired more during 66, 
four during 33 and 15 during 0.  The population of the 29 cells that had a Probability 
effect in the Delay period are displayed in Figure 5.5.  
 The data in the Sample, Anticipation and the Outcome period were subject to 
separate two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Probability (4: 0, 33, 66, 100) and bin 
(bins 1-6 for Sample or 20: bins 1-20 for anticipation and outcome) as factors, with 
repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In neither the Sample nor 
the anticipation period was there any significant effect of Probability, F(3, 672) = 1.74, p 
= .16; F(3, 4480) = .81, p = 0.444. In the Outcome period, there was a significant effect 
of probability, F(3, 4480) = 38.61, p < .001, however when unrewarded trials were 
removed, there was no effect of probability, F(2, 3360) = .17, p = .85. 
 
Figure 5.5. Population plot: Probability Selective cells in the Anticipation period. 
Normalised firing rate for probability selective cells in the Anticipation period. The ITI 




represents the 300 ms period prior to the first peck to the stimulus. Anticipation represents 
the 2000ms period between pecking the stimulus and the outcome, and, and Outcome 
represents the 2000 ms period where reward may or may not be delivered. ITI: intertrial 
interval; S: Stimulus period.  
Probability Selective Cells in the Outcome Period. 
Next, cells were filtered based on firing rates in the Outcome period. 66 of the 167 
cells showed a significant Probability effect during the Outcome period (One-Way 
ANOVA). Of those, 47 fired more during 100 trials, seven fired more during 66, one 
during 33 and 11 during 0.  The population of the 66 cells that had a Probability effect in 
the Delay period are displayed in Figure 5.6.  
The data in the Sample, Anticipation and the Outcome period were subject to 
separate two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Probability (4: 0, 33, 66, 100) and bin 
(bins 1-6 for Sample or 20: bins 1-20 for anticipation and outcome) as factors, with 
repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In neither the Sample nor 
the Anticipation period was there any significant effect of Probability, F(3, 1560) = 0.5, 
p = .71; F(3, 10400) = .95, p = 0.41. In the Outcome period, there was a significant effect 
of probability, F(3, 10400) = 22.13, p < .001. However, given that during the reward 
period there could be movement artefact, the “probability” effect could just be 
representative of the fact that the higher probability trials result in more reward delivery 
and therefore more movement. Therefore, we removed unrewarded trials in the 33% and 
66% conditions to see if there was a difference in cell activity in a period where it was 
more likely that the birds were behaving in the same way (moving to receive reward) 
across all trial types. When unrewarded trials were removed, there was no effect of 
probability, F(2, 7800) = .22, p = .81, suggesting that NCL cells simply increase firing 





Figure 5.6. Population plot: Probability Selective cells in the Outcome period. 
Normalised firing rate for probability selective cells in the Outcome period. The ITI 
represents the last 4500 ms of the 5000 ms intertrial interval. The Sample period (S) 
represents the 300 ms period prior to the first peck to the stimulus. Anticipation represents 
the 2000ms period between pecking the stimulus and the outcome, and, and Outcome 
represents the 2000 ms period where reward may or may not be delivered. ITI: intertrial 
interval; S: Stimulus period.  
5.4 Experiment 2 
In the previous experiment, we designed the task so that there was no choice 
required and therefore allowing observation of neural activity purely based on stimulus 
association. The task design was based on the study by Koenen et al (2013), who reported 
that when stimuli predicting a certain reward amount were presented, in both choice task 
and non-choice tasks (i.e. a stimulus association task like that used in experiment 1) the 
neurons in NCL reflected the reward amount that would be received. However, the 
manipulations of value in Koenen et al’s experiment were straightforward differences in 




the differences across the different manipulations stem from a more complex  where they 
simply manipulated the amount of reward delivered, perhaps with a more complex 
manipulation like probability, a choice component is required to engage NCL neurons.   
Perhaps in the task used by Koenen et al (2013) during both the choice and non-
choice trials they register the “value” upon pecking the stimulus because they know for 
sure that it will lead to reward. Perhaps in the current experiment, when the birds are not 
sure whether their peck will result in reward, the value is not encoded in NCL in the 
sample or the delay phases of the trial. However, if we made the task a choice between 
two probabilities, we might see value coding upon the selection of the “better” option, 
because the bird has to understand which is better before making their selection. Perhaps 
until two options are compared, the bird simply interprets each stimulus as a potential 
predictor of reward. Furthermore, studies in rats and mice (Bari et al., 2019; Hong et al., 
2019) where firing in the mPFC and the OFC did reflect probability processing both used 
choice paradigms. 
Therefore, after gathering and analysing the firing of the 167 cells used in the 
previous analysis, which indicated no evidence of value coding in relation to probabilistic 
discounting, we decided to develop a choice task for the remainder of the recording 
sessions. Given that none of the four birds had had their electrodes advanced through the 
full area of NCL yet, we aimed to record from at least 50 cells while the same birds carried 
out a choice task. We designed a procedure that presented the birds with two of the stimuli 
that they had already learnt to associate with an assigned probability of reward delivery 
(Figure 5.7). The bird indicated its preferred stimulus by pecking it once, and was 
delivered reward based on the probability that the stimulus indicated. All possible 
combinations of pairs were presented, and they were counterbalanced as to what side each 
stimulus appeared on. We weighted the number of trials dedicated to each pair based on 
two considerations. First, how “close” the probabilities being presented were (i.e. 1 vs 33 
is closer than 1 vs 100) and second, whether the outcome was certain or uncertain. For 
each trial, the probability that reward would be delivered was calculated independently 
for each trial based on the stimulus that had been chosen, rather than fixed before the start 
of the session, as was the case in the first experiment. The pairs presented were 0 vs 33% 
(n = 26), 0 vs 66% (n = 16) 0 vs 100% (n = 10) 33% vs 66% (n = 20) 33% vs 100% (n = 




We recorded the number of “correct” responses, in other words, when the bird 
chose the stimulus associated with the higher probability of reward. We also recorded the 
latencies to make a correct response for each pair, and the Anticipation period pecks 
associated with each pair. Given that the selection between two probabilities might 
require a more ‘conscious’ processing of the value of each stimulus, we hypothesised that 
a choice task might elicit neural representation of value better than a stimulus association 
task like that we used in previous experiment designs.  
 
Figure 5.7. Behavioural procedure for the choice task. At the end of the ITI a two sample 
stimuli, each indicating either a 100, 66, 33 or 0 trial were presented in the Left and right 
top holes. One peck to either of the stimuli turned both stimuli off and initiated a 2 second 
anticipation period. In rewarded trials, the bird was then allowed two seconds of access 
to wheat, and at the same time the house light and hopper light turned on. In non rewarded 
trials the house light and hopper light would turn on, but birds would gain no access to 
wheat.  
Data Analysis 
The activity of each cell was normalized by dividing the firing rate in each 50ms 
bin by the maximum ITI firing rate. Next, each period of each cell was subjected to a two-




0v100, 66v0, 100v33, 33v0, 66v33, 100v66) as factors. The dependent variable was the 
firing rate on each trial of a cell during the ITI and defined period. A Period effect 
indicated that a cell either increased or decreased its firing rate in the defined period 
compared to in the ITI. A Pair effect indicated that the there was a significant difference 
in responding to at least one of the pairs compared to the others.  
Each cell was also subject to a Wilcoxon rank sum test, comparing firing during 
‘easy’ trails (0v100, 33v100, 0v66) to firing during ‘difficult’ trials (0v33, 33v66, 
66v100). Cells with a significant difference in firing between easy and difficult trials were 
classified as having a “difficulty effect”. Given the very small number of cells, follow up 
analysis was difficult, so instead the number of cells meeting either of the above criteria 
are described. 
5.5 Choice Task Results 
Behavioural Data 
All four birds’ choices indicated that they understood the hierarchy of 
probabilities each stimulus represented, even on the first day of playing the choice task. 
In all four birds, the greatest number of errors (choosing stimulus that represented the 
lower reward probability) was in the 100 vs 66 pair (Figure 5.8). The increased errors for 
66 vs 100 is in line with the behavioural data from our previous experiment, in which 
latencies to peck the 100 and the 66 stimulus were not significantly different, suggesting 
that the birds did not clearly distinguish the 100 stimulus as the higher value stimulus.  
We analysed the birds’ performance across the different pairs by subjecting the 
data to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Pair as a factor (6: 100v66, 66v33, 
33v0, 100v33, 66v0, 100v0). There was a significant effect of Pair, F(5, 15) = 6.88, p < 
.05. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that the birds made significantly more errors 
in the 100 vs 66 pair than on all other pairs except for the 33 vs 0 pair, which produced 
the second highest number of errors. The 33 vs 66 pair produced the third highest number 
of errors, however the difference in errors when compared to 100 vs 0 and 100 vs 33 fell 
just short of significant. The birds’ accuracy also reflected the ‘difficulty’ of the pairs, 
with a paired samples T-test revealing that they made making significantly more errors in 





Figure 5.8. Behavioural data for choice task. The percentage of errors made by all birds, 
across all sessions during which cells were recorded. A response was considered an error 
if the bird pecked the lower probability stimulus rather than the higher probability 
stimulus. Significant differences are indicated with an asterisk.   
Electrophysiology 
We recorded from 53 neurons across the four birds. The histology figure shown 
in the first experiment (Figure 5.2) displays the electrode tracks. There were no 
differences between birds or hemispheres, so the data were collapsed across bird and 
hemisphere. A repeated-measures two-way ANOVA with Pair (6: 100v66, 66v33, 33v0, 
100v33, 66v0, 100v0) and Period (2: the defined period and ITI) as factors was carried 
out on each of the NCL cells.  Each cell was also subject to a Wilcoxon rank sum test, 
comparing firing during ‘easy’ trails (0v100, 33v100, 0v66) to firing during ‘difficult’ 






Table 5.1. Period, Pair and Difficulty selective cells in each trial period 
 
During the ‘Choice’ period 27 cells showed a period effect, however only three 
cells showed a Pair effect and three showed a Difficulty effect. In the Anticipation period, 
26 showed a Period effect, however only four showed a Pair effect, while six cells showed 
a Difficulty effect. In the outcome period, 28 showed a Period effect; one showed a Pair 
effect and one showed a Difficulty effect. 
Given the very small number of cells we collected, it was difficult to conduct any 
meaningful analysis on the data set, however from the data that was gathered, it seems 
that the most substantial difference we analysed related to choice difficulty, in particular 
in the delay period, where 11% of cells differentiated “easy” and “difficult” choices. 
5.6 Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
In the first experiment of the current chapter, we trained birds to learn that four 
different stimuli were associated with different probabilities of reward delivery, using a 
simple stimulus association task. We found that the birds preferred more probable 
rewards, and thus valued stimuli representing higher probabilities. In other words, their 
behaviour was indicative of probabilistic discounting. However, we recorded from 167 
cells in NCL and found there was no evidence of neural representation of probability, or 
value in relation to probabilistic discounting, in the cells we recorded. We went on to 
record from the same birds during a choice task, where they could choose between two 
of the stimuli they had previously been trained in. We recorded from a small group of 
cells (n = 53) but still found no evidence that NCL cells coded the preferred option. Our 
findings were in contrast to primate studies where value coding related to probabilistic 
discounting is evident in the areas that also exhibit delay and effort discounting (Amiez 
et al., 2006; Kennerley et al., 2009; Yang & Murray, 2018).  
 Period effect Pair effect Difficulty effect 
Choice  27 (51%) 3 (5%) 3 (5%) 
Anticipation  26 (49%) 4 (8%) 6 (11%) 




Our findings of no probability nor value representation are also in contrast to the 
first two chapters of the current thesis, which explored delay discounting and physical 
effort discounting. In both of the studies, NCL represented the discounted value of reward 
when delay to reward or effort requirements were manipulated. However, in the current 
study, where probability was the manipulated variable, and where the birds’ behaviour 
clearly indicated that they valued high probability stimuli, NCL neurons firing rates did 
not reflect a preference for the stimulus that predicted certain reward.  
The only difference in activation of NCL cells across probabilities was in the 
outcome period. Given the differences were no longer evident when the non-rewarded 
trials were removed from analysis, the difference was most driven by differential 
responses to reward delivery versus non-reward delivery. The difference between reward 
delivery and non-reward delivery probably represents a response to the visual or audial 
stimulation associated with reward delivery, or perhaps the difference in movements 
associated with retrieving reward compared to not receiving reward. The difference in 
firing in the Outcome period cannot be assumed reflective of value coding. 
Limitations of the task design 
One limitation of the current task design is that the stimuli may have been 
overlearned, and as such, cells in NCL were not required to encode complex information 
that might be relevant to making a decision. A human fMRI study (Huettel, Stowe, 
Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006) described two separate neural systems encoding risk 
(when a person knows how uncertain an outcome is) and ambiguity (when a person does 
not know the level of uncertainty).  The authors reported that activation in the lPFC 
related to preferences for ambiguity, and that lPFC activity was modulated by impulsive 
decisions. On the other hand, activation in the posterior parietal cortex related to 
preference for risk (Huettel et al., 2006).  The task that we used, most closely matches the 
risk element the Huettel et al (2006) describe. If there is a similar dissociation of 
ambiguity and risk in the avian brain as the authors report in the human brain, perhaps 
the NCL is encoding ambiguity, and the other concept, risk, is encoded elsewhere. 
Another possible limitation is the ecological validity of the task we designed. 
Grabenhorst et al (2019) conducted a study that aimed to create a more realistic scenario 
of probability manipulation. They argued that only in a controlled laboratory setting 




case in our task design. So instead, they based the expectation of reward on an assessment 
of ever changing recent experiences of reward. They recorded from DLPFC in monkeys 
carrying out a task where the probability of reward for two different options was 
constantly changing, and they found that cells dynamically encoded “risk-updating” as 
the probabilities associated with each option was adjusted based on experience, and that 
the cells also encoded the upcoming choice between the two options (Grabenhorst, 
Tsutsui, Kobayashi, & Schultz, 2019).  If pigeons were presented with a task similar to 
that described in Grabenhorst et al, or even one where they had to learn the probability of 
reward associated with novel stimuli each session, perhaps NCL activity would be found 
to represent the updated values of the novel stimuli. However, given the findings in the 
first two studies of the current thesis, where we demonstrated neural modulation in NCL 
in response to value manipulations, it seems unlikely that these changes would result in 
neural modulation. 
Implications for the Avian Brain and Probabilistic Discounting 
In their 2006 review, Green and Myerson (2006) explore the evidence for and 
against a model of a generalised value discounting framework, in particular comparing 
probabilistic and delay discounting. They describe an argument made by Rachlin et al 
(1991) that probabilistic discounting is a subtype of delay discounting, because a low 
probability of an outcome means that on average, over time the delays between receiving 
a reward are longer than a more probabilistic reward, which will be delivered more often 
(Rachlin et al., 1991). On the other hand, Myerson and Green (1995) argued that perhaps 
the opposite is true, that delay discounting is a subtype of probabilistic discounting.  They 
argue that in a naturalistic foraging setting, if there is a longer delay before gaining access 
to an outcome (for example, food), there is a higher likelihood that it will no longer be 
available, perhaps having been taken by a competitor (Myerson & Green, 1995). 
Furthermore, the mathematical modelling of delay and probabilistic discounting is similar 
(Green & Myerson, 2004).  
However, Green and Myerson (2006) go on to discuss underlying issues with 
assuming that the same process applies to both probabilistic and delay discounting. In 
particular, differing amount of reward appears to alter probabilistic and delay discounting 
choices in different, and sometimes, opposite ways (Christensen, Parker, Silberberg, & 




of probabilistic and delay discounting may look very similar, it seems they are distinct 
processes. When we consider the neural data from our probability experiment, compared 
to our delay discounting experiment, two tasks with a very similar design, we find that 
NCL neurons do not encode probabilistic and delay discounting in the same way. Our 
discrepancy in findings between the two studies indicates that in the avian brain, two 
different areas are involved in representing these two different concepts. 
Conclusions 
We hypothesized that NCL would reflect value when probability was 
manipulated. Our hypothesis was based on the findings that in mammals, similar areas 
that encode delay and effort discounting are involved in probabilistic decisions too. 
Furthermore, the previous chapters found strong evidence for NCL activity reflecting 
value. However, contrary to our hypothesis, we saw no evidence to suggest that NCL is 
involved in value discounting when probability is involved. Our null finding could be a 
result of our failure to create an ecologically valid task, or could be due to overlearning. 
Alternatively, the avian brain may simply encode probabilistic value in a separate area to 






Chapter 6: General Discussion 
The aim of the present thesis was to explore the extent to which cells in the pigeon 
equivalent of the prefrontal cortex respond to different aspects of value discounting. 
Pigeons were trained on simple stimulus-association tasks, where they learnt that different 
stimuli predicted different manipulations of reward value.  We compared the neural 
activity to that reported in studies of the mammalian prefrontal cortex during similar value 
discounting tasks. In Chapter 2, the manipulation was the delay to the reward, and reward 
amount. In Chapter 3 and 4, we manipulated the physical and the cognitive effort, 
respectively. Finally, in Chapter 5, we manipulated the probability of reward delivery. In 
each case, we recorded from cells in the NCL, an area considered the avian analogue of 
the mammalian prefrontal cortex. 
6.1 Summary of Findings: 
NCL Cells Encoded Delay Discounting 
The first study explored how cells in NCL encode value as an integrative sum of 
reward amount and delay to reward. The birds’ latencies to respond indicated that they 
most preferred the stimulus that predicted a short delay followed by a large reward (S3) 
and that their second preference was the stimulus that predicted a short delay followed by 
a small reward (S1). Both of these stimuli were preferred over the two stimuli that 
predicted a long delay (L3 and L1) which were no different from each other. The neural 
data in the Sample period of the trial mirrored the stimulus preferences, in particular 
during the stimulus period and the first second of the delay period. Furthermore, while 
there was no evidence of actual value coding in the final second of the delay, the change 
in firing pattern towards the end of the delay period seemed to reflect anticipation of 
reward. There was very little evidence for value coding in the reward period. The only 
evidence for value coding was in the first 500 ms of the reward period, where there was 
increased firing to S3, but the effect was weak. By the second 500 ms of the reward period, 
there was no evidence of any value coding.  
Based on the literature exploring value coding in the mammalian PFC, the OFC 
is thought to be involved in encoding value when delay is manipulated, and responds in 
a comparable way to the NCL cells described in Chapter 2. Studies of the mammalian 
OFC find that firing is modulated by reward magnitude and in anticipation of reward 




activity is modulated in response to changes in reward value achieved by manipulating 
the delay to reward only at the presentation of a stimulus, during the delay period and 
when reward is delivered (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Roesch & Olson, 2005). To 
date, the research in the avian brain has confirmed that NCL is implicated in encoding 
reward amount and in encoding delay to reward (Kalenscher et al., 2005; Koenen et al., 
2013). The findings from the delay discounting study further demonstrate that cells in 
NCL show properties similar to the OFC with respect to encoding value based on both 
delay to reward and reward amount.  
NCL Cells Encoded Effort Discounting  
In the second study, we explored how NCL and CDL cells encode the value of a 
reward when it is discounted by a physical effort cost. We recorded from 245 cells in 
NCL and 57 in CDL during a task where birds were required to peck a stimulus predicting 
a subsequent high effort (HE) task (peck a total of eight times across four spatially-
distributed positions on the screen) or a subsequent low effort (LE) task (make four pecks 
to a single central location on the screen). The latency-to-peck data strongly supported 
the fact that the birds preferred the LE trials over the HE trials. We examined whether 
NCL and CDL cells exhibited ‘effort selectivity’, and, if so, whether or not they were 
‘value selective’ (fired preferentially to the LE trials). We focussed in particular on the 
period during which the birds were presented with each stimulus that would predict the 
upcoming effort condition, the periods before and after exerting the effort, and the reward 
period. 
 Mirroring the behavioural preferences of the birds, cells in NCL that were effort 
selective in both the Stimulus and the Pre-Effort periods fired significantly more during 
LE trials than HE trials, even when controlling for pecking. The stimuli indicating the 
trial types were balanced across birds, and we saw higher firing rates to the LE stimulus 
across all birds, therefore it is unlikely that the difference in firing rates was simply due 
to stimulus selectivity. In contrast to the Sample and Pre-Effort periods, Effort Selective 
cells showed no neural preference for LE trials over HE trials during the Effort, Post-
Effort, or Reward periods.  
The apparent coding of value in NCL as a function of effort cost is similar to that 
seen in the ACC of mammals. Much like studies conducted in rats exploring cell firing in 




cells fired in preference of a stimulus that, through conditioning, has been associated as 
the ‘better value’ option. Indeed, our findings in NCL are comparable to Porter et al 
(2019) who showed rodent ACC neural populations respond to behaviours with the 
highest value, even in effort tasks where no decision between behaviours needs to be 
made (Porter et al., 2019).  
CDL Did Not Encode Effort Discounting 
A handful of CDL cells were Effort Selective in that they fired more during either 
LE or HE trials. However, unlike in NCL, as a population, cells in CDL showed no 
modulation in firing that reflected a preference for the LE or HE trials. Of course, we 
exercise some caution in this conclusion as we recorded from a smaller number of CDL 
cells than NCL cells. Although overall CDL cells seemed to exhibit no neural activity 
indicative of a preference for either the LE or HE trials, an interesting observation was 
noted in the number of inhibitory and excitatory cells in each period of the task. For 
example, 95% of CDL cells fired in an inhibitory manner during the 300 ms prior to the 
first effort peck, and 60% fired in an inhibitory manner during the Reward period. In 
contrast, during the Post-Effort period, 86% of cells fired in an excitatory manner. So 
while not firing differentially between HE and LE trials, a large proportion of CDL cells 
appeared to be inhibited during the Effort period, and then seem to ‘rebound’, firing in an 
excitatory manner during the Post-Effort period, before being again inhibited during the 
Reward period. Although neurons in CDL may not play a role in value coding, CDL cells 
could be involved in response-outcome coding, playing an important role in associating 
the effortful action of pecking to the beneficial reward outcome. If this is the case, CDL 
could still play an important role in learning and associating actions with outcomes.  
It is interesting that despite the fact that CDL has some connectivity patterns 
similar to the cingulate cortex (Atoji & Wild, 2005), cells in CDL do not appear to directly 
modulate their firing rate in response to effort discounting in the same way that ACC does 
(Hillman & Bilkey, 2010; Porter et al., 2019). The current literature on the function of 
CDL is limited, and to our knowledge no other study has conducted electrophysiology 
recordings from CDL. CDL is part of the limbic/olfactory sub-module that makes up the 
cortico-hippocampal network of the avian brain (Shanahan et al., 2013). The majority of 
studies that make mention of CDL are lesion studies, where CDL is used as a control area, 




it is difficult to draw on any previous literature to speculate on why CDL exhibits the 
pattern of inhibitory and excitatory changes observed in the current study. We found that 
CDL does not seem to directly code value, but does seem to fire in a pattern that may be 
useful in associating action and reward. We therefore posit that CDL may be involved 
more in the updating of the mental model of an action-outcome sequence (Kolling et al., 
2016) rather than representing the value of each outcome in the way that NCL does. 
The pCET Failed to Elicit Behaviour Indicating Cognitive Effort Discounting.  
Similar to the second study, the third study aimed to manipulate reward value by 
changing effort requirements, but this time manipulating cognitive instead of physical 
effort. The attempts to create a convincing cognitive effort paradigm were unsuccessful. 
The pigeon cognitive effort task, or the pCET, required birds to learn to associate a 
stimulus with either a high cognitive effort, or a low cognitive effort task. In order to 
manipulate cognitive effort requirements, a search task was created where the pigeon had 
to locate and peck the non-vertical line in a grid of lines. The angle of the target line 
determined whether it was a high effort (45°) or a low effort (90°) search. The target 
behavioural pattern was for accuracy of the search to be the same across the two task 
difficulties, so that the reward likelihood was the same. At the same time, the latency to 
initiate the high cognitive effort task had to be longer than the low, to reflect a preference 
for less effort.  
We were unable to strike the balance of cognitive demand but achievability in 
order to see the birds behave in a way that suggested they preferred the low effort task, 
but could perform equally well across the two task difficulties. Future attempts at the task 
could continue to experiment with variations on the design, with the aim of achieving the 
desired behavioural pattern. One manipulation could introduce a yoked animal in order 
to balance the reward delivery, as was done in the rat cognitive effort task, or the rCET 
(Hosking, Cocker, & Winstanley, 2016; Hosking et al., 2014; Zeeb & Winstanley, 2011). 
Furthermore, testing the birds in a choice task, either separately or as probe trials during 
session, could help to establish whether a preference exists even when the reward is yoked 
to a control.  
Cognitive effort is currently addressed as a very “human” concept. When we 
consider the cognitive capabilities that set humans apart from other mammals, academic 




require cognitive effort, are seen as key “human” skills (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). 
Perhaps because of the human-centric view of cognitive effort, as well as the difficulties 
of measuring such a subjective concept in animals, the exploration of it in animals is 
limited to the rCET studies. However, just because there is a lack of studies of cognitive 
effort in animals does not mean that cognitive discounting is unimportant to animals. It is 
therefore important to continue to explore this concept, and perhaps extend the rCET to 
other species. By understanding more about the neural circuits involved in cognitive 
effort discounting, we can begin to understand why some people lack the inherent 
motivation to tackle cognitively demanding tasks, and on the other hand, what may be 
driving those that engage in great cognitive feats. 
NCL Did Not Encode Probabilistic Discounting  
 In the final study, we explored how NCL cells respond when the probability of 
reward delivery is manipulated. We recorded from 167 NCL neurons during a stimulus-
association task, where birds had learnt that four different stimuli predicted four different 
probabilities of reward delivery. A linear behavioural preference quickly emerged based 
on the latencies to peck each stimulus, with birds most preferring the 100% trials, 
followed by the 66%, the 33% and the 0% respectively. However, upon analysis of the 
neural data, it was clear that during no period of the trial did NCL cells exhibit value 
related changes in activity. In a follow up experiment, the birds were required to choose 
between two different stimuli, each representing a different probability of reward 
delivery. Again, the birds’ choices indicated that they understood which stimuli related 
to which reward likelihood, and preferred stimuli that represented a higher probability of 
reward delivery. However, NCL cells still showed no modulation in activity related to 
value encoding.  
The null finding was somewhat surprising given that literature exploring 
probabilistic discounting in the mammalian brain identifies OFC as playing an important 
role in encoding the associated value (van Duuren et al., 2009). Based on the mammalian 
literature, and the findings of the first two experiments of the thesis, it was hypothesised 
that like delay and effort discounting, probabilistic discounting, too, would be encoded 
by NCL cells. However, the fact that NCL cells did not modulate firing indicates that in 
the avian brain, probabilistic discounting is not represented in an area common to the 




One point of controversy in the literature surrounding probabilistic discounting is 
whether probabilistic discounting is simply operating under the same framework as delay 
discounting. Some argue that the delay itself is not the factor that discounts reward value, 
but that the reduced value is because of the decreased probability that the animal would 
receive the reward if they have to wait longer (Green & Myerson, 2004). For example, in 
the wild, caching food for later (i.e. delaying reward) could result in the food being stolen 
(i.e. increasing the probability of not receiving reward). Conversely, a situation with a 
low probability of reward could be interpreted as leading to a more delayed reward, 
compared to a more highly probable situation (Rachlin, Brown, & Cross, 2000). For 
example, if there is a 90% probability of reward delivery, the animal might interpret that 
there is going to be a reward immediately, however if it was a 10% probability, they might 
assume that they will not receive reward until another trial, in others words, that the 
reward will be delayed. The neural results of the delay discounting and the probabilistic 
discounting studies indicate, at least in the avian brain, that the same area is not encoding 
both types of value discounting, suggesting that they may be independently related to the 
discounting of value. We found that while the behaviour in both tasks indicated that the 
birds preferred the “best option” to the worst option, only delay discounting was 
represented in the NCL, or at least, in the area of NCL from which we recorded. 
6.2 Implications for NCL 
The literature supporting NCL as the functional analogue of the mammalian PFC 
is small, but growing. In respect to value coding, studies have found NCL to modulate 
firing in the same manner as the mammalian PFC in the anticipation of reward and reward 
delivery (Kalenscher et al., 2005; Koenen et al., 2013). The present thesis adds to the 
current knowledge in that it shows that NCL has properties similar to the mammalian 
OFC with respect to encoding the more valuable option when delays to reward, and 
reward amount are manipulated. It also demonstrates that NCL cells have properties 
similar to the mammalian ACC with respect to encoding the more valuable of two options 
when differing effort costs are required. Furthermore, our recordings from CDL in 
Chapter 2 show that value is not simply coded by populations of cells all around the brain, 
as CDL cells did not exhibit the neural preference that NCL cells did. Our findings are 
somewhat in contrast to where these functions are located in the mammalian frontal 
regions; in the mammalian brain, delay discounting and effort discounting are thought to 




discounting in the ACC. Based on the first two chapters described here, it seems that in 
the avian brain, both functions are encoded in the same area of NCL. 
When it comes to value coding in the mammalian brain, one theory that has been 
proposed is that a core network involving OFC and ventral striatum code a general ‘value’ 
signal (Aridan et al., 2019; Schmidt et al., 2012; van Duuren et al., 2009; Westbrook et 
al., 2019). The idea of one area representing generalised value computations in the 
mammalian brain is expanded upon by van Duuren et al (van Duuren et al., 2009). Their 
study explored probability discounting in the rat OFC, and found different groups of cells 
representing different aspects of value. They concluded that perhaps subpopulations of 
OFC cells encode different aspects of reward value, such as time to reward, and reward 
magnitude, but that OFC cells as an ensemble reflect a general value code, no matter the 
parameters that contribute to the value. While it is perhaps a simplistic view of value 
coding given the many areas of the mammalian PFC that are known to be involved in 
value coding, it could help us to understand NCL’s role in the avian brain. 
It has been established that while the avian brain is a lot smaller, cells in the avian 
brain are typically smaller than those in mammalian brains, and therefore, when compared 
to mammalian brains of the same size, the avian brain contains far more neurons 
(Olkowicz, Kocourek, & Lu, 2016). In other words, the avian brain operates in a much 
more compact version of the mammalian brain. It is therefore reasonable to posit that the 
NCL may in fact be responsible for functions that in the larger mammalian brain are 
processed in separate areas. After all, Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that unlike in the 
mammalian brain, NCL encodes both delay and effort discounting, representing a 
combination of both OFC and ACC functions we see in mammalian brains.  In fact, NCL 
may act as an area the encodes value in a “common currency”, encoding different aspects 
of value at a subpopulation level, and encoding over-all value at a population level (van 
Duuren et al., 2009).  
If it is the case that NCL represents a universal value encoding area, it begs the 
question why NCL cells did not reflect probabilistic discounting in the experiment 
conducted in Chapter 4. There are two reasons that could explain the null funding. On the 
one hand, it could be the case that the probability task was too passive to engage the 
higher order nature of NCL processes; while the Effort and Delay tasks required birds to 




probability task was simply a peck-outcome task. However, given the failure to elicit 
value coding even when using a more “active” choice paradigm, it seems unlikely that 
passivity of task is the problem. Alternatively, it could be the case that there is a 
subpopulation of cells outside of the small area that we were recording from, but still in 
NCL that does encode probabilistic discounting. The coordinates used for the NCL 
surgeries were the same across all four experiments. However, NCL represents a 
relatively large area of the avian brain, and so many parts of NCL have been unexplored 
in relation to value coding.  
6.3 Exploring Different Areas of NCL 
Currently, the coordinates of NCL electrophysiology studies in pigeons is 
typically between 5.5 and 6.5 AP and 7.0ML. At these coordinates, cells have been found 
that are involved in stimulus-outcome associations, goal directed behaviour, reward 
anticipation and working memory (Colombo et al., 2001; Johnston et al., 2017; 
Kalenscher et al., 2005; Kalt et al., 1999; Koenen et al., 2013; Scarf et al., 2016; Starosta 
et al., 2013). However, the same coordinates have produced null findings, such those 
described in Chapter 5, where NCL cells showed no value preference when probability 
was manipulated. Furthermore, one might predict that countless other un-published null 
findings in studies of NCL cell activity exist, too.  
A thorough exploration of the different coordinates that still fall within the NCL 
region could reveal functionally diverse sub-areas of the relatively large structure that is 
NCL. As discussed earlier, sub-populations that encode different aspects of value could 
be involved in a larger scale ensemble of NCL cells that encode a generalized value 
signal, similar to that described by Van Duuren et al (van Duuren et al., 2009). Given the 
range of subareas of the mammalian PFC that exist, and the distinct roles that we know 
the areas to be involved in, it would be unsurprising to find that different areas of NCL 
are involved in different functions. Therefore, future research into the role of NCL, and 
the functional similarities between NCL and mammalian PFC should begin to explore the 
different areas of NCL in order to document any changes through the region. Doing so 
may lead to a more detailed mapping and understanding of the avian brain network, and 






6.4 Directions for Future Research 
There remains a large gap in the literature exploring the functional makeup of the 
avian brain. In particular, there is more research to be done to explore the PFC-like 
qualities of the pigeon brain that help pigeons adapt quickly to new and changing 
environments, and ultimately make decisions that lead to their survival. By understanding 
how the avian brain carries out processes such as value computations, and comparing it 
to the current research based on the mammalian brain can help to further the knowledge 
of how the human brain has developed to carry out such processes. Perhaps more 
importantly, it contributes towards helping to model how brain dysfunction can drive 
humans to behave in ways that are not adaptive or beneficial to the person in day to day 
life. Therefore, future research that expands on the current findings of function in NCL, 
as well as other parts of the avian brain, will help to develop a clearer and more complete 
picture of how the brain works.  
One future study directly related to the studies in the present thesis would be to 
create a task that combines the parameters described in the different studies that were 
carried out. In other words, train birds to learn a larger number of stimuli, with each one 
representing a unique cost; some effort costs, and others delay costs. By doing so, the 
idea that NCL cells may represent a general value code could be supported, or weakened. 
Using the same stimulus-association paradigm, but with a range of value manipulations 
would allow us to record the activity of the same cells in response to a range of value 
costs. Based on the hypothesis that cells exist that represent value as a whole, irrespective 
of the manipulated value parameter, we would expect to see a set of cells that do just this; 
fire differentially in a pattern that reflects the pigeons’ preferences, irrespective of the 
cost type. Similar to OFC recordings in rats (van Duuren et al., 2009), we might also find 
sub-populations of cells that reflect different aspects of value.  
Another area of interest to add to the findings described in the first two 
experiments would be to further explore the “choice” paradigm that we began to 
experiment with in the final chapter. We found that NCL cells encoded both effort 
discounting and delay discounting at a stimulus-association level, so it would be useful 
to explore whether it is also involved in making decision when the same costs were 
presented but in a choice format. It seems likely that NCL would be involved, in particular 




responses to different expected reward amounts (Koenen et al., 2013). However it would 
also be interesting to explore whether areas closely connected the NCL may encode the 
final choice. An added benefit of a choice paradigm is that it would allow the exploration 
of dysfunctional choices, that is, when the birds choose the least valuable or “incorrect” 
option. By recording cell activity when mistakes are made, we may find an interesting 
neural pattern that relates to such dysfunction.  
6.5 Implications for the Avian Brain  
Up until relatively recently, avian cognitive abilities, and in turn, the avian neural 
systems have been somewhat dismissed in the realm of neuropsychology. During the 
1990s and 2000s a series of studies demonstrated that corvids and other birds displayed 
higher-order thinking that were previously considered exclusive to primates. Corvids 
were found to show behaviour indicative of the use of episodic memory, future planning 
and theory of mind (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Emery & Clayton, 2001; Raby, Alexis, 
Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007). In following studies, pigeons also showed remarkable skills 
including orthographic processing (Scarf et al., 2016) and numeric abilities (Scarf, Hayne, 
& Colombo, 2011), and even the ability to distinguish Picasso paintings from Monet 
paintings (Watanabe, Sakamoto, & Wakita, 1995).  
As the literature builds supporting the complex cognitive abilities of birds, so too 
have studies investigating the way that the avian brain encodes complex cognitive 
abilities. The avian brain presents an interesting candidate for exploring higher-order 
cognitions. While the mammalian brain is comprised of a six-layer cortex, which is 
thought to be largely responsible for encoding higher order behaviours, the avian brain 
has no cortex (Karten, 1969; Reiner et al., 2004). Instead, the ‘layers’ of the avian brain 
exist as nuclear clusters that represent a similar network to the layers of the mammalian 
cortex (Dugas-ford, Rowell, & Ragsdale, 2012). Furthermore, cells in the avian brain are 
typically smaller than those in mammalian brains, and therefore, when compared to 
mammalian brains of the same size, the avian brain contains far more neurons (Olkowicz 
et al., 2016). So, the study of the avian brain is a study of an alternative organisation to 
the mammalian brain, and helps understand how a smaller brain, with a whole new 
organisation, and densely packed neurons, computes functions similar to those seen in 




By exploring the value related properties of NCL, the current thesis serves to 
increase understanding of a cluster of the avian brain that is likely carrying out 
computations similar to the prefrontal areas of the mammalian brain. Interestingly, the 
PFC has long been considered one of the defining features of primates, and even humans; 
an area that sets us apart by allowing us the skills to control our own behaviour and 
operate in a society. As we increase our knowledge of the avian brain, it becomes more 
and more apparent that perhaps some of the features that we as humans perceive as setting 
us apart, are not exclusive to our own species. It also highlights ways in which the human 
brain is not perhaps at the point of evolutionary perfection we might imagine, and that 
other brains, such as the avian brain, may carry out some processes in a more efficient 
way. A good example of the avian brain’s efficiency is the visual processing areas of the 
brain; birds are one of the few species that possess visual abilities on par, or even 
exceeding those of primates’ visual abilities. However, the avian brain has to encode the 
complex processing required in visual discrimination in a much smaller space to any 
primate (Clark & Colombo, 2020).  
Changing our egocentric view of brain evolution, where we place the human brain 
at the apex of function, allows us to appreciate and learn from other species. A more 
balanced view is that brains across different species have developed to become the 
optimum machine for driving behaviour that suits the ecological niche in which they 
operate. For humans, socialising and understanding other humans is important. Whereas, 
for birds, eyesight for finding food below, and spatial memory and planning, to allow 
caching behaviours, are more beneficial areas, and their brains have developed to reflect 
that.  
6.6 Summary 
The findings described in the current thesis contribute to the growing literature 
aimed at understanding the neural networks of the avian brain. When it comes to the 
human brain, there is much left to be understood, and the quest to understand, and in turn 
optimize the human brain, continues. Understanding how other species’ brains work, 
using techniques that cannot ethically be conducted in healthy human subjects, is vital to 
optimizing and understanding the human brain. The default perception is to consider the 
human make up the ‘best’ and the most highly evolved. However, it is important to 




similar environment but along a separate trajectory. By accepting that alternative 
evolutionary tracks could have resulted in similar, if not more efficient neural networks 
to help the animal survive in certain situations, we can learn and apply that understanding 
to bettering the technology and the algorithms that are becoming more and more pertinent 
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Appendix 1. Modified pCET 
In the Cognitive Effort experiment described in Chapter 3, we failed to see the 
behavioural requirements that would indicate cognitive effort discounting. The criteria 
that was set for the experiment required the bird to prefer the low cognitive effort (LCE) 
trials, but to perform equally well in both LCE and high cognitive effort (HCE) trials. The 
rationale behind the criteria was to ensure that cognitive effort requirements, rather than 
reward probability, was the factor influencing any observed neural modulation. While 
some birds met the criteria during the behavioural training stage, their behaviour while 
recording did not. As expected, we therefore also saw no neural modulation in response 
to the different trial types.  
At the completion of the experiment, we developed one more version of the 
pigeon cognitive effort task (pCET) using the same birds, where the LCE and HCE tasks 
were more difficult. The reason we did so was in the hope that increasing the difficulty 
after the birds had been trained on the easier version could result in equal performances, 
owing to the fact that they know the task requirements, but a behavioural preference for 
the LCE task.  
Methods 
Subjects 
The subjects were three adult homing pigeons (Columba livia) that had recently 
finished the pCET described in Chapter 3. The birds had free access to grit and water and 
were maintained at 80 – 85% of their free feeding body weight and fed a mixture of wheat, 
corn, peas, pellets, and grains. They were housed in individual wire mesh cages with a 12 
h to 12 h light–dark cycle beginning at 07:00 h. The subjects were kept and treated in 
accordance with the University of Otago Code of Ethical Conduct for the Manipulation 
of Animals and the University of Otago Animal Ethics Committee approved the 
experiment.  
Apparatus 
The pigeons tested in standard operant chambers measuring 35 cm (length) x 43 
cm (width) x 39 cm (height). At the front of the chamber was a 17-inch monitor. In front 
of each monitor sat a Carroll Touch infrared touch frame (EloTouch, baud rate 9600, 




holes arranged in a 3-row by 3-column format. The size of each square hole was 3.8 cm 
x 3.8 cm and the center-to-center distance of each hole was 4.5 cm. Situated 20 cm below 
the center key was a hopper that could be illuminated and delivered the wheat reward. 
The stimuli used were two black and white pictures; one picture of a cactus flower and 
one picture of a person on a skateboard, and two geometric stimuli; one cross and one 
triangle. Each bird was assigned two of the pictures to represent high cognitive effort 
(HCE) trials and two different pictures to represent low cognitive effort (LCE) trials. The 
stimuli used to predict HCE and LCE trials were balanced across the birds. The stimuli 
were 3.8 cm x 3.8 cm in size and appeared centered in the square hole. Every peck to the 
touch screened was accompanied by a 100 ms, 1000 Hz tone. 
Behavioural Task 
Following a 5000ms inter trial interval, one of the four stimuli, indicating whether 
the trial would require high or low cognitive effort, appeared in the central square hole 
(see figure 1). Three pecks to the stimulus turned it off and initiated a two-second Pre-
effort delay period, followed by ether a high effort or low effort period. In HCE trials, 
nine individual lines, 1.6 cm in length, appeared in each of the outer response holes. Eight 
of the lines were vertical, and the remaining line was either 45° or 22°. In LCE trials, the 
non-vertical line was 45°. The bird was required to search for the non-vertical line, and 
peck it once. If the bird correctly pecked the non-vertical line, the effort stimuli 
disappeared and the reward period commenced, allowing the bird two seconds of access 
to the wheat. If the bird made an incorrect response to a vertical line, the effort stimuli 
disappeared and the house light turned off for 1 sec, and birds were not given access to 
wheat. Each session consisted of 96 trials, with 24 dedicated to each of the stimuli, 
randomly intermixed. The birds were trained until they showed an effort preference, as 
indicated by their latency to peck the stimulus, but no significant difference in 





Figure 1. Behavioural Procedure. Following the HCE (high cognitive effort) stimulus an 
array of nine lines appeared, one of which was at a 22° degree angle, while the rest were 
vertical, and the bird was required to peck the 22° line. Following the LCE (low cognitive 
effort) stimulus, an array of nine lines appeared, one of which was 45° while the rest were 
vertical, and the bird was required to peck the 45° line. In both trial types, if the bird 
correctly pecked the non-vertical line, they received 2 sec access to wheat. If the bird 
incorrectly pecked one of the vertical lines, no reward was delivered and the house light 
switched off for 2 sec.  
Results 
In order to see whether the birds showed a preference for the LCE trials, we 
recorded the latency to peck the stimuli representing the different trial types. In two of 
the birds (D5 and D6), the latency to peck the LCE stimulus was significantly shorter than 
the latency to peck the HCE stimulus, D5: t(17) = 6.5, p < .01, D6: t(17)= 5.8, p < .01. 
The third bird, D7, showed no difference in latencies to peck the stimuli, t(17) = 1.6, p = 






Figure 2. Peck latencies Latency to peck the high cognitive effort (HCE) stimulus and 
the low cognitive effort (LCE) stimulus for each bird, averaged across all trials in a 
session. 
 
To understand whether the difference in peck latencies could be attributed to the 
difference in cognitive effort, rather than simply a difference in reward outcome 
likelihood, we recorded the performance of each bird across the trials. To do this, the 
percentage of correct trials (when a bird correctly pecks the non-vertical line) was 
calculated across all the sessions in a day. In all the birds, accuracy was significantly less 




.01; D7 t(17) = 19.2, p < .01. The proportion of correct trials across the two trial types for 
each session are displayed in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Proportion of correct trials. The proportion of correct trials for each trial type, 
during each session across the three birds.  
Discussion 
The aim of the pCET manipulation was to observe whether changing the difficulty 
of the tasks used in Chapter 3 could result in the birds showing a preference for LCE 
trials, but showing an equal performance across LCE and HCE trials. After running the 
three birds on the modified task for 18 days, the desired behavioural pattern failed to 




appears that the more difficult version meant that they could not perform the HCE task to 
the same level as they did the  
LCE task. Accordingly, their behavioural preference, established by the latency to peck 
each stimulus, quickly shifted to preferring the LCE. In other words, we saw a behavioural 
preference shift to LCE that we did not see consistently in the original pCET task, but we 
also saw a significant discrepancy between performances on LCE and HCE trials. The 
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Neurons in the Pigeon Nidopallium 
Caudolaterale Display Value-
Related Activity
Madeline Dykes1, Aylin Klarer2, Blake Porter  1, Jonas Rose2 & Michael Colombo1
We recorded from neurons in the nidopallium caudolaterale, the avian equivalent of the mammalian 
prefrontal cortex, in four birds. The birds were required to peck a stimulus that indicated the amount of 
reward they would receive (small or large) after a certain delay (short or long). We found that the activity 
of neurons in the nidopallium caudolaterale was modulated by the value of the reward that would 
be received based on the reward amount and the delay to reward. We found that value coding was 
most prominent during the presentation of the sample period, and less so during the delay period and 
during the presentation of the reward itself. Our findings support the view that activity in nidopallium 
caudolaterale reflects the encoding of the value of reward based on a combination of reward amount 
and delay to a reward.
Temporal discounting is the diminishing perception of the effects of an action due to a delay1. Frontal areas of the 
human brain, and in particular the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), have been implicated in temporal discounting2,3. 
Some cells in OFC, for example, fire in relation to reward magnitude, some encode the length of the delay, while 
others only fire in increasing anticipation of a reward delivery4. Cells in the OFC of primates are also known to 
modulate their activity in response to changes in the value (benefits minus costs) of a reward, achieved by varying 
the duration of the delay5,6.
In the current study we investigated whether cells in the avian brain also code the value signified by a stimulus, 
and whether that value is modulated by the delay to receive the reward. In line with studies in mammals indicat-
ing that value coding occurs in the frontal areas of the brain, we examined the activity of cells in the nidopallium 
caudolaterale (NCL), the avian analogue of the primate prefrontal cortex7,8. Recently, a number of studies have 
begun to examine the reward processing characteristics of NCL cells. Koenen, Millar, and Colombo9 found that 
NCL cells were modulated by whether a stimulus predicted a large, small, or no reward. Specifically, in the period 
where the cue was presented, and in the subsequent delay period before the delivery of the reward, some NCL 
cells exhibited a graded change in activation as a function of the anticipated reward amount.
Cells in the NCL also seem to be involved in temporal discounting. Kalenscher et al.10 gave pigeons a choice 
between an immediate small reward and an immediate large reward. Naturally, the pigeons chose the immediate 
large reward, but across the session, as the delay to the large reward was increased, pigeons shifted their preference 
to the immediate small reward. The NCL cells integrated reward amount and delay-to-reward, thereby coding the 
subjective reward value of a stimulus10.
The findings of Koenen et al.9 and Kalenscher et al.10 suggest that cells in NCL code stimulus value, and that 
the value may be modulated by the delay to reward. These experiments, however, have two limitations. First, in 
both studies, pigeons were trained using a choice paradigm, and as such, many factors could be at play in mod-
ulating neural activity. When two stimuli appear on a screen, for example, any modulation in firing could be in 
response to either of the stimuli. Second, the neural activity was examined during the delay period, and again, 
factors other than pure stimulus value may have come into play in modulating neural activity. Neural modulation 
in the delay period, for example, could be a result of the visual components of the stimulus eliciting continued 
responses that carry over into the delay period that are unrelated to the value that the subject assigns to the stimu-
lus. Similarly, neural modulation during the delay period could also result from movements made by the animals 
in anticipation of receiving a reward, again potentially contaminating any neural modulation based on the value 
the animal assigns to the stimulus.
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Perhaps a better way to examine value coding is to observe neural activity while an animal is presented with a 
single stimulus that indicates the magnitude of the reward to be received following a specified delay period. Such 
an experiment has recently been conducted by Kasties, Starosta, Güntürkün, and Stüttgen11, who measured neu-
ral activity in NCL when pigeons were presented with one of four stimuli that predicted one of four conditions: 
small reward after a short delay, small reward after a long delay, large reward after a short delay, or large reward 
after a long delay. Although Kasties et al.11 did find cells in the NCL that responded differently to the four stimuli, 
a fact perhaps not too surprising given the known visual sensitivity of NCL cells12, they found no evidence that 
the responses to the stimuli were modulated by either the reward amount, the delay length, or the interaction 
of reward amount and delay length. The authors concluded that the cells in NCL showed no evidence of value 
coding11.
Given that NCL cells code reward amount9, temporal discounting10, and the shift in preference from a delayed 
large reward to a small immediate reward10, it is surprising that Kasties et al.11 found no evidence that NCL cells 
were modulated by reward value. There are, however, two limitations of the Kasties et al.11 study that may have 
made it difficult to find value coding. The first limitation concerns aspects of the reward itself. In the Kasties et 
al.11 study, the small reward consisted of 1–1.5 s access to food and the large reward consisted of 5–6 s access to 
food. The variable nature of the reward duration with the “small” and “large” categories, plus the fact that reward 
was only delivered on 50% of the trials, may have interfered with the mapping of a reward value onto an associ-
ated stimulus.
A second limitation of the Kasties et al.11 study was that value coding was only assessed during the presenta-
tion of the stimulus. A number of investigators have found that information concerning the value of an item is 
transmitted during the period between stimulus presentation and the appearance of the reward. For example, 
Komura et al.13 found that when presented with a cue signalling a preferred reward, cell firing in the rat’s thal-
amus increased across the delay period subsequent to stimulus presentation. Similarly, Koenen et al.9 reported 
differential firing in NCL cells in response to differing reward amounts during a delay period prior to reward. By 
focusing on just the sample period, Kasties et al.11 may have underestimated the capacity of NCL cells to engage 
in value coding.
Another important issue that Kasties et al.11 did not investigate was whether value coding continued into the 
reward period. In mammals, the OFC has been implicated in updating information related to expected outcome 
important for decision making, thereby facilitating flexible behaviour6,14. Past experiments have found that OFC 
activity is modulated by reward value at the time of reward presentation4,15. To date, while NCL activity during 
the reward period has been recorded16, whether that activity is modulated by the perceived value of the stimulus 
that preceded it has not been explored.
In the current study we re-examined the issue of value coding in NCL neurons. We trained pigeons to asso-
ciate four cues with four different conditions; short delay followed by small reward (S1), short delay followed 
by large reward (S3), long delay followed by small reward (L1) and a long delay followed by large reward (L3). 
Instead of the stimuli predicting reward on 50% of the trials, the stimuli in the current experiment predicted 
reward on 100% of the trials. Additionally, Epstein’s (1981)17 finding that the amount of food gained is not nec-
essarily proportional to the duration of the food presentation, and that long food access durations run the risk 
of depleting the food hopper18, has prompted some to manipulate reward amount by using a specified number 
of reward-presentation periods, rather than different reward durations19–21. In line with these findings, our small 
reward consisted of one 2-s period of food delivery and our large reward consisted of three 2-s periods of food 
delivery. Finally, we examined value coding in NCL activity in the sample period, the delay period, and the begin-
ning of the reward period.
Methods
Subjects. The subjects were four experimentally naïve adult homing pigeons (Columba livia). The birds had 
free access to grit and water and were fed a mixture of wheat, corn, peas, pellets, and grains sufficient to maintain 
them at 80–85% of their free feeding body weight. They were housed in individual wire-mesh cages and kept 
on a 12 to 12 light-dark cycle with lights on at 07:00 h. The subjects were kept and treated in accordance with 
the University of Otago Code of Ethical Conduct for the Manipulation of Animals, and the University of Otago 
Animal Ethics Committee approved the experiment.
Apparatus. The subjects were trained and tested in standard operant chambers measuring 35 cm (length), 
43 cm (width), and 39 cm (height). At the front of the chamber was a 43 cm monitor surrounded by an infrared 
touch frame. In front of the touch frame sat a plexiglas panel with six square holes arranged in a 2-row x 3-column 
format. The size of each square was 6 cm by 6 cm and the center-to-center distance of each hole was 6.5 cm. 
Situated 20 cm below the center key was a hopper that could be illuminated and delivered the wheat reward. The 
stimuli consisted of four black and white pictures; one picture of Arnold Schwarzenegger, one picture of a cactus 
flower, one picture of a black crow and one picture of a person on a skateboard at a skate park. The stimuli were 
6 cm by 6 cm in size, and appeared centered in the square aperture.
Behavioural Task. At the end of a 5-s intertrial interval (ITI), one of the four stimuli appeared on the 
center-top hole (Fig. 1). Three pecks to the stimulus turned it off and initiated a delay period. Every peck to the 
touchscreen was accompanied by a 50-ms 1000-Hz feedback tone. At the end of the delay period the reward was 
delivered. Each stimulus was followed by either a short (2 s) delay or a long (8 s) delay, and either a small reward 
(one 2-s period of access to wheat) or large reward (three 2-s periods of access to wheat). For the large reward the 
three 2-s periods were delivered one after the other with an inter-reward pause of 1 s during which time the hop-
per was lowered. For ease of exposition, the stimuli are referred to as S1, S3, L1 and L3, with the letters signifying 
a short or long delay, and the number signifying one or three reward periods. Each session consisted of 64 trials, 
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with 16 trials dedicated to each of the four stimuli, randomly intermixed. Which stimuli were associated with 
each of the four delay/reward conditions was balanced across animals. The birds were trained until the latency to 
peck the S3 stimulus was shorter than the latency to peck the L1 stimulus across four of five consecutive sessions.
Surgery. At the completion of behavioral training the birds were implanted with a lightweight microdrive 
to allow single-unit recording. They were first anesthetized with a mixture of ketamine (25 mg/kg) and xylazine 
(5 mg/kg). After pruning the feathers on the scalp and overlaying the ears, the head was immobilized using a 
Revzin stereotaxic adapter22. The scalp was first sprayed with a topical anesthetic (10% xylocaine) and then cut 
and retracted to expose the skull. A hole was drilled above the NCL at AP +5.5 ML ±7.523. Six stainless steel 
screws were placed into the skull (one serving as a ground screw), the tips of the electrodes of the microdrive were 
lowered to position them above the NCL, and the microdrive was secured to the skull with dental acrylic. The 
incision was sutured and sprayed with xylocaine. The bird recovered in a padded and heated cage until fully alert 
and mobile and then returned to its home cage where it was allowed to recover for at least seven days before the 
recording sessions started.
Neural Recording. Eight 25-um formvar-coated nichrome wires (California Fine Wire, Grover Beach, CA, 
USA) mounted in the microdrive were used for recording the extracellular activity of single neurons in the NCL. 
For each session one electrode was used to record the neural activity and a second electrode with minimal activity 
served as the indifferent. All electrodes were impedance–matched to about 0.5–1 MOhm. The signal was passed 
through a FET headstage, then a Grass P511K preamplifier (Grass Instruments, Quincy, Massachusetts, United 
States) where it was amplified and filtered to remove mains electrical 50 Hz noise. An oscilloscope and speaker 
were used to monitor the signals. A CED micro1401 system (Cambridge Electronic Design Limited, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom) collected the electrophysiological data, and CED Spike2 software was used for behavioral 
time-tagging of all events and analysis of the spike data. Good isolation of a cell, and a signal-to-noise ratio of at 
least 2:1, were the criteria for selecting a cell for a recording session. After cell isolation the behavioural program 
was initiated. A recording session lasted approximately one hour. At the end of the session the electrodes were 
advanced 40 µm. The birds were tested once a day.
Data Analysis. We analyzed the sample period (Sample), the first second of the delay (Delay-1), the second 
second of the delay (Delay-2), and the first second of the reward period (Reward-1) for evidence of value coding 
in the firing rates of NCL neurons. With respect to the sample period, unlike studies with primates where one 
can monitor the exact position of the eyes, it is difficult in pigeons to monitor when they are looking at the visual 
stimulus. Colombo, Frost, and Steedman24 adopted a convention that neural activity to a viewed stimulus was 
measured during a period from −400 ms to −100 ms prior to the first peck to that stimulus. The reason the 
period ends 100 ms prior to contact with the keys is because pigeons close their eyes approximately 80 ms prior 
to a key peck25.
Cells were selected for population plot analysis in one of two ways. In the first selection method each cell’s 
Sample, Delay-1, and Delay-2 data was subjected to a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Stimulus (4: S1, 
S3, L1, L3) as a factor. The dependent variable was the firing rates of cell during the 300 ms sample presentation 
periods or 1000 ms delay periods. In the second selection method we conducted a paired t-test comparing the 
firing rates of the cells during the S3 and L1 trials, again separately for the sample and the two delay periods. On 
the basis of whether the main effect of Stimulus was significant the cell’s data entered into a population plot.
For the population plots, each cell’s data was normalized by dividing all its firing rates by the average firing in 
the middle three seconds of the ITI period, and subjected to two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs with Stimulus 
(4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and Bin (6: bins 1–6 for the sample period, or 20: bins 1–20 for the delay period) as factors, with 
repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). LSD planned pairwise comparisons were evaluated 
at p < 0.05.
Figure 1. Behavioural procedure. The sequence of events for each of the four stimuli. S1: short delay, small 
reward; S3: short delay, large reward; L1: long delay, small reward; and L3: long delay, large reward. The small 
reward consisted of one 2-s period of wheat reward, whereas the large reward consisted of three 2-s periods of 
wheat reward. The short delay and long delays were 2 s and 8 s in duration, respectively.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Results
Histology. All electrode tracks were within the targeted NCL region as defined by Karten and Hodos22. The 
histology results are shown in Fig. 2. The intended track positions for NCL were AP +5.5 and ML +7.5. The track 
position for the first left NCL bird (Z9) was AP +6.75 and ML +7.5, differing only from the intended AP position 
by 1.25 mm. The track position for the second left NCL bird (B6) was AP +5.5 and ML +7.8, differing only from 
the intended ML position by 0.3 mm. The track position for the first right NCL bird (B4) was AP +6.0 and ML 
+7.6, differing from the intended AP position by 0.5 mm and the intended ML position by 0.1 mm. The track 
position for the second right NCL bird (B7) was AP +5.75 and ML +7.2, differing from the intended AP position 
by 0.25 mm and the intended ML position by 0.3 mm.
Behavioural Data. For each session, the median latency to the first peck was calculated across the 16 trials 
dedicated to each of the four stimuli. The latency to the first peck averaged across all sessions from which cells 
were recorded is displayed in Fig. 3. The latencies were subjected a log10 transformation to reduce across-subject 
variability, and the transformed latencies were subjected to a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Stimulus 
(4: S1, S3, L1, L3) as the factor (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 
9) = 43.49, p < 0.01. Planned pairwise comparison confirmed the latencies to S1 and S3 differed from the latencies 
to L1 and L3, but that the latencies to S1 and S3 were no different from each other, nor did the latencies for L1 and 
Figure 2. Electrode track reconstruction. Electrode track position reconstructions for the two right NCL 
birds (B4 and B7) and two left NCL birds (B6 and Z9). All recordings were within the full dorsal-ventral extent 
of NCL. The following are the brain regions as defined by Reiner et al.26: A, archopallium; DA, tractus dorso-
arcopallialis; CDL, area corticoidea dorsolateralis; Hp, hippocampus; N, nidopallium; Rt, nucleus rotundus; 
TeO, tectum opticum; TrO, tractus opticus; V, ventricle.
Figure 3. Behavioural performance. Mean latency of the first peck to each of the four stimuli for the four birds 
averaged across all sessions from which neurons were isolated. Note that shorter latencies represent higher value 
to the pigeon. Error bars represent ± 1 SEM.
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L3 differ from each other. The failure to detect a difference between S1 and S3 was due to one of the four subjects 
who, although showed faster responses to the stimuli that predicted the short delay (S1 and S3) than the long 
delay (L1 and L3), showed no difference in its latency to S1 and S3.
Sample Period. We recorded from a total of 207 cells. There were no right-left differences in the response 
characteristics of the cells and so the data were collapsed across this variable. Of the 207 cells, 35 displayed a 
significant effect of Stimulus (one-way ANOVA) during the 300 ms Sample period. Examples of two cells that 
responded differently to the stimuli during the sample period are shown in Fig. 4.
The population response for all 35 cells that showed a significant effect of Stimulus is shown in Fig. 5. The 
data in Sample, Delay-1, Delay-2, and Reward-1 periods were subjected to separate two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and Bin (6: bins 1–6 for the Sample period, or 20: bins 1–20 for the 
delay and reward periods) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In the 
Sample period there was a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 102) = 4.98, p < 0.01. Planned pairwise comparisons 
Figure 4. Examples of NCL cell activity. Panel A and B show two different cells, each from different birds. Both 
panels present the raster and histogram of one cell over 64 trials. Panel A shows a cell that exhibits an increased 
firing rate at the time that the stimulus is presented for all four stimuli, however there is a noticeably increased 
response to S3 and S1 compared to L3 and L1. Panel B shows a cell that only exhibits an increase in firing on the 
presentation of the S3 stimulus, with no change in firing seen when the other stimuli were presented.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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revealed that the activity to S3 was greater than the activity to all the other stimuli, the activity to S1 was greater 
than the activity to L1 and L3, however there was no difference in the activity between L1 and L3. In the Delay-1 
and Delay-2 periods, there was no significant effect of Stimulus, all Fs(3, 102) < 1.76, all ps > 0.17.
Overall, in the Reward-1 period there was also no significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 102) = 1.90, p = 0.16. We 
analysed the first 500 ms of the reward period as well and did find a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 102) = 3.53, 
p < 0.05. Pairwise comparisons revealed that activity to S3 was greater than the activity to L1, but not S1 or L3. 
There were no differences in activity between S1, L1 and L3. In the second 500 ms of the reward period, there was 
no significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 102) = 1.99, p = 0.15.
Recall that the Sample period analysed corresponded to a 300 ms period from −400 ms to −100 ms prior to 
the first peck (see Methods). Although restricting the analysis to this period has certain advantages, such as it is 
uncontaminated by pecks and, more importantly, we are sure that the bird is looking at the stimulus during this 
period, it does have one disadvantage. Given the latencies to the stimuli that predicted short delays (S1 and S3) 
were just over 0.5 s, and the latencies to the stimuli that predicted the long delays (L1 and L3) were just over 2 s, 
the “sample” period was, relative to their onset, much earlier for the S1 and S3 stimuli compared to the L1 and L3 
stimuli. We therefore conducted a second analysis on the 35 cells examining value coding in a 400 ms period from 
the onset of the stimuli, excluding trials for which the latency to respond to the stimulus was less than 400 ms. The 
results are shown in Fig. 6.
The data in the Sample period was subjected to two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Stimulus (4: S1, S3, 
L1, L3) and Bin (6: bins 1–6) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In 
the Sample period there was a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 102) = 4.43, p < 0.05. Identical to the previous 
analysis based on a sample period from −400 ms to −100 ms prior to the first peck, when the sample period con-
sisted of the first 400 ms from the onset of the stimuli, planned pairwise comparisons revealed that the activity to 
Figure 5. Population plot: Sample filtering (peck aligned). Normalised firing rate for cells that show a 
significant effect of Stimulus across the four trial types during the Sample period. The ITI represents the entire 
5 s ITI period, Sample represents a 300 ms period from −400 ms to −100 ms prior to the first peck, and Delay-1 
and Delay-2 represent the first second and second second of the 2 s (for S1 and S3) or 8 s (for L1 and L3) delay 
period. Reward-1 is the first second of reward presentation. In S1 and S3, therefore, Reward-1 occurs after the 
2 s delay period, whereas in L1 and L3 Reward-1 occurs after the 8 s delay period.
Figure 6. Population plot: Sample filtering (stimulus onset aligned). Normalised firing rate for cells that show a 
significant effect of Stimulus across the four trial types during the Sample period. The ITI represents the entire 
5 s ITI period, Sample represents a 400 ms period immediately following the onset of the stimulus, and Delay-1 
and Delay-2 represent the first second and second second of the 2 s (for S1 and S3) or 8 s (for L1 and L3) delay 
period. Reward-1 is the first second of reward presentation. In S1 and S3, therefore, Reward-1 occurs after the 
2 s delay period, whereas in L1 and L3 Reward-1 occurs after the 8 s delay period.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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S3 was still greater than the activity to all the other stimuli, and that the activity to L1 and L3 were no different to 
each other. In contrast to the previous analysis, the activity to S1 was no different to the activity to L1 and L3. In 
summary, the lower response rate to the L1 and L3 stimuli observed in the previous analysis was not due to the 
fact that the “sample” period for these stimuli was much later than for the S3 stimulus.
We also examined the overall preferences for each of the 35 cells individually (see Data Analysis). Of the 
35 cells, 30 responded to S3 and at least one of the other three stimuli (S1, L1, and L3). Of these 30 cells, 24 
(80%) showed a clear and significant (p < 0.05) preference for S3 over the remaining stimuli. Thus not only is the 
preference for S3 exhibited at a population-level analysis, but it is also present in a tally of the individual cells’ 
preferences.
Delay-1 Period. Of the 207 cells, 25 displayed a significant effect of Stimulus (one-way ANOVA) during the 
Delay-1 period. Note that these 25 cells were not selected on the basis of whether they show enhanced activity 
during the delay, but simply on the basis of whether they showed differential activity to the four stimuli during 
the delay. Of these 25 cells, nine overlapped with those that showed a significant effect of Stimulus in the Sample 
period. The population response for these 25 cells is shown in Fig. 7. The data in the Sample, Delay-1, Delay-2 
and the first second of the reward period were subjected to separate two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with 
Stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and Bin (6: bins 1–6 for the Sample period, or 20: bins 1–20 for the delay and reward 
periods) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In neither the Sample 
period, Delay-1 period, or Delay-2 period, was there was a significant effect of Stimulus, all Fs(3, 72) < 1.49, all 
ps > 0.26.
Overall, in the Reward-1 period there was a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 72) = 3.82, p < 0.05. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that activity to S3 differed from activity to all other stimuli. Activity in S1, L1 and L3 did 
not differ. We also analysed the first 500 ms of the reward period and again noted a significant effect of Stimulus, 
F(3, 72) = 4.75, p < 0.01. Pairwise comparisons revealed that activity to S3 differed from activity to both L1 and 
L3, but not S1. There was no difference between activity to S1 and any other stimulus, and the activity to L1 and 
L3 did not differ from one another. In the second 500 ms of the reward period, there was no significant effect of 
Stimulus, F(3, 72) = 1.75, p = 0.17.
Delay-2 Period. Of the 207 cells, 39 displayed a significant effect of Stimulus (one-way ANOVA) during the 
Delay-2 period. Note that as was the case in the Delay-1 analysis, these 39 cells were not selected on the basis of 
whether they show enhanced activity during the delay but simply on the basis of whether they showed differential 
activity to the four stimuli during the delay. Of these 39 cells, four overlapped with those that showed a signifi-
cant effect of Stimulus in the Sample period, three overlapped with those that showed a significant effect in the 
Delay-1 period, and five overlapped with those that showed a significant effect of Stimulus in both periods. The 
population response for these 39 cells is shown in Fig. 8. The data in the Sample, Delay-1 and Delay-2 period 
were subjected to separate two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with Stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and Bin (6: bins 
1–6 for the Sample period, or 20: bins 1–20 for the delay and reward periods) as factors, with repeated measures 
over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In the Sample period, there was a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 
111) = 4.57, p < 0.05. Planned pairwise comparisons (p < 0.05) revealed that S3 differed from S1 and L3, but not 
L1. S1 differed from S3 and L3, but not L1, and L1 did not differ from any of the stimuli. There was no significant 
effect of Stimulus in the Delay-1 and Delay-2 periods, all Fs(3, 111) < 2.28, all ps > 0.10.
Although we failed to find any evidence of value coding in the Delay-2 period, an inspection of Fig. 8 reveals 
the beginnings of differential coding towards the end of the Delay-2 period. To examine the effect further, we 
examined the last 500 ms of the Delay-2 period. The data was subjected to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA 
with Stimulus (4: S1, S3, L1, L3) and Bin (10: bins 1–10 for the delay period) as factors, with repeated measures 
over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 114) = 3.44, p < 0.05. 
Figure 7. Population plot: Delay-1 filtering. Normalised firing rate for cells that show a significant effect of 
Stimulus across the four trial types during the Delay-1 period. The ITI represents the entire 5 s ITI period, 
Sample represents a 300 ms period, and Delay-1 and Delay-2 represent the first and second second of the 2 s (for 
S1 and S3) or 8 s (for L1 and L3) delay period. Reward-1 is the first second of reward presentation. In S1 and S3, 
therefore, Reward-1 occurs after the 2 s delay period, whereas in L1 and L3 Reward-1 occurs after the 8 s delay 
period.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Planned pairwise comparisons (p < 0.05) revealed that firing to S1 differed from firing to L1 and L3, while there 
was no difference in firing between S1 and S3. Firing to S3 differed significantly from L3, and the difference 
between S3 and L1 neared significance. L1 and L3 did not differ from one another.
Overall, in the Reward-1 period there was no significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 114) = 0.07, p = 0.36. We also 
analysed the first 500 ms of the reward period and again there was a significant effect of Stimulus, F(3, 114) = 3.37, 
p < 0.05. Planned pairwise comparisons (p < 0.05) revealed that there was no difference in firing among S3, S1 
and L1 and the activity to L3 differed from the activity to all other stimuli. In the second 500 ms of the reward 
period, there was no effect significant of Stimulus, F(3, 114) = 0.22, p = 0.85.
Discussion
Summary of Findings. In the present study, we explored how cells in NCL encode value as an integrative 
sum of reward amount and delay to reward. We recorded from 207 NCL cells during a task where birds were 
required to peck a stimulus that predicted either a small or large reward, following either a short or long delay 
period. We examined the firing of these cells during the period that the birds were presented with each stimulus, 
and in the delay period prior to reward.
When cells where filtered on the basis of showing a significant Stimulus effect in the Sample period, 35 of 207 
cells (16.9%) fired in a pattern that closely mirrors the birds’ stimulus preferences (note that a shorter response 
latency to a stimulus indicated that the birds valued the stimulus higher). Specifically, the birds responded fastest 
to the stimulus that predicted a short delay followed by a large reward (S3) over the stimulus that predicted a short 
delay followed by a small reward (S1), and both of these stimuli were preferred over the two stimuli that predicted 
a long delay (L3 and L1) which were no different from each other. The neural data in the Sample period of these 
35 cells mirrored these stimulus preferences. When the period immediately following the stimulus presentation 
was analysed, cells still fired in preference for S3, however the differentiation between S1 and the other stimuli 
disappeared. Given that it cannot be guaranteed that the bird is looking at the stimuli at this time, the first analysis 
used is likely to be a more accurate representation of the cell’s response to the stimulus. Despite evidence for value 
coding in the Sample period, the stimulus preferences of these sample-selective cells were not carried over into 
either the Delay-1 or Delay-2 periods. However, in the first 500 ms of the reward period, these cells fired signifi-
cantly more to S3 than to L1. The difference in firing was not evident in the second 500 ms of the reward period.
When cells were filtered based on activity in the Delay-1 period, 25 of 207 cells (12.0%) showed a significant 
effect of Stimulus. There was no difference in firing to any of the four stimuli in the Sample, Delay-1, or Delay-2 
periods of these 25 cells. In other words, although a particular cell might have shown a preference for one stim-
ulus over another, a different cell would have shown a different pattern of preference, such that when all these 
cells were combined, as in our population plot, no clear stimulus preference emerged. The firing of cells filtered 
based on the Delay-1 period did however show some difference in firing in the first 500 ms of the reward period. 
Cells fired more to S3 than to either L1 or L3, but the difference in firing disappeared in the second 500 ms of the 
reward period.
Finally, when the cells were filtered based on activity in the Delay-2 period, 39 of 207 cells (18.8%) displayed a 
significant effect of Stimulus. Interestingly, these 39 cells that were selected on the basis of their firing during the 
Delay-2 period did display some evidence of value coding in the Sample period in that the cells fired significantly 
more to S3 than to all stimuli except L1. Similar to the situation for the Delay-1 period, there was no difference 
in firing to any of the four stimuli in the Delay-1 or Delay-2 periods. However, we found that differentiation did 
occur to some extent in the last 500 ms of the Delay-2 period in that the neural responses to S1 and S3 were no 
different to each other, S1 differed from both L1 and L3, but S3 only differed from L3 and the difference between 
S3 and L1 neared significance. In other words, cell firing in the last half of the delay-2 period began to differentiate 
between short and long delay. While there was no evidence of actual value coding from the Delay-2 period cells, 
the change in firing pattern seems to reflect anticipation of reward.
Figure 8. Population plot: Delay-2 filtering. Normalised firing rate for cells that show a significant effect of 
Stimulus across the four trial types during the Delay-2 period. The ITI represents the entire 5 s ITI period, 
Sample represents a 300 ms period, and Delay-1 and Delay-2 represent the first and second second of the 2 s (for 
S1 and S3) or 8 s (for L1 and L3) delay period. Reward-1 is the first second of reward presentation. In S1 and S3, 
therefore, Reward-1 occurs after the 2 s delay period, whereas in L1 and L3 Reward-1 occurs after the 8 s delay 
period.
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There was also very little evidence for value coding in the reward period. The only evidence for value coding 
was in the first 500 ms of the reward period expressed generally as an increased firing to S3, but the effect was 
weak. By the second 500 ms of the reward period there was no evidence of any value coding.
Comparison to Other Studies. Previous studies showed that NCL appears to encode reward amount9 
as well as subjective reward value of a stimulus by integrating reward amount and delay-to-reward in choice 
paradigms10. In both of these studies, the NCL activity showed modulation during the delay period prior to the 
delivery of the reward. The findings of the current study support the role of NCL in detecting value of conditioned 
stimuli and rate coding the “best” option (short delay-large reward) during the Sample period when the bird 
is shown the stimulus. Our study also finds that the modulation of NCL activity based on reward amount and 
delay-to-reward is not exclusive to choice paradigms. Instead, NCL cells react in response to a single stimulus that 
indicates a reward and its temporal cost, so any change in activity cannot be explained by factors that could be 
at play in choice paradigm, such as an integrated value assessment based on being presented with two different 
options.
Previously, NCL activity has been found to be modulated by reward delivery9,16. At the most, the firing pat-
terns observed in the current study in the reward period reflected to some extent the “best” reward outcome when 
cells were filtered by activity in the Sample and the Delay-1 periods. The fact that activity reflected the best option 
is consistent with findings of neural activity of mammalian OFC. The OFC is thought to play an important role in 
updating information about expected rewards4,15. Our finding that activity of NCL cells during reward delivery 
was modulated to some extent by the value of a reward suggests that NCL may play a role similar to the OFC in 
updating expected reward outcomes to optimise future behaviours.
Our findings also have implications for a recent study by Kasties et al.11, whose design was on the surface 
similar to that of the current study, yet failed to find any evidence for value coding in NCL. They found that 
while NCL cells responded differently to four different stimuli, there was no evidence of modulation in NCL 
activity in response to reward amount, delay length, nor an interaction of reward and delay length. The absence 
of value coding in NCL neural activity occurred despite the fact that, based on latencies, their subjects showed 
clear preferences for the stimuli that were similar to that of our own birds. In contrast, we did find modulation 
in NCL activity in response to stimuli that predicted different reward amounts. What may have accounted for 
the differences between the two studies? We incorporated a number of small changes that we believe assisted the 
pigeons to differentiate between the different stimuli and the reward outcomes they predicted. First, in contrast 
to Kasties et al.11 who delivered reward on only 50% of trials, we delivered reward on 100% of trials. Furthermore, 
in contrast to Kasties et al.11 who manipulated reward amount by increasing the duration for which access to 
food was available, we manipulated reward amount by increasing the number of reward presentation periods. We 
believe that by increasing the reward delivery periods, and by delivering reward on 100% of the trials, the birds 
were better able to determine the “best” option. As a result, we saw that in both the behavioural data, and in the 
neural data during the Sample period, NCL cells clearly reflected the most valuable outcome, followed by the next 
most valuable outcome.
Our finding of no value coding in the delay seems to stand in contrast to that of Koenen et al.9, who reported 
reward modulation during the delay period. Closer inspection of our data, however, revealed the emergence of 
reward modulation in the last half of the Delay-2 period. The fact that Koenen et al.9 reported more evidence of 
reward modulation in the delay period may be due to the fact that they employed a 3 s delay whereas we only ana-
lyzed a 2 s delay period. More to the point, it is more likely that the activity we began to witness towards the end 
of the Delay-2 period, and that observed by Koenen et al.9 is better classified as activity related to the anticipation 
of reward than value coding. The reason in the case of the current study is that the increase in neural activity was 
observed on short delay trials irrespective of whether there were one (S1) or three (S3) rewards imminent. Thus, 
the neural activity in the last half of the Delay-2 period was more likely coding an upcoming reward rather than 
the value of the recently-seen stimulus. The same outcome was reported by Koenen et al.9 in the no-choice con-
dition, where reward modulation was observed in that the cells displayed much less firing to 0 upcoming rewards 
than to 1 or 3 upcoming reward, the latter two being neurally indistinguishable. It thus appears that reward 
modulation in the delay is more a representation of whether a reward is imminent, than a code for the value of 
the recently seen stimulus.
Implications for Value Coding in NCL. The literature supporting NCL as a functional analogue to the 
mammalian PFC, at least with respect to value coding, is relatively small. Based on the mammalian literature 
the PFC, and in particular the OFC, is involved in encoding value. Studies of the mammalian OFC find that 
firing is modulated by reward magnitude and in anticipation of reward delivery2–4. Furthermore, OFC activity 
is modulated in response to changes in reward value achieved by manipulating the delay to reward only at the 
presentation of a stimulus, during the delay period and when reward is delivered5,6. To date, the research in the 
avian brain has confirmed that NCL is implicated in encoding reward amount and in encoding delay to reward9,10. 
The present study adds to the current knowledge in that NCL appears to show properties similar to the OFC with 
respect to encoding value based on both delay to reward and reward amount. We can now add value coding relat-
ing to temporal discounting to the list of functional similarities with the mammalian PFC.
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neurons in the pigeon nidopallium 
caudolaterale, but not the 
corticoidea dorsolateralis, display 
value and effort discounting 
activity
Madeline Dykes  *, Blake porter  & Michael colombo  *
We recorded from single neurons in two areas of the pigeon brain while birds were required to peck 
a stimulus indicating either a high effort task or a low effort task would follow. Upon completion of 
the task the birds received the same reward. We found that activity in the nidopallium caudolaterale, 
an area equivalent to the mammalian prefrontal cortex, was modulated by the value of the reward 
that would be received based on how much effort was required to obtain it. Value coding was most 
prominent during the presentation of the stimulus indicating a high or low effort task, and in the 
delay period immediately prior to carrying out the effort task. In contrast, activity in the corticoidea 
dorsolateralis was not modulated by value, however, population firing patterns suggest that it may 
be involved in associating actions with outcomes. Our findings support the view that activity in the 
nidopallium caudolaterale reflects value of reward as a function of effort discounting and as such may 
serve functions similar to the mammalian anterior cingulate cortex.
The value of an outcome is not based purely on the amount of reward expected, but also the costs that are required 
to obtain it. A number of studies have addressed the effects of effort cost in decision making paradigms by manip-
ulating the effort required to achieve a reward. For example, rats placed in a T-shaped maze having to decide 
between receiving a large reward associated with a high-effort cost (climbing a barrier; HCHR) or a small reward 
associated with a low-effort cost (no barrier; LCLR) chose the HCHR arm on the majority of trials1. The authors 
also found that when the barrier was increased in size, the preference shifted to favour the LCLR arm, indicating 
a change in the perception of the reward value as effort requirements were manipulated1. Similar changes in 
behaviour have also been shown in primates2. Overall, these data support the theory that the value of an outcome 
is discounted based on the effort cost required to obtain that outcome.
A number of studies in rats and humans indicate the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a region of the pre-
frontal cortex, is critical to processing effort-based information3–5. The ACC is an area connected to a number of 
sites in the brain including the ventral midbrain, amygdala, and motor areas, and is thought to play a vital role 
in learning and updating information to guide decision making6,7. These features may indicate that the ACC is 
involved in decisions regarding the cost of physical effort. Hillman and Bilkey8, and Cowen, Davis, and Nitz9 
recorded from neurons in the ACC of freely moving rats trained to choose between HCHR and LCLR arms in 
a maze, where climbing a barrier represented the effort cost. Hillman and Bilkey8 found that 63% of cells in the 
ACC increased firing prior to moving towards a specific reward outcome, and 94% of these cells fired more before 
moving towards the “best” option – in the first instance, HCHR rather than LCLR arm. When they manipulated 
the amount of reward given and the presence of barriers in both arms, ACC cells dynamically adjusted their firing 
rate to represent the most valuable option8. Cowen et al.9 reported similar patterns of activity, with ACC cells 
firing in relation to the most valuable option. These electrophysiological findings provide a neurological basis for 
effort-based decision making in the ACC of rodents, similar to that seen in humans.
Department of Psychology, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. *email: madelinedykes009@gmail.com; 
colombo@psy.otago.ac.nz
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A more recent study by Porter, Hillman, and Bilkey10 recorded from ACC cells in rats during a task where 
the effort requirements were manipulated but the reward amounts remained constant. The design differed from 
previous studies of effort discounting because it did not require the rats to make a choice between high and low 
effort. The rats ran along a shuttle box that was tilted at different angles, creating different levels of effort required 
to get to the reward. Recordings from the ACC again demonstrated the same dynamic response patterns seen in 
their earlier study in that ACC firing was responsive to the most valuable actions and outcomes accounting for 
different effort states, but this time in a non-choice paradigm. The authors also found that cells fired differentially 
between high effort and low effort trials not only when they were carrying out the action, but also when they were 
receiving the reward10. These data indicate that the ACC may have a broader role in monitoring the effort costs of 
behaviours and their outcomes regardless of decision making demands.
A number of behavioural studies in birds have shown that manipulating effort costs also change the perceived 
value of the associated reward11,12, suggesting that the same neural mechanisms may underlie effort-based deci-
sions in the avian brain. Studies in chicks focussing on the neural basis of effort have found that lesions to the 
arcopallium and the medial striatum decrease both foraging efforts and choices to exert greater effort to retrieve 
food, even when the food amount is large13–16. However, the neural encoding of effort discounting has not yet 
been explored in the pigeon brain. Given that in mammals the frontal areas are crucial to value discounting by 
effort costs, we examined whether the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL), an area in the avian brain that has been 
defined as the equivalent of the mammalian prefrontal cortex (PFC)17,18, and whose neurons have been shown to 
code reward amount and reward value19–22, would serve a similar function in birds.
Pigeons were trained on high-effort (HE) and low-effort (LE) tasks. The HE task required the birds to peck 
a total of eight times across four spatially-distributed positions on the screen, whereas the LE task required four 
pecks to a single central location on the screen. If NCL neurons predicted the most valuable outcome, as they do 
in the mammalian ACC, then we would expect to see more firing towards a stimulus that predicts an upcoming 
LE task than HE task. We balanced the stimuli used for each condition across the birds so that any elevation 
in firing rate was due to the effort manipulation rather than simply visual selectivity. In addition to recording 
from NCL we also recorded from the area corticoidea dorsolateralis (CDL). CDL is a thin area on the outermost 
layer of the brain connecting the caudal pallium and the hippocampus23. Atoji and Wild23 (see also Csillag & 
Montagnese24) have compared the CDL to the cingulate cortex of the mammalian brain. For example, CDL has 
connections to the hippocampal complex, basal ganglia, and amygdala, as does the cingulate cortex in mammals. 
Unlike the mammalian cingulate cortex, however, CDL does not connect to higher order motor areas and to the 
brainstem, and CDL has connections to olfactory areas that do not exist in the cingulate cortex23. To our knowl-
edge, electrophysiological recordings have not been carried out in CDL. The effort task used in the current exper-
iment provided an opportunity to explore any functional similarities between CDL and the mammalian cingulate 
cortex in encoding the value of effortful behaviours.
Methods
Subjects. The subjects were six experimentally naïve adult homing pigeons (Columba livia). The birds had 
free access to grit and water and were maintained at 80–85% of their free feeding body weight and fed a mixture 
of wheat, corn, peas, pellets, and grains. They were housed in individual wire mesh cages with a 12 h to 12 h light–
dark cycle beginning at 07:00 h. The subjects were kept and treated in accordance with the University of Otago 
Code of Ethical Conduct for the Manipulation of Animals and the University of Otago Animal Ethics Committee 
approved the experiment.
Apparatus. The apparatus and the methods used were similar to that used by Dykes et al.25. The pigeons were 
trained and tested in standard operant chambers measuring 35 cm (length) x 43 cm (width) x 39 cm (height). 
At the front of the chamber was a 17-inch monitor. In front of each monitor sat a Carroll Touch infrared touch 
frame (EloTouch, baud rate 9600, transmission time 20 ms). In front of the touch frame sat a plexiglass panel with 
six square holes arranged in a 2-row by 3-column format. The size of each square hole was 6 cm × 6 cm and the 
center-to-center distance of each hole was 6.5 cm. Situated 20 cm below the center key was a hopper that could 
be illuminated and delivered the wheat reward. The stimuli used were four black and white pictures; a picture 
of a cactus flower, a picture of Arnold Schwarzenegger, a picture of a person on a skateboard, and a picture of a 
black crow. Each bird was assigned one of the pictures to represent high effort (HE) trials and a different picture 
to represent low effort (LE) trials. The stimuli used to predict HE and LE trials were balanced across the birds. 
The stimuli were 6 cm × 6 cm in size and appeared centered in the square hole. Every peck to the touch screen was 
accompanied by a 100 ms, 1000-Hz tone.
Behavioural task. At the end of a 5 sec intertrial interval (ITI), one stimulus appeared in the top center 
square hole (see Fig. 1). Three pecks to the stimulus turned it off and initiated a 2 sec Pre-Effort delay period, 
followed by either a high-effort (HE) or low-effort (LE) Effort period. On HE trials four dots appeared, one in 
each of the top-left, top-right, bottom-left, and bottom-right holes, and the pigeon was required to peck each dot 
twice. The pigeon was allowed to peck the dots in any order, and each dot disappeared after it had been pecked 
twice. On LE trials, a dot appeared in the top center hole and the pigeon was required to peck it four times. If the 
pigeon pecked at a dot location after the dot had disappeared, the peck tone sounded, but the trial sequence was 
not otherwise interrupted. After all dots had been pecked in the Effort period there followed a 2 sec Post-Effort 
period, followed by a Reward period during which the pigeon was given 2 sec access to wheat, irrespective of 
whether the effort condition was HE or LE. Each session consisted of 64 trials with 32 trials dedicated to each of 
the stimuli, randomly intermixed.
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Surgery. After behavioural training the birds were implanted with a lightweight microdrive to allow 
single-unit recording. They were anesthetized with a mixture of ketamine (25 mg/kg) and xylazine (5 mg/kg). 
After pruning the feathers on the scalp and overlaying the ears, the head was immobilized using a Revzin stere-
otaxic adapter26. The scalp was first sprayed with a topical anesthetic (10% xylocaine) and the skin overlying the 
skull was cut and retracted to expose the skull. For the four NCL birds, a hole was drilled above the NCL at AP 
+5.5, and ML ±7.527. The tips of the electrodes of the microdrive were lowered to position them above the NCL. 
For CDL birds, the microdrive was built so that the electrodes were angled at 27° and the electrodes lowered into 
the brain so the tips were at AP +6.0 and ML ±4.0. Six stainless steel screws were placed into the skull (one serv-
ing as an electrical ground screw). The microdrive was attached to the skull with dental acrylic. The incision was 
sutured and sprayed with xylocaine. The bird recovered in a padded and heated cage until fully alert and mobile 
before returned to its home cage. There it was allowed to recover for at least seven days before the recording ses-
sions started.
Neural recording. Eight 25 µm formvar-coated nichrome wires mounted in the microdrive were used for 
recording the extracellular activity of single neurons in the NCL. For each session one electrode was used to 
record the neural activity and a second electrode with minimal activity served as the indifferent. The signal was 
passed through a FET headstage, then a Grass P511K preamplifier (Grass Instruments, Quincy, Massachusetts, 
United States) where it was amplified and filtered to remove 50 Hz noise. An oscilloscope and speaker were 
used to monitor the signals. A CED micro1401 system (Cambridge Electronic Design Limited, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom) collected the electrophysiological data, and CED Spike2 software was used for behavioural 
time-tagging of all events and analysis of the spike data. Good isolation of a cell and a signal-to-noise ratio of at 
least 2:1 were the criteria for cell selections.
After cell isolation the behavioural program was started. A recording session lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
At the end of the session, the electrodes were advanced approximately 40 µm. The birds were tested once a day.
Data analysis. Data analysis was similar to that used in Dykes et al.25 The 300 ms sample period (Sample), the 
2 sec Pre-Effort period (Pre-Effort), the 300 ms effort period (Effort), the 2 sec Post-Effort period (Post-Effort) and 
the 2 sec reward period (Reward) were all subject to analysis. With respect to the Sample period, unlike studies 
with primates where one can monitor the exact position of the eyes, it is difficult in pigeons to monitor when they 
are looking at the visual stimulus. Colombo, Frost, and Steedman28 adopted a convention that neural activity to a 
visual stimulus was measured during a period from −400 ms to −100 ms prior to the first peck to that stimulus. 
The reason the period ends 100 ms prior to contact with the keys is because pigeons close their eyes approximately 
80 ms prior to a key peck28. In the ITI, the Pre-Effort, and the Post-Effort periods, the first 500 ms of each period 
was excluded from analysis in order to avoid including residual activity driven by the period that took place 
immediately before (Reward, Sample, and Effort periods, respectively). With respect to the Effort period analysis, 
the LE and HE periods differed in both latency to complete the effort requirement and in the number of pecks 
required. Therefore, the 300 ms period prior to making the first effort peck was analysed rather than then entire 
Effort period.
All cells that fired at less than 0.1 spikes/sec in the ITI were excluded from further analysis. Each cell’s Sample, 
Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period data was subjected to a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA 
with period (2: ITI and defined period) and stimulus (2: HE and LE) as factors. The dependent variable was the 
firing rate on each trial of a cell during the ITI and defined period. An effect of Stimulus indicated that the cell 
responded differently on HE and LE trials. A Period effect indicated that a cell either increased or decreased its 
firing rate in the defined period compared to the ITI. The cell’s data was entered into a population plot on the basis 
of whether the main effect of Stimulus (HE vs LE) was significant, thereby illustrating the firing pattern of cells 
that differentiate between HE and LE trials in a given period.
Those cells that did show an effect of stimulus were defined as “Effort Selective”. In other words, they fired 
differentially to LE and HE trials. We then also examined whether the Effort Selective cells, as a group, showed 
a LE Value Preference. In order to establish whether they showed a LE Value Preference, the data in the Sample, 
Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period of the sub-population of all Effort Selective cells for the defined 
period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms, 
Figure 1. Behavioural procedure. At the end of the ITI, either a high-effort (HE) or low-effort (LE) sample 
stimulus was presented in the centre top hole. Three pecks to the stimulus turned it off and initiated a 2 sec Pre-
Effort period. On HE trials, four dots appeared, one in each corner of the screen. The bird was required to peck 
each dot twice before being rewarded. On LE trials, the bird was simply required to peck one dot in the middle 
of the screen four times. Following the Effort period was a 2 sec Post-Effort period, followed by 2 sec of access to 
reward.
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6: bins 1–6 for the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1–40 
for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). If the 
sub-population of Effort Selective cells fired significantly more during LE trials compared to HE in the defined 
period, they were characterized as having a LE Value Preference.
Results
Histology. For NCL and CDL birds all electrode tracks were within the targeted region as defined by Karten 
and Hodos26, and the histology results are shown in Fig. 2. The intended track positions for NCL electrodes were 
AP +5.5 and ML ±7.5. The track position for the right hemisphere NCL bird Eli was AP +6.75 and ML +8.9, 
differing from the intended AP position by 1.25 mm and the intended ML position by 1.4 mm. The track position 
for the right hemisphere NCL bird Eva was AP +6.25 and ML +8, differing from the intended AP position by 
0.75 mm and the intended ML position by 0.5 mm. The track position for the left hemisphere NCL bird Leo was 
AP +6 and ML −9, differing from the intended AP position by 0.5 mm and the intended ML position by 1.5 mm. 
We were unable to identify the electrode tracks in the remaining left hemisphere bird, Mac, although the entry 
point was located at AP +5.3, differing from the intended AP position by only 0.2 mm. The intended entry point 
for CDL electrodes were AP +6 and ML ±4. The entry point for the right hemisphere CDL bird D2 was AP +6.75 
and ML +4, differing from the intended AP position by 0.75 mm. The entry point for the left hemisphere CDL 
bird M9 was AP +6.5 and ML −3.5, differing from the intended AP position and ML position by 0.5 mm.
Behavioural data. For each session, the median latency to the first peck of the sample stimulus (indicating 
either high or low effort) was calculated across the 32 trials dedicated to each stimuli. The latency to the first peck 
averaged across all sessions from which cells were recorded is displayed in Fig. 3. The latencies for each bird were 
Figure 2. Electrode track reconstruction. Electrode track position reconstructions for the two right NCL birds 
(Eli and Eva), the right CDL bird (D2), one left NCL bird (Leo), and one left CDL bird (M9). All recordings were 
within the full dorsal-ventral extent of NCL and CDL. We were unable to recover the electrode tracks of the 
second left NCL bird (Mac), but the termination point indicated by the depth records is represented by the star. 
The following are the brain regions as defined by Reiner et al.34 A, arcopallium; DA, tractus dorso-arcopallialis; 
CDL, area corticoidea dorsolateralis; Hp, hippocampus; N, nidopallium; Rt, nucleus rotundus; TeO, tectum 
opticum; TrO, tractus opticus; V, ventricle.
Figure 3. Behavioural performance. Mean latency to the first peck for the LE and HE stimuli for each of the 
four NCL birds (Mac, Eli, Leo, and Eva) and two CDL birds (D2 and M9), averaged across sessions during 
which neurons were recorded. Note that the shorter latencies indicate higher value to the pigeon. Error bars 
represent ± 1 SEM.
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subjected to a Wilcoxon’s signed rank test and in all cases, the latency to the stimulus indicating a HE trial was 
significantly longer than the latency to the LE stimulus (Mac: t(39) = 15.40, p < 0.001; Leo: t(43) = 8.92, p < 0.001; 
Eva t(31) = 9.98, p < 0.001; Eli t(44) = 9.85, p < 0.001; D2: t(29) = 11.01, p < 0.001; M9: t(20) = 7.64, p < 0.001).
Period selective and effort selective cells. We recorded from a total of 245 NCL cells. Four cells were 
removed on the basis that their average firing rate across the entire ITI period was less than 0.1 spikes per second, 
leaving 241 cells that were used for the NCL analysis. We recorded from a total of 57 cells in CDL. Two cells were 
removed because the firing rate in the ITI was less than 0.1 spikes per second, leaving 55 cells that were used for 
the CDL analysis. A repeated-measures two-way ANOVA with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Period (2: the defined 
period and ITI) as factors was carried out on each of the NCL and CDL cells, separately. The results are shown in 
Table 1.
Effort selective cells in the Sample period. NCL cells. The population plot of the 31 Effort Selective 
NCL cells, irrespective of whether they fired more in HE or LE trials, is shown in Fig. 4. Twenty one of the 
cells fired more to the LE stimulus, while the remaining 10 cells fired more in response to the HE stimulus. A 
Chi-squared test revealed that the number firing more to LE than HE was greater than expected by chance, X2 (1, 
n = 31) = 3.90, p < 0.05. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject 
to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms, 6: bins 1–6 for 
the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1–40 for the Reward 
period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a significant 
effect of Stimulus during the Sample period, F(1, 30) = 4.49, p < 0.05, and in the Pre-Effort period, F(1, 30) = 6.46, 
p < 0.05, with cells firing more during LE trials than HE trials, and therefore the Effort Selective cells, as a pop-
ulation, showed a LE Value Preference. There was no effect of Stimulus, in the Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward 
period, all Fs(1, 30) < 0.8, all ps > 0.38. An example of an Effort Selective NCL cell in the Sample period is shown 
in Fig. 5a. In CDL, only three cells were Effort Selective and so given the small number, no further analysis was 
conducted.
Effort selective cells in the Pre-Effort period. NCL cells. The activity of the 34 Effort Selective cells in 
the Pre-Effort period, after adjusting to control for peck related activity, irrespective of whether they fired more 
during HE or LE trials, is displayed in Fig. 6a. Twenty-seven of the 34 Effort Selective NCL cells fired more during 
Trial Period
NCL NCL CDL CDL
Period Selective Effort Selective Period selective Effort Selective
Stimulus 67 (28%) 31 (13%) 16 (29%) 3 (6%)
Pre-Effort
(peck adjusted) 100 (42%) 34 (14%) 23 (42%) 8 (140.5%)
Effort 135 (59%) 23 (10%) 52 (95%) 2 (4%)
Post-Effort 185 (77%) 26 (11%) 47 (86%) 8 (15%)
Reward 174 (72%) 25 (10%) 40 (73%) 10 (18%)
Table 1. Period Selective and Effort Selective cells in each trial period.
Figure 4. Population plot: Effort Selective NCL cells in the Sample period. Normalised firing rate for Effort 
Selective cells during the Sample period. The ITI represents the last 4500 ms of the 5000 ms intertrial interval. 
The Sample period (S) represents the 300 ms period prior to the first peck to the stimulus. The Pre-Effort period 
(PRE-EFF) represents the 1500 ms before the effort stimuli appear, and the Effort period (EFF) represents the 
300 ms prior to the first effort peck. The Post-Effort period (POST-EFF) is the 1500 ms prior to reward delivery, 
and Reward represents the 2000 ms reward delivery period. ITI: intertrial interval; S: Stimulus period; PRE-
EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: Effort period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period.
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LE trials, while seven fired more during HE trials. A Chi-squared test revealed that there were more cells that 
fired to LE than would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n = 34) = 11.77, p < 0.001. An example of an Effort Selective 
NCL cell in the Pre period is shown in Fig. 5b. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward 
period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms 
6: bins 1–6 for the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1–40 
for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was 
a significant effect of Stimulus in the Sample period, F(1,33) = 4.80, p < 0.05, and the Pre-Effort period, F(1, 
33) = 16.71, p < 0.001, with cells firing significantly more during LE trials than HE trials, and therefore the Effort 
Selective cells, as a population, showed a LE Value Preference. In the Effort period, there was a slight difference 
between firing in HE and LE trials, with more firing during LE trials, however the difference fell short of signif-
icance, F(1, 33) = 3.71, p = 0.06. There was no significant difference firing between HE and LE trials during the 
Post-Effort, and Reward periods, all Fs(1, 33) < 2.16, all ps > 0.15.
CDL cells. The population plot of the eight Effort Selective CDL cells, after controlling for the possible effect 
of pecks, is shown in Fig. 6b. Of the eight cells, five fired more during HE trials, while the remaining three fired 
more during LE trials. A Chi-squared comparison revealed that no more cells fired to LE compared to HE than 
would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n = 8) = 0.5, p = 0.48. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, 
and Reward period was subject to a two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms 6: 
bins 1–6 for the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1–40 for 
the Reward period) as factors, with repeated-measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was no 
significant effect of Stimulus in any period, all Fs(1, 6) < 2.33, all ps > 0.17.
Figure 5. Examples of NCL single-unit activity. Panel (a,b) show two different cells, each from different birds. 
Each panel displays the raster (top) and histogram (bottom) activity of the cell over a 64 trial session. (a) An 
NCL cell that displays a noticeable increase in firing to the presentation of the LE stimulus compared to the 
HE stimulus. The cell also fires in an inhibitory manner during the Pre-Effort period of HE trials. (b) An NCL 
cell that displays an increased firing rate during the Pre-Effort period of LE trials, but not during HE trials. ITI: 
intertrial interval; Stim: Stimulus period; Pre: Pre-Effort period; Eff: Effort period; Post: Post-Effort period.
7Scientific RepoRtS |         (2019) 9:15677  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-52216-3
www.nature.com/scientificreportswww.nature.com/scientificreports/
Effort selective cells in the Effort period. NCL cells. The population response of the 23 Effort Selective 
NCL cells, irrespective of whether firing was higher during LE and HE trials, is shown in Fig. 7. Ten cells fired 
more during LE trials, while the remaining 13 fired more in HE trials. A Chi-squared test revealed that there were 
no more cells firing more to HE to LE than would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n = 23) = 0.39, p = 0.53. The data 
in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way 
ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms 6: bins 1–6 for the Sample and Effort periods; 30: 
bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1–40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated 
measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward 
periods, there was no effect of Stimulus, all Fs(1, 22) < 3.53, all ps > 0.07. In CDL, only two cells were Effort 
Selective and so given the small number, no further analysis was conducted.
Figure 6. Population plot: Effort Selective Cells in the Pre-Effort period. (a) Normalised firing rate for Effort 
Selective NCL cells during the Pre-Effort period, correcting for peck related activity. (b) Normalised firing rate 
for the Effort Selective CDL cells during the Pre-Effort period, correcting for peck related activity. For details on 
the timing of the periods, see Fig. 4. ITI: intertrial interval; S: Stimulus period; PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: 
Effort period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period.
Figure 7. Population plot: Effort Selective NCL Cells in the Effort period. Normalised firing rate for Effort 
Selective NCL cells during the Effort period. For details on the timing of the periods, see Fig. 4. ITI: intertrial 
interval; S: Stimulus period; PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: Effort period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period.
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Effort selective cells in the Post-Effort period. NCL cells. The population response of all 26 Effort 
Selective NCL cells, regardless of whether they fired more during LE or HE trials is shown in Fig. 8a. Twelve fired 
more during LE trials, while the remaining 14 fired more in HE trials. A Chi-squared test revealed that there were 
no more cells firing more to HE compared to LE than would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n = 26) = 0.15, p = 0.70. 
The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a repeated-measures 
two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms 6: bins 1–6 for the Sample and Effort peri-
ods; 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1–40 for the Reward period) as factors, with 
repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). In the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and 
Reward periods, there was no effect of Stimulus, Fs(1, 25) < 1.71, all ps > 0.29.
CDL cells. The population plot of all eight Effort Selective CDL cells, irrespective of whether they fired more dur-
ing HE or LE trials is shown in Fig. 8b. Of the eight Effort Selective cells, seven fired more during the Post-Effort 
period in LE trials, while the remaining cell fired more during the Post-Effort period in HE trials. An example 
CDL cell that shows a difference in firing between HE and LE trials in the Post-Effort period is shown in Fig. 9. A 
Chi-squared comparison revealed that more cells fired at higher rates during LE trials compared to HE trials than 
would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n = 8) = 4.5, p < 0.05. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, 
and Reward period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin 
(all bins 50 ms 6: bins 1–6 for the Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 
40: bins 1–40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rected). There was no significant effect of Stimulus in any period, all Fs(1, 7) < 1.67, all ps > 0.24.
Effort Selective cells in the Reward period. NCL cells. The population response of all 25 Effort 
Selective NCL cells, irrespective of whether they fired more during HE or LE trials, is shown in Fig. 10a. Fourteen 
fired more during HE trials and 11 fired more during LE trials, and a Chi-squared test revealed that this was 
no more than would be expected by chance, X2 (1, n = 25) = 0.36, p = 0.55. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, 
Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: 
HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms 6: bins 1–6 for the Sample and Effort period, 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort 
and Post-Effort periods, or 40: bins 1–40 for the Reward period) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was a significant effect of Stimulus in the Pre-Effort period, with cells 
firing more during LE than HE trials, F(1, 24) = 7.69, p < 0.05. In the Sample period, there was a slight difference 
between firing in HE and LE trial, with more firing during HE stimuli, however the difference fell short of signif-
icance, F(1, 24) = 4.11, p = 0.05. There was no significant effect of Stimulus in the Effort, Post-Effort, or Reward 
periods, all Fs(1, 24) < 4.11, all ps > 0.05.
Figure 8. Population plot: Effort Selective Cells in the Post-Effort period. (a) Normalised firing rate for Effort 
Selective NCL cells during the Post-Effort period. (b) Normalised firing rate for Effort Selective CDL cells 
during the Post-Effort period. For details on the timing of the periods, see Fig. 4. ITI: intertrial interval; S: 
Stimulus period; PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: Effort period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period.
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CDL cells. The population plot of all 10 Effort Selective cells, irrespective of whether they fired more during HE 
or LE trials, is shown in Fig. 10b. Of the 10 cells, eight fired more during the Reward period of HE trials, while 
the remaining two fired more during the Reward period in LE trials. A Chi-squared comparison revealed that 
the number of cells with higher firing rates during HE trials compared to LE just fell short of significance, X2 (1, 
Figure 9. Examples of CDL single-unit activity. Each panel displays the raster (top) and histogram (bottom) 
activity of the cell over a 64-trial session. The cell displays a significant increase in firing during the Post-Effort 
period of LE trials compared to HE trials. ITI: intertrial interval; Stim: Stimulus period; Pre: Pre-Effort period; 
Eff: Effort period; Post: Post-Effort period.
Figure 10. Population plot: Effort Selective Cells in the Reward period. (a) Normalised firing rate for Effort 
Selective NCL cells during the Reward period. (b) Normalised firing rate Effort Selective CDL cells during the 
Reward period. For details on the timing of the periods, see Fig. 4. ITI: intertrial interval; S: Stimulus period; 
PRE-EFF: Pre-Effort period; EFF: Effort period; POST-EFF: Post-Effort period.
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n = 10) = 3.6, p = 0.06. The data in the Sample, Pre-Effort, Effort, Post-Effort, and Reward period was subject to 
a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA, with Stimulus (2: HE or LE) and Bin (all bins 50 ms 6: bins 1–6 for the 
Sample and Effort periods; 30: bins 1–30 for Pre-Effort and Post-Effort periods; 40: bins 1–40 for the Reward 
period) as factors, with repeated measures over Bins (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). There was no significant 
effect of Stimulus in any period, all Fs(1, 9) < 1.52, all ps > 0.25.
Discussion
Summary of findings. In the present study, we explored how NCL and CDL cells encode the value of a 
reward when it is discounted by effort costs. We recorded from 245 cells in NCL and 57 in CDL during a task 
where birds were required to peck a stimulus predicting a subsequent high effort task (peck a total of eight times 
across four spatially-distributed positions on the screen) or a subsequent low effort task (make four pecks to a sin-
gle central location on the screen). The latency-to-peck data strongly supports the fact that the birds preferred the 
low effort trials over the high effort trials. We examined whether NCL and CDL cells exhibited Effort Selectivity, 
and, if so, whether or not they were Value Selective (fired preferentially to the Low Effort trials) in the period that 
the birds were presented with each stimulus that would predict the upcoming effort condition, the periods before 
and after exerting the effort, and the reward period.
Mirroring the behavioural preferences of the birds for the stimuli that predicted the LE trials, cells in NCL that 
were Effort Selective in both the Stimulus and the Pre-Effort periods fired significantly more during LE trials than 
HE trials, even when controlling for pecking. The stimuli indicating the trial types were balanced across birds, 
and we saw higher firing rates to the LE stimulus across all birds, therefore it is unlikely that the difference in fir-
ing rates was simply due to stimulus selectivity. In contrast to the Sample and Pre-Effort periods, Effort Selective 
cells showed no neural preference for LE trials over HE trials during the Effort, Post-Effort, or Reward periods. In 
contrast to NCL, while a number of CDL cells were Effort Selective, the population of Effort Selective CDL cells 
showed no increase in firing towards LE trials compared to HE trials during any period of the task, indicating no 
LE Value Preference in CDL cells.
Implications for NCL function. Given that for both HE and LE trials the reward amount was the same but 
the physical effort different, the pattern of firing we saw in NCL is consistent with the notion that NCL is impor-
tant for representing the effort-discounted value of a stimulus. Naturally, the LE and HE trials differ along a few 
other dimensions in addition to effort, and it is important to consider whether these factors could also be driving 
the observed neural differences. Given that NCL activity is modulated by the animals’ pecking20, a main factor to 
consider is whether higher peck rates to the LE stimulus that continued into the Pre-Effort period could account 
for the higher neural activity during the Sample and Pre-Effort periods. However, we do not believe this is likely 
for two reasons. First, in the Pre-Effort period, we statistically controlled for any peck-related neural activity, and 
even when doing so significant differences in neural activity emerged during the LE and HE trials. Second, the 
differences in neural activity were also present during the Sample period where, because the period of analysis 
was from −400 ms to −100 ms prior to the first peck, pecks had no bearing. Thus, the observed differences in 
NCL activity between HE and LE trials was likely driven by effort discounting of reward value and not an artefact 
of peck frequency.
The HE and LE trials also differ in terms of the spatial arrangements of the stimuli in that following the LE 
stimulus, the animal needs only to peck to one spatial position in the Effort period, whereas following the HE 
stimulus the animal needs to peck at four different spatial positions in the Effort period. Thus either the spatial 
positions themselves, or the movement differences that the two different spatial arrays would engender, might 
also account for the observed neural differences. Again, the same logic that we applied to our peck data would 
apply to an explanation based on differences in spatial arrays or movement. Although both differences in spatial 
arrays or movements could account for the differences in neural activity between LE and HE trials during the 
Pre-Effort period, neither could account for the differences in neural activity during the Sample period where 
the stimuli that predicted the LE and HE trials were presented in the same central position. Overall, we believe it 
was the impending difference in effort requirements that was driving the neural differences observed during the 
Sample and Pre-Effort periods.
A final point to consider is whether the longer latency to peck the HE stimulus compared to the LE stimulus 
could explain the difference in firing during the Sample period. The longer latency to peck the HE stimulus is 
a useful indicator of preference, or lack thereof, and our method of analysing the time period from −400 ms to 
−100 ms prior to the first peck is important because it is the only time we know the bird is looking at the stimulus. 
One possibility is that the longer latency to peck the HE stimulus could have resulted in neural habituation of the 
response to that stimulus. However, although neural habituation might explain the difference observed between 
LE and HE during the Sample period, it does not explain why we still see the difference during the Pre-Effort 
period. We are therefore confident that the nerual differences are meaningful and driven by the effort differences 
associated with the stimuli.
The apparent coding of value in NCL as a function of effort cost is similar to that seen in the ACC of mammals. 
In effort studies with rats, ACC cells fire to the “best” outcome when effort based options are manipulated8,10,29. 
While our task did not require dynamic changes in value appraisal, the current design allows us to see the encod-
ing of a stimulus that, through conditioning, has been associated as the ‘better value’ option. Indeed, our findings 
in NCL are similar to Porter et al.10 who showed rodent ACC neural populations respond to behaviours with the 
highest value, even in effort tasks where no decision between behaviours needs to be made.
The literature supporting NCL as the functional analogue of the mammalian PFC is small, but growing. In 
respect to value coding, studies have found NCL to modulate firing in the same manner as the mammalian PFC 
in the anticipation of reward and reward delivery, as well as in response to the value of temporally discounted 
rewards19,21,25. To date, no one has explored whether value as a function of effort discounting is also encoded 
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in NCL. The present study adds to the current knowledge in that it shows that NCL has properties similar to 
the mammalian ACC with respect to encoding the more valuable of two options when differing effort costs are 
required. Our findings are somewhat in contrast to where these functions are located in the mammalian frontal 
regions; unlike in the mammalian PFC, the same area of the avian NCL that encodes effort discounting, also 
encodes delay discounting25. In the mammalian brain, delay discounting and effort discounting are thought to be 
coded in separate areas, with delay discounting being attributed to the orbitofrontal cortex, and effort discounting 
to the ACC8,10,29–31. One possibility is that the smaller avian brain has evolved to carry out more generalised value 
computations in a single region, NCL. Another possibility is that we have yet to fully explore the possibility that 
NCL consists of sub-regions each serving the different aspects of processing reward-based information.
Implications for CDL function. A handful of CDL cells were Effort Selective in that they fired during 
either LE or HE trials. However, unlike in NCL, as a population, cells in CDL showed no modulation in firing 
that reflected a preference for the LE or HE trials. Of course, we exercise some caution in this conclusion as we 
recorded from a smaller number of CDL cells than NCL cells. Although overall CDL cells seemed to exhibit no 
neural activity indicative of a preference for either the LE or HE trials, an interesting observation was noted in 
the number of inhibitory and excitatory cells in each period of the task. For example, 95% of CDL cells fired in an 
inhibitory manner during the 300 ms prior to the first effort peck, and 60% fired in an inhibitory manner during 
the Reward period. In contrast, during the Post-Effort period, 86% of cells fired in an excitatory manner. So while 
not firing differentially between HE and LE trials, a large proportion of CDL cells appeared to be inhibited during 
the Effort period, and then seem to ‘rebound’, firing in an excitatory manner during the Post-Effort period, before 
being again inhibited during the Reward period. Although neurons in CDL may not play a role in value coding, 
CDL cells could be involved in response-outcome coding, playing an important role in associating the effortful 
action of pecking to the beneficial reward outcome. If this is the case, CDL could still play an important role in 
learning and associating actions with outcomes.
It is interesting that despite the fact that CDL has some connectivity patterns similar to the ACC23, cells in 
CDL do not appear to directly modulate their firing rate in response to effort discounting in the same way that 
ACC does8,9,29. The current literature on the function of CDL is limited, and to our knowledge no other study has 
conducted electrophysiology recordings from CDL. CDL is part of the limbic/olfactory sub-module that makes 
up the cortico-hippocampal network of the avian brain32. The majority of studies that make mention of CDL are 
lesion studies, where CDL is used as a control area, and in most of these cases the lesion is imprecise and affects 
surrounding areas. As such, it is difficult to draw on any previous literature to speculate on why CDL exhibits the 
pattern of inhibitory and excitatory changes observed in the current study. We found that CDL does not seem 
to directly code value, but does seem to fire in a pattern that may be useful in associating action and reward. 
We therefore posit that CDL may be involved more in the updating of the mental model of an action-outcome 
sequence33 rather than representing the value of each outcome in the way that NCL does.
Conclusions. We found the cells in the pigeon NCL encode value as a function of effort discounting. Our 
findings are consistent with a growing body of literature suggesting the NCL is an important area of the pigeon 
brain for encoding value19–21,25. Unlike the mammalian brain, the avian brain does not seem to process delay 
discounted value and effort discounted value in separate areas, but rather NCL acts as one more generalized value 
coding region. Despite some analogies between ACC and CDL in terms of connections patterns, while a handful 
of CDL cells were Effort Selective, we found no evidence that CDL cells encoded value. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible that CDL plays a role in associating responses and outcomes.
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